Sharia the American way by Bristol, Jeffrey Paul
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2020

























JEFFREY PAUL BRISTOL 
 
AA, Defense Language Institute, 2002 
BA, Marlboro College, 2009 
MA, University of Chicago, 2012 





Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 









Associate Professor of Anthropology
Second Reader____________________________
Charles Lindholm, PhD
Professor Emeritus of Anthropology
Third Reader______________________________
Adam Kuper, PhD
Visiting Professor of Anthropology
London School of Economics
Fourth Reader_____________________________
Charles Glenn, PhD
Professor Emeritus of Education
iv
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank principally my wife whose support was unerring whether it be in
Mauritania, Boston, Ann Arbor or Tampa. I also owe a huge debt of gratitude to the Islamic 
Centers and Muslims around Boston without whose cooperation this work would never have 
been possible. My advisers, Profs. Shahla Haeri and Charles Lindholm also helped me greatly 
despite sometimes large geographical distances. Finally, I am indebted to the Wenner Gren 
Foundation for the support their Doctoral Dissertation Grant provided in supporting my field 
work.
v
SHARIA, THE AMERICAN WAY
JEFFREY PAUL BRISTOL
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2021
Major Professor: Shahla Haeri, PhD, Associate Professor of Anthropology
ABSTRACT
Based on observational fieldwork and interviews carried out in Boston in ten Islamic 
community centers and mosques, supplemented by archival research in Suffolk County court 
records and surveys of relevant literature, this ethnography investigates how various 
communities and sects of Sunni Muslims in the Boston area utilize and conceptualize Islamic 
law. The presence and operation of Islamic law in the US (as well as in Europe) has increasingly 
become a center of interest and conflict. Some commentators have portrayed the operation of 
Sharia in non-majority Islamic countries as a victory for cultural pluralism and for an open, even 
expanding, global community. Others see Sharia as a threat to basic and ancient lifeways that 
have traditionally been characterized by the predominance of “Judeo-Christian” religion.
This ethnography seeks to move beyond these poles to examine what role Islamic law 
actually plays in the lives and religion of a cross-section of American Muslims. Through a 
combination of interviews, the examination of legal records and local government activities, 
such as courts and public hearings I use the microcosm of the Islamic community in Boston to 
understand how American disestablishmentarianism, or the American relation between the 
church and the state, creates an environment that allows Muslims to seek and gain public 
recognition and accommodation for their faith. Moreover, I examine how these laws allow 
Boston’s Muslims, and in turn the Muslims of the United States at large, to build lives that are
vi
distinctly Islamic while simultaneously incorporating themselves within the larger American
cultural milieu, which has historically been characterized by primarily Christian and less
prominently Jewish religious cultural practice.
The thesis also examines the role Islamic law plays in building both accommodations
and distinctions between the Islamic community and its American neighbors. It analyzes which
aspects of the Sharia various communities of Muslims consider most important and how they
reconcile differences and conflicts between aspects of American culture and law that present
obstacles to realizing the ideal Islamic life according to Sharia. Far from a draconian code that
demands complete obedience, the data shows that Sharia is actually a flexible tool that makes
accommodation possible. At the same time, the discourse and praxis of Sharia also divides
American Muslims along lines that often have nothing to do with the law per se but rather
reflect the basic tensions and divisions of American society at large. In particular, it considers
the differences between African-American Muslim communities and Muslims originated from
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A study of American Muslims as a whole is a difficult task, as a result of both the large
scale of the study and the diversity of the population it seeks to examine. One anthropologist
cannot study every Islamic community or Muslim living in the United States. Even a single
volume comprising the work of several scholars would barely scratch the surface.1 Because of
this difficulty, a sample is required. While samples are usually drawn from a larger population in
accordance with fixed scientific and mathematical procedures, this is impossible for the
anthropologist who study the people they find in situ. Consequently, the anthropologist can
best accomplish sampling by selecting a geographical area that represents the population they
wish to study as well as can reasonably be expected.
This study focuses on Boston, Massachusetts. While it is not the city with the largest
population of Muslims in America,2 its population is large, robust and, perhaps most
significantly, diverse. While numbers are elusive regarding the exact numbers of Muslims in
Boston, the population there is old, dating back to the late nineteenth century. Its age makes it
one of the first areas of Muslim settlement in the United States. The presence of a high
concentration of internationally recognized educational institutions mean that its Islamic
population has been drawn from all over the world. Because of their diverse origins, the area
1 Though some remarkable efforts to do just this have been made, including Muslims on the
Americanization Path (2011), edited by Yvonne Haddad and John Esposito and Akbar Ahmed’s Journey
into America: The Challenge of Islam (2010).
2 That distinction would likely go to the greater Detroit area. Unfortunately, the US census does not
collect information regarding religious affiliation and other groups who do, such as the Pew Foundation,
are unable to produce exact numbers. See “New Estimates Show U.S. Muslim Population Continues to
Grow.” (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/03/new-estimates-show-u-s-muslim-
population-continues-to-grow/, accessed November 21, 2019).
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has mosques and Islamic centers comprised of many different ethnicities. This diversity has
allowed me to observe a wide spectrum of Islamic legal practice in this area and use it as a
microcosm of the US as a whole.
At the time of my research from 2015-2016, the greater Boston area contained over 19
major Islamic institutions.3 While they have various names, they are most commonly called
either “mosques” or “Islamic Centers.” In keeping with what seems to be the tendency of
American Islamic communities, this paper will use the term “Islamic Center” to describe these
institutions instead of “mosque.”4 These Centers range in size from a mere handful of families to
centers with well over a thousand congregants, though as we shall see, individuals typically
visited more than one institution, making a precise determination of congregational size very
difficult. The largest Islamic center has a vibrant and flourishing religious community devoted
not just to religious services, but also education. This community was, at the time of the project,
beginning a major investment in building an Islamic seminary for the study of the religious
sciences.
While Boston has both Sunni and Shi’ite communities, the majority of the city’s Muslims
are Sunni, like both the global and the American Muslim population. For the sake of simplicity
and because the two denominations’ interpretation and practice of Islamic law differs so
strongly, this study only focuses on the Sunni population of the city and country. While this
limitation is unfortunate, it is not overly restrictive because Boston’s Sunni population is highly
3 See the Appendix for a complete list of institutions included in my study
4 For the purposes of this project, we will use the word “mosque” in two different senses: the first will be
to refer to African-American Islamic places of worship, for while immigrant communities seem to prefer
“Islamic Center” as the name of their religious sites, African-Americans, especially those of the Warith
Deen Mohammad school of Islamic law, tend to use the word “mosque” to describe their institutions.
The second use of “mosque” will be to refer to institutions of Islamic worship found in majority-Muslim
countries which will be discussed largely as a contract to the institutions commonly found in the United
States.
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diverse and the Shi’ite community very small.5 There are large populations of Turks, South
Asians, Africans, African-Americans and Arabs. The Arab population is likewise diverse, with
many different geographic regions represented. The Islamic Centers themselves tended to
reflect this cosmopolitanism, though some were largely mono-ethnic. Significantly, three
centers are Turkish, two North African, three South Asian, three African-American and the rest
of mixed origins. Each of these populations has much in common, but also significant features
that distinguish them from the others.
Given this diversity, it is reasonable to wonder whether there is a need for an
ethnography covering the entire Muslim population of the United States. There are few
ethnographies covering such a vast category of persons. Even ethnographies of the Islamic
world usually cover subgroups within the whole.
The basic nature of the United States and the size and nature of its Muslim population
makes an ethnography of the whole more than just a quixotic quest. In fact, other scholars have
attempted to do this very thing (Ahmed 2010). The nature of the United States and the
homogenizing impact that the American immigrant experience has on incoming populations
makes American Muslims (with the exception of African-American Muslims) a subject more than
amenable to research as a group.
As my research demonstrates, America’s Muslims have forged inter-ethnic binds that
eliminated many of the distinctions that might otherwise separate them given their diverse
national and cultural origins. The gradual elimination of ethnic distinctions, which unites
disparate groups into a common whole, is not unusual in the record of American ethnicity. A
5 There are many more Shi’ites in Detroit. In Boston, however, there was only a single, small Shi’ite Islamic
center.
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similar effect happened to European-Americans who were once divided by strong ethnic
differences but are now commonly referred to and thought of as being a homogenous “white”
whole notwithstanding regional and other variations.
In fact, many white Americans are largely unaware of their ethnic identities or, if they
know them, these identities do little to set them apart from one another.6 The children of
America’s Muslim immigrants as they are being enculturated to American life are experiencing a
similar process of homogenization, a subject which will form a major theme of this inquiry.
This assimilation does not mean that the American Muslim community, at least the
Sunni part of it, does not contain its own diversity. While there is a process of homogenization
happening to the children of immigrants, there are still many immigrants who themselves keep
ethnic and cultural differences alive and well. It is important to note here, and we shall see
below, that these boundaries are not firm, but are permeable and individuals move between
them frequently.
A still significant, but increasingly less important, division is race. The division between
the immigrant and the African-American community is gradually disappearing, but what still
remains is perhaps the most salient divide between America’s Muslims. The extreme differences
in education, income and geographical residency makes this distinction a difficult one to
eliminate wholly and presents the strongest challenge to analyzing the American Muslim
population as a whole. This racial divide is, moreover, reflective of the same divide in American
society at large.
6 For a description and history of Euro-American ethnic identity and its homogenization see Fredrickson’s
Diverse Nations (2016, 11-38).
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Length of residence in the United States is another important factor. As we shall see, the
immigrant community was caught in a conflict during the 1960’s and ‘70’s between those
immigrants who were new in coming to the US and those who have been resident in the country
for generations. This conflict was overcome relatively quickly and now the two groups are
difficult to distinguish, but as the story of the Islamic Community of New England, the Quincy
Mosque, will demonstrate, there was a high degree of animosity among these communities
initially. Such animosity has largely disappeared, but the trials and tribulations the community
experienced as a result has shaped the experience and contours of American Islam.
Despite these differences, the current process of homogenization among America’s
Muslims is driven by a deep sense of unity that is encouraged by the Islamic concept of the
Ummah, or community of Muslim believers united by their faith into a single whole despite
superficial distinctions, combined with a strong sense of identity with the American nation. The
belief in the Ummah drives America’s Muslims to participate in organizations that have as their
explicit goal the homogenization of American Islamic faith while these Muslims’ identification as
Americans helps to create a special (though not exclusive) national identity. While the work of
these organizations, as we shall see, is not perfect, it is effective enough to allow us to speak of
a distinct community of American Muslims with enough commonality to be considered a
coherent group.
One may ask why Islamic law is so important. Beyond the trite response that Sharia7 is
what interests me in ways that identity or theology do not, Islamic law, for reasons we will
explore shortly, plays a particularly special and important role in Islam. Islamic law is certainly
not the whole of Islam, as we are reminded by Shahab Ahmed in What Is Islam? (2016). As I
7 I will use “Islamic law” and “Sharia” interchangeably.
6
shall argue, it does create a set of acts and orientations through which people express their own
faith and which they use to interact with Muslims and non-Muslims alike by creating rules for
personal behavior and through the intervention of the American civic legal system. Both the
enactment of Islamic law and debates about it play integral parts in shaping the constituency of
the American Islamic community. In this way, Islamic law provides a framework that facilitates
social interaction between different and diverse parties.
Islamic law also presents a site for conflict. The United States is characterized by a
system of disestablishmentarianism, which is the system of interaction between religion and the
American state created by the First Amendment to the US Constitution.
Disestablishmentarianism limits the ability of the state to endorse religious practice while Sharia
seems to compel it. Likewise, in the United States and most Christianate8 countries, law is not a
personal phenomenon based in faith, but a public one based in power relationships rooted in
the state. In Islam, the law is something quite different. As we shall see in our discussion of it
below, Sharia is intensely personal and has often had an antagonistic relationship with the state.
Consequently, the way both the American government and America’s Muslims reconcile these
tensions is extremely important and illustrative in the lifeways of Muslims themselves and the
United States as a nation of multiple groups with different interests and beliefs. How America’s
Muslims navigate these tensions highlights how communal life is possible.
Map of the Dissertation
8 I use the terms “Christianate” and “Islamicate” in accordance with Hodgson’s suggested use of the terms
(Hodgson 1974, 94-95). They refer to societies who cultural complexes are dominated by one religion or
the other while still comprising large populations that are not either Christian or Muslim. Thus, European
civilization may be considered “Christianate” while having many non-Christians and Middle Eastern, North
African and Central Asian society may be considered “Islamicate” while having many non-Muslims.
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This dissertation begins with an introductory discussion of Islamic law and the
anthropological study of it. What follows is divided into three major sections. The first is an
exploration of what Islamic law is. The second explores Islamic law and its role in communities in
the United States generally and in Boston, Massachusetts specifically. The third analyzes the
aspects of Sharia law used in the United States and how it is implemented with a focus on the
Islamic community in Boston.
The first section is itself divided into two chapters. The first deals with a general sketch
of the different communities that are present in the US and Boston as well as the history of
these communities and how they developed. While an exploration of the US at large may seem
like too broad a focus for our fieldwork, this project was taken in part as a way to examine the
macrocosm in miniature. Moreover, the community of Boston, indeed all communities of
Muslims in the US, are connected in various ways to the larger American community in ways
that make Boston’s Muslims difficult to analyze outside of their larger context.
The second section deals with the institutions that are responsible for shaping the
Islamic community in Boston. Unlike the first chapter of this section, our discussion of
institutions will largely focus on the fieldwork environment of Boston. While some larger,
national institutions will necessarily enter into our analysis, far more of it will examine the local
context and the local institutions of Islamic worship that facilitate worshippers’ engagement
with Sharia. We will explore not just how these institutions help to promote Sharia and Islamic
engagement, but also their structural and institutional context and how their governance as
elements of civil society contributes to the creation of an American way of understanding
Islamic law.
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The second section of our analysis dives directly into the law. It is divided into three
chapters. The first deals with how Islamic law operates structurally. In this chapter, Islamic law is
viewed as a kind of “structuring structure” to borrow a term from Bourdieu (1977, 78-79),
though instead of looking at these structuring structures through the lens of individual action,
i.e. habitus, we examine how these structures shape the community as a whole and both
develop and resolve tensions. The major theme of this chapter is to understand how Islamic law
both separates and combines, separating at once Muslims in the US from Muslims in their home
countries as well as separating Muslims in the US from non-Muslims. Islamic law also does the
reverse, it creates social structures that help integrate Muslims into American society and
establishes them as a legitimate if separate community in the broader global Ummah. This
simultaneous unifying, separating and differentiating process is complex and raises many
questions of identity, legal operation and community solidarity which will be explored in this
chapter.
The second chapter of this section examines what elements of Islamic law American
Muslims actually use. As discussed above, while Islamic law might be viewed as a system of total
services à la Mauss (1990, 7), not every aspect of it is used by Muslims even when living in an
Islamicate country. The aspects of Sharia that American Muslims choose to implement in their
own lives is significant in understanding not just how Islamic law operates in their social
contexts but also how they integrate themselves and Sharia into the broader American context.
The final chapter is similar to the second but deals with Islamic law from the perspective
of the American legal system. It explores how an ostensibly secular system like the American
one can adapt to Sharia requirements and where it operates to enforce Islamic legal rulings. This
chapter considers in greater depth the possibility of conflict and synergy between the two
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systems and how the obstacles are overcome when possible and where Islamic law fails to be
implemented by the American legal system at junctures of true incompatibility.
The structure of this dissertation, therefore, seeks to cover a broad outline of the major
elements of Islamic law as practiced in the United States with the Muslim population of Boston
used as a sample for the whole. It covers not just the sociological nature of the community, but
also how that community uses Islamic law to both set itself apart and to integrate itself within
the American context. Law is only half the story. Consequently, in understanding the community
as a whole we come to understand Sharia in particular.
Methods and Interviews
My ethnographic research was conducted from the middle of 2014 until 2016,
comprising approximately two years of fieldwork. During the course of this process, I focused on
three primary ways of collecting data. The first was participant observation where I attended
gatherings at local Islamic institutions. The second was structured and unstructured interviews.
The third was archival research. All three were conducted roughly simultaneously and
contributed to developing my argument.
In order to develop my knowledge of the cultural landscape, I started my process by
identifying all of the local Islamic institutions, with an eye specifically to Islamic centers and
mosques. The result is the chart presented as Appendix A. I proceeded to contact each of the
locations either through their website or by telephone calls. Only in the cases of the Islamic
Society of Boston Cultural Center (ISBCC) and the Islamic Society of Boston did I attend before
contact because each of these centers had cultural events open to the general public.
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After contacting the centers, I arranged to speak either to the Imam or the
representative of the board that dealt with public outreach. Usually this involved attending at
least one Friday prayer session at each center, though at several of the institutions I attended
other events as well. At three of the Islamic centers, I attended Friday prayers sessions regularly
for a period of about six months. At two of the Centers, I attended special regular events which
included discussions on Islamic law and other topics. I also attended major community events
given by the Centers, the most significant were a community Ramadan Break-Fast, open houses
and fairs for the local community as well as an annual picnic. Each Islamic center or mosque was
quite welcoming with the exception of the ISBCC which, after being notified of my interest,
declined to participate in the research, claiming that they had too many people conducting
research there already.
In addition to Islamic centers and mosques, I also contacted civil society institutions that
operate in the northeast. Specifically, the Sharia Board of New York as well as groups associated
with the Islamic Council of New England and the ISBCC. I also conducted interviews with several
members of the Fiqh Council of North America, the Rahmat-e Alam Foundation and a regular
attendee of the American Muslims Jurists’ Association. These were done with the aim of better
understanding how civil society organizations outside of official centers implement Islamic law
in the US. Unlike interviews with my local informants, these discussions were held over the
telephone though in all other respects they resembled my other interviews.
My interviews tended to be formal and structured, though I did not record them. I
found my informants usually provided better answers when not recorded and were less
concerned about the ramifications of what might be said. Immediately after and during each
session, I made notes on what was said. Occasionally my informants requested copies of said
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notes, which were provided. The feedback I received from these individuals was minimal,
indicating that the method captured the discussions accurately.
I conducted formal interviews with 35 separate individuals. Most of them were only
single sessions, though I had ten informants that sat for multiple interviews. These were an even
mix between Imams and local congregants. I had informal conversations with many more
individuals. While I could not give an exact number, it would certainly be in excess of one
hundred. These conversations occurred in various settings. Some were before and after Friday
prayers, but most happened at social events. People were generally curious and interested both
in who I was and in my project when they learned of it. I met most of the informants who sat for
formal interviews who were not officially affiliated with Islamic Centers through these official
events.
Each interview lasted approximately forty-five minutes. They were generally
conversational in tone. The setting of the interviews varied. I met some informants in informal
settings such as cafes and others in the Islamic Center spaces. My interviews with Imams tended
to take place in their offices.
Unfortunately, I was unable to collect quantitative statistical data of these institutions.
The reason for this was largely bureaucratic: the IRB protocol at BU required me to submit all
surveys verbatim before they were distributed. As it took the IRB six months to give me basic
clearance for my project, I did not anticipate that their turn around for my surveys, which I
anticipated having to make up on the spot based on my findings, would be adequate for my
research agenda.
My archival research consisted largely of work in the Suffolk County courthouse. I
examined the probate and family court records for all divorce and will contests that involved
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Muslims. My methodology for determining whether an individual was a Muslim was based on
the person’s name. This was feasible since names in Islam are extremely important and most
converts change their name to an Islamically accepted one. Those born Muslim likewise almost
always have at least one name that is Islamic in origin. I therefore went back twenty years in the
archives looking through every probate and family law record for names that would match my
pattern. I discovered an unfortunately small number of divorces in that time and no wills that
were contested, but as the divorce files contained the entire settlement, the records were
useful in gaining a picture of what an Islamic divorce might look like.
I conducted further research on events that informed my general background and
perspective on Islamic law in the US but failed to make it into my dissertation. For example,
during the course of my fieldwork, an extensive dispute regarding the installation of an Islamic
cemetery in Dudley, Massachusetts, just outside of Worcester, was ongoing. While I was unable
to attend any of the town meetings, zoning board or health meetings directly, all were recorded
and subsequently broadcast, enabling me to follow all of the public proceedings. Likewise, I
conducted extensive media research. As I prepared to conduct in-person interviews, I
determined that the subject of the controversy would not fit directly into the dissertation
because it was not substantially related to any of the core topics involving Islamic law, but
consideration of the material was extremely helpful in formulating some of the arguments
discussed above. I hope to publish some of this material in the future.
One significant feature that is lacking in this ethnography compared to many others is
extensive quotations from informants. This is largely due to the method I used to collect data.
Because I relied on summarization rather than direct recording, I often did not have the exact
13
quotes that my informants used to describe something. Consequently, rather than risk a
misattribution, I have paraphrased their words instead.
What Is Islamic Law?
Understanding how America’s Muslims use and understand Islamic law requires us to
understand what Islamic law is. There are many books describing Islamic law from a technical
perspective, focusing especially on its development (e.g. Schacht 1964; Hallaq 2009). These
works often focus purely on the technical aspects of the law, its method of producing legal
decisions, the basis of its authority and who has authority to produce which rulings. Less often is
Islamic law described as part of the greater Islamic intellectual milieu or from the perspective of
its influence on and within a particular society.
While there are ethnographies that discuss Islamic law and courts operating in specific
social contexts (e.g. Rosen 1989; Haeri 2014), these explore Islamic law within the context of an
Islamicate society. The present ethnography has a different social context, however, one that is
not part of an Islamicate world, but a Christianate one. This difference in societal background
highlights certain problems inherent in Islamic law as law as well as necessitating a review of
what Islamic law is to understand how it can adapt and change to radically new contexts,
contexts which both Muslims (e.g. Qutb 2006) and non-Muslims (e.g. Ali 2015) alike occasionally
claim provide incompatible ground for the operation of Sharia. To understand that Sharia does,
in fact, adapt to such a radically new context, we must first understand what it is and how it
differs from what law is typically considered to be in the Christianate world.
In order to further this understanding, we will explore first what Islamic law is with an
eye to highlight those aspects of it which enable it to engage both with the broader aspects of
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Islamic faith as well as the larger elements of society within which it operates. This latter point is
particularly important because the Sharia does not emerge into a vacuum within American
society. Instead, it interacts with a different religious tradition, Christianity, which has its own
distinct and often hostile interpretations of the value of religious law.
Islamic law provides the framework within which Muslims live, worship and interact
with their fellow beings. As such, it is central to Islam. Islamic law is divine law. Islamic law is in
this way similar to Jewish law. Indeed, both are startlingly alike in their process, theories and
methodologies (Wegner 1982). The similitude of the two systems goes beyond some of the
superficial parallels, such as purity and dietary rules. It reaches to the depths of how the law
functions in each religion, a function that differentiates Judaism and Islam on the one hand from
Christianity on the other. The difference between the role of the law in Christianity and Islam
has been the source of many of the misunderstandings and conflicts that have emerged
between societies influenced by each. In fact, as we shall see, the radically different
interpretation of the law in the two religions is a source of perennial misunderstanding between
the adherents of the two faiths and a primary reason for the conflict that exists between Islam
and Christianity.9
For practicing Muslims, Islamic law serves as a base for their religious lives. While
researching in Mauritania several years ago, I asked people whether or not they studied Islamic
9 The following discussion treats Islam and Christianity at a broad level of generalization. I do this in the
understanding that there is a high level of analysis where each religion has enough in common to discuss
basic elements of their faith and creed. One may of course point to exceptions to each rule, exceptions
that may pull us into side channel arguments about there being “Islams” rather than one “Islam.” This
argument no doubt has certain value to scholars who wish to compare traditions within the whole, but
my informants preferred a view of Islam that emphasized the unity of the tradition and so it makes sense
here to consider the tradition as a whole. Moreover, it is my experience through both academic and field
study that there are contiguous traditions of both Islam and Christianity that merit their being treated as
unitary phenomena at least on a high level of abstraction. It is at this higher level of generalization where
the current discussion proceeds.
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law. Almost everyone responded that they did, but this was a matter of course, they said: every
child studied Islamic law so they would know how to pray, what to eat and how to live their
lives, including how to marry, divorce (particularly important in Mauritania), and conduct
business. Everyone, they said, was a student of Islamic law. Only some were more serious
students than others.10
For all of its importance to the lives of practicing Muslims, Islamic law stirs up fear and
consternation in the minds of many in the European-influenced West. When these people hear
the phrase “Islamic law,” images of hands being amputated for theft or people being stoned for
adultery come to mind.11 In part this mistaken assumption develops because the religion that
dominates the European-influenced West, Christianity, has a very different relationship with the
law; one that must be explored and clarified in order to understand Islamic law fully from its
own perspective.
While the law plays a central role in the lives of Muslims, Christianity has long had a very
different relationship with the law. Not only does Jesus in the Gospels often take a hostile
position toward Jewish law and legal scholars,12 Paul in his Epistles also opposes the law, going
so far as to condemn its rule as being restricted to murderers; parricides and matricides;
sodomites; liars; the unchaste; the godless and the otherwise sinful. It is not, he explicitly
declaims, for “a righteous person” (1 Timothy: 8-11). This is not the only place where Paul
condemns the law as a dead end and a false salvation: this message was a core aspect of his
10 On this divide, see the distinction between fiqh and furūᶜ below.
11 See as an example “Gay sex and adultery will be punishable by stoning to death and thieves will be
amputated under 'vicious' new Sharia laws brought in by Brunei,”
(https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6855129/Gay-sex-punishable-stoning-death-vicious-new-Sharia-
laws-brought-Brunei.html).
12 This is particularly clear in the casuistic discussion Jesus has with the Pharisees, who were the legal
experts of their times.
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teaching, one Christianity assumed as a path to incorporating a non-Jewish population into a
new, previously Jewish religious rite (Wright 2009, 108-28).
The Christian interpretation of the law as a dangerous dead-end has had serious
consequences for law’s place not just in religion but within society more generally. By placing
the person of Christ as central to salvation, an individual could no longer rely on their own
actions to preserve their eternal soul. This made the law, which both in Judaism and in Islam
provides the framework for behaviors that allow an individual to obtain salvation for
themselves, not merely religiously moot, but a potential source of damnation, for if one trusted
to the law instead of Christ, one’s salvation was impossible. Law, in other words, became
associated with Mammon. Consequently, law was moved outside religion into a secular realm
(Witte 2006, 16-28). Even where it existed in the Church, such as Canon Law, it controlled only
the administrative aspects of the church body, not the relationship between a worshipper and
God and was derived not from scripture, but from the secular sources of the Roman Empire
(Helmholz 2010, 2-6). Consequently, when the Catholic Church in the late medieval period tried
to turn Canon Law to political ends in affecting in the kingdoms of temporal rulers, its effects
were impermanent and often weak (Witte 2006, 20-25; Helmholz 1975, 187-9).
With the Protestant Reformation and the destruction of a highly organized church in
much of Europe, Canon Law was excised from its administrative use in much of Europe,
enhancing the distinction between the legal and the holy. Some Christian reformers, such as the
Anabaptists, went so far as to suggest that even simple recourse to the law as a means of
solving social problems puts one’s soul in jeopardy. To this day many communities of Amish and
Old Order Mennonites refuse to take delicts, whether civil or criminal, to court. They would
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rather suffer temporal pain and loss than the spiritual damnation that recourse to the law
represents (Hostetler 1984, 36-47).
Due to these influences the law has come, in countries influenced by Christianity, to
represent something at best not holy and at worst truly unholy. In the Christian imaginary, the
law is a strict, rigid rule of oppression that threatens the peace and harmony of religious and
moral purity, to be used only by governments to control unstable populations and cement
temporal rule. 13
Islam’s understanding of the law is the opposite of Christianity’s. For a Muslim, Islamic
law represents the best desires of God for his creation. It sets the rules by which, if everyone
were to follow and obey them, peace, harmony, and personal salvation for all the world might
be obtained. On the contrary, if their precepts are broken, humanity will suffer misery, tyranny,
and damnation by our own hands. Consequently, when dealing with Islamic law we must not fall
into the temptation, which even many scholars of Islam do, of imagining Sharia to be rigid and
impersonal.14 Instead, law from the Islamic perspective is a highly personal affair, representing
for many a guide to the best way an individual can maintain a close, dedicated relationship to
God.15
13 This discussion of the relationship between Christianity, the state and the law is not intended to make
any comments about the relationship between Islam, the state and the law, for they have very different
histories.
14 This view of Islamic law underpins its discussion in Shahab Ahmed’s What Is Islam? (2016), as an
example.
15 While it is often common, both among Muslims and non-Muslims, to refer to the god of Islam as Allah,
in accordance with the Arabic, in this work I use the term ‘God.’ I do this because Allah in Arabic simply
means “God.” In fact, when Christian Arabs pray, the word they use to refer to God is ‘Allah.’ Thus to
avoid needless exoticism and to emphasize the continuity of Islamic concepts in English, I chose to
translate the word. This is a practice with some support (see, for example, Murata & Chittick’s Vision of
Islam (1994)), though many Muslims themselves prefer to use the Arabic word.
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To describe Islamic law generally, we can say that it is a set of guidelines covering both
what the European West conventionally views as law (rules governing criminal offenses,
contracts, marriage and divorce, etc.) as well as what it traditionally views as ethics
(admonitions to be honest, trade fairly, etc.), personal conduct (rules on personal hygiene and
dress, etc.) and worship (how and when to pray, how to sacrifice to God, etc.). The
comprehensiveness of this system has led some scholars to question whether Islamic law should
really be called “law” (Weiss 2006, 21-22; Ramadan 2009, 271-274). Such a narrow conception
of law, however, reflects the assumption of the Christianate understanding of law these authors
have absorbed from their cultural milieux.
Divisions of Islamic Law
Islamic law is composed of two general categories that encompass between them the
whole range of rules described above. The first category covers the ᶜibādāt, or elements
concerned with worship. Of particular importance among these are four of the so-called Five
Pillars of Islam: how and when to pray, how and when to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, how
and when to fast and how and what to pay for alms. The final pillar, witnessing that there is no
God but God and that Muhammad is His Prophet, has some relation to Islamic law, but is also
dominated by the related discipline of theology. The ᶜibādāt, ultimately, covers acts that
concern the personal relationship between a worshipper and the divine.
The second category of Islamic law are the muᶜāmalāt, or the things concerned with
human interaction. This category includes things that involve the interactions of people. This
category contains much of what we more commonly recognize as law, including the law of
contracts, marriage, criminal penalties and prohibitions as well as other phenomena bearing on
the relation of individuals (Encyclopedia of Islam, Fiḳh).
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The category of muᶜāmalāt will form the primary basis of the inquiry below as it controls
the social interaction of worshippers. This does not mean that the ᶜibādāt are not important for
shaping an American conception of Islamic law, however, for the ᶜibādāt often govern issues
related to piety, which are highly influential in bringing together the community for religious
ritual and thereby creating social solidarity. Aspects of the ᶜibādāt that we consider will include
the requirements for the celebration of Ramadan and the communal Friday prayer.
All told, Islamic law governs most of the actions a Muslim will undertake in their life.
While this may make Islamic life and ethics seem rigid, legalistic and uncompromising, this is not
so. In reality, Islamic law is a vibrant and adaptive system of rules that binds an individual’s
private and public life into a single whole, a whole that exists within the greater social and
religious milieu of Islam itself. Islamic law is in this way a Maussian system of total services that
can guide the worshipper through any conflict or situation and ensure the larger Islamic
community operates according to the same set of ethics and social practices, enhancing the
unity of the Islamic world, or Ummah (Mauss 1990, 7).
The Religious Sciences
Islamic law as a modality for engaging in religious practice has come under strong
criticism lately, which we shall discuss in detail below (e.g. Ahmad 2016). With the rise of
Wahabbi and Salafist ideas over the course of the twentieth century, the dominance of Islamic
law as the primary paradigm of Islamic religious practice has become nearly hegemonic (Ahmad
2016, 117-29).16 While we will discuss the impact of this change below when we deal with its
effects on Islamic practice in the United States, it is important to consider the Sharia’s role in
16 For an ethnographic discussion of the effects of Wahhabi proselytization and its establishment as the
law as the central paradigm of Islamic practice see Cole’s Nomad of the Nomads.
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Islamic religious discourse as a whole, for while the law is central in certain conceptions of Islam
today, historically and perhaps even still for many Muslims, the law is simply part of a larger
religious discourse and apparatus. While it has a certain pride of place, it is not the full
embodiment of Islam. Consequently, understanding the role the law plays in Islamic religious
thought and practice is essential to understanding its influence and limitations in order to
understand how and why it can have so much influence in the lives of Muslims, but also how
and why its argumentation and control can be limited, re-interpreted and thus changed. This
ability to change is key to understanding how Sharia adapts to new contexts, such as the
American one. In order to understand this role of the law, we must understand the larger
intellectual context of Islam itself.
Islamic law is part of a broader constellation of religious intellectual disciplines. These
disciplines are referred to as the ᶜUlūm al-Dīn, or the Religious Sciences. While law is the most
practical of these disciplines and the only one that a worshipper must know to lead a religiously
correct life, true understanding of the law and a complete relationship with God is, according to
Islamic belief, impossible without operating through the entire range of these disciplines.
Without them, the law becomes a dead letter that traps its adherents into rigid, unyielding
social practice. It is, in other words, these other disciplines that complement the action of the
law in the everyday lives of Muslims and enables it to grow, adapt, and reveal its inner meaning
to them.
Perhaps the most famous and widely read work describing these sciences is the book by
the famous mystic and theologian Al-Ghazali (d. 1111) called Iḥya ᶜUlūm al-Dīn, or The Revival of
the Religious Sciences. In this work, Al-Ghazali lists the religious sciences as theology,
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jurisprudence, exegesis, the science of Hadith17 and Sufism. Each of these disciplines is religious
because they let the student know something about the divine and inform us about God’s
relationship with humanity. They are sciences, Al-Ghazali and others assert because like the
traditional Aristotelean understanding of the term, they are capable of producing knowledge in
their own particular field with a degree of certainty (Ibn Khaldun 2001, 543-548, 549-551; Al-
Ghazali 2005, 21-22).
The role of the religious sciences in Islam is particularly significant because of the
centrality of revelation in its faith. Islam in this respect shares a common need for disciplinary
rigor with Judaism, which has its own versions of the religious sciences in the mystical
(Kabbalah), philosophical (Filosofia), non-legal exegetical traditions (Aggadah) and legal
methodology (Halakhah) (Almog 2003, 32-6).
One of the central tensions found in religions that emphasize revelation is the
distinction between revelation and reason. In Islam especially the primary issue in the
development of the religious sciences concerned how to navigate the conflict between these
two poles, a navigation made particularly difficult because the sources of revelation and reason
are so different in their nature.
Revelation on its own is generally regarded as more powerful than reason because it
allows direct access to the truth and can reveal information which reason on its own could never
discover. On the other hand, revelation is only fully reliable without interpretation as long as its
source is present. In the absence of a prophet, reason must be used to determine the meaning
of revelation. Furthermore, even when a prophet is present, Islam holds that there are certain
17 Hadith are stories or sayings from the Prophet Muhammad’s life. Because the Prophet is viewed as
having perfect behavior due to his special relationship with God, these sayings have important
information for deriving legal and theological principles. For more information see Ṣiddīqī’s Ḥadīth
Literature: Its Origin, Development & Special Features (1993).
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phenomena, like logic or music, that exist outside the sphere of revelation and are properly in
the domain of reason that might themselves impinge upon revelation, diluting its efficacy with
their imposition of potential fallacies. This taxonomy of the sources of knowledge has been
heavily explored by Muslim intellectuals throughout the history of the religion, though its most
elaborated and accessible description for an English-reading audience can be found in Chapter 6
of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah (Ibn Khaldun 2001, 594-5, 629-633).
In his work, Ibn Khaldun discusses the divide between reason and revelation while
emphasizing the ultimate role reason comes to play in revelation. Reason has a role in revelation
because epistemology in the Islamicate world asserts a strict thesis and antithesis in these forms
of knowledge with human beings as a synthesis between them.
On the one hand there is knowledge of the divine that is identifiable with revelation.
This knowledge is transcendent and belongs to the imaginative and intellectual faculties of
mankind. On the other hand, there is the knowledge of the senses, which derives from inputs
coming from the world around us that draws upon more basic conceptual tools like sight and
sound. Like knowledge of the divine, however, this aspect of human knowledge also uses the
intellectual faculties.
Human beings share the divine intellectual faculty with the angels, connecting the
human realm with God. Humans share the sensory faculties with animals, bringing us into
interaction simultaneously with the material world. Human beings, therefore, exist in a middle
realm.
Prophets are individuals who have a much more intimate connection with the divine
than do other people, thus giving them special spiritual and intellectual abilities. Other people
can access some of these faculties by activating that part of their minds that deals with these
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things, i.e. the rational faculties that operate above but in conjunction with the sensible or the
imaginative faculties that come into play during a mystical experience and correspond with the
divine, but for almost everybody, even for philosophers or Sufi masters, these faculties are
weaker than those of the prophets’ and so are subject to error in their attempts to unravel the
mysteries of God, which exist in a realm removed from reason or experience (Ibn Khaldun 2001,
595-598).
Ibn Khaldun draws out the dilemma that revelation poses to reason through a simple
example: while reason shares some of the intellectual features of revelation, revelation in its
most perfect form, that exercised by the prophets, is as far above normal reason as the faculties
of a person to think are above those of an animal. While both humans and animals think,
animals are limited in their reasoning to their senses and the environment around them while
human beings can reason abstractly about truth and nature in a way incomprehensible to their
bestial counterparts (Ibn Khaldun 2001, 595-6).
Consequently, reason must tread lightly when it deals with the topics of revelation lest it
misinterpret or misunderstand revelation’s contents, confusing the similarity in their process
(the intellect) with the difference in their sources (sensory faculties for reason, divine
transcendence for revelation) since those concepts that are simple for a revelatory faculty are
impossibly complex for a rational one, just as the abstract nature of thought is easy for a human
brain but impossibly complex for an animalistic one.
Indeed, the criticism of relying on reason to determine the truth of the divine rather
than revelation is the focus of Al-Ghazali’s most famous work The Incoherence of the
Philosophers where he criticizes the great Islamic metaphysicians for using their own unaided
imaginations to infer the truth about the world from observations made of their environment.
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What makes the errors that reason introduces into revelation particularly dangerous is
that in the absence of further revelation, its correction is impossible.18 The possibility of this
threat in the Islamic mind is very real, for it is a cornerstone of Islamic theology that each of the
messages revealed before (to the Christians, the Jews and other communities) was corrupted by
their adherents’ use of reason. Muslims must therefore practice great care to avoid similar
corruption. Unfortunately, in the Islamic model, revelation is particularly susceptible to
corruption by reason because much of revelation’s content is so extraordinary that reason could
never discover it and so it is in the nature of reason to want to correct the seemingly impossible
data it receives from revelation.
The tension that exists between reason and revelation provides the crux of the problem
Islamic law encounters when entering new territories like the United States. While revelation
provides the law a pole star from which to guide, reason threatens to throw the follower of the
law off-course through a miscalculation of direction. While reason provides the power to the
individual to determine new laws for new situations, it must be strictly confined by the dictates
of revelation otherwise the new laws designed to make life possible in a new world will swallow
the old law, turning it from something righteous and divine into something new and potentially
religiously unconscionable. The law therefore uses the discipline of the religious sciences to
harmonize this tension and make it productive: it gives room to reason to create new and
reactive guidance while tethering it to revelation to prevent it from moving too far afield and
violating the precepts of religion it is supposed to protect.
The Role of Islamic Law in the Religious Sciences
18 The purpose, according to an Islamic understanding of the world, of Muhammad’s revelation is to be
the final corrector to the mistakes reason made to earlier revelations, thus this conflict between reason
and revelation rests at the very heart of Islam’s view of its own ontology.
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Islamic law has an important place in terms of the rest of the Islamic sciences. While all
of the other sciences are restricted in their scope to those who are capable of undertaking their
challenge, either intellectually or spiritually, Islamic law is the one religious science that is
incumbent upon all Muslims to learn. This does not mean that all Muslims must be legal scholars
or that all Muslims must blindly follow a complicated and emotionally devoid legal code; to
assume these things is to fall into the trap introduced at the beginning of this chapter, that is to
judge Islamic law by the standard understanding of law in the Christian West. Instead, Islamic
law is central to the religion of Islam because it defines how one should interact both with God
and with humanity. As a result, Islamic law has a surprising amount of flexibility and warmth.
The centrality of Islamic law to Islam itself has recently come under attack in the
Western academy, especially by Western academics who are themselves Muslim. The late
Shahab Ahmed made a particularly trenchant critique in his posthumous book What Is Islam?.
Ahmed opens his book with a series of vignettes, including that of a wine drinking Muslim, and
ends each with the question: “How is this Islam?” with the intent to show that these examples
challenge the prevailing focus of scholarship on Islamic law (Ahmed 2016, 10-31).
Ahmed’s challenge is a good one, for there is a trend to boil Islam down into nothing but
the law.19 This reductionism is unfortunate, for it ignores the other long and storied religious
sciences and other intellectual products of the religion, including its devotional literature and
poetry.
What Ahmed sometimes acknowledges, but often glosses over, is that even considering
these exceptions, no individual Muslim can dispense with the law and still remain a practicing
19 Though it must be admitted this is a position that is most common to right-wing anti-Islam extremists in
Europe, the United States and other Anglophone countries and extreme Islamic fundamentalists
themselves. Most scholars and practitioners of Islam hold a much more nuanced understanding of the law
than Ahmed credits them.
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Muslim in any orthodox sense. This is not true of philosophy, mysticism, or poetry. To take
Ahmed’s wine-drinking Muslim as an example, while this individual may seem to flout the
Islamic legal tradition by drinking wine,20 they must have recourse to the law when they pray,
for without the legal sciences, knowing the form and timing of the prayers is impossible. In other
words, even for Muslims that may ignore precepts of the law in some circumstances, they must
follow them in others.
Even Sufism, the most famously “antinomian” of the religious disciplines is surprisingly
guided by the law, as the scholars of Sufism Chittick, Ernst and Ayoub observe (Chittick 2006, 25;
Ernst 1997, 16-7; Ayoub 1990). Sufism divides the law into its outer and inner meaning, which
are usually, but not always in harmony (Chittick 2006, 16-7, Ayoub 1990, 223). In cases where
they differ, Sufis argue the inner meaning should take precedence, which might entail acting in
such a way that seems to violate the law.21
An example of this synergy between law and mysticism can be found in the story of a
Sufi who was travelling with a caravan to make the Hajj. It was Ramadan and everyone was
fasting, but his fellow passengers, upon learning of the presence of the great master in their
midst, began to celebrate the Sufi and honor him excessively. The Sufi feared both for his own
piety as well as that of his eulogizers, for they almost seemed to make him an object of worship.
As a result, in the middle of the day, during their break, the Sufi sat down and ate lunch,
breaking the commanded Ramadan fast. Upon seeing this clear breech of the law, the members
20 Though the great jurist Abu Hanifah himself permitted alcohol consumption in moderation as long as its
source was not grapes or dates, the two kinds of alcohol commonly available to seventh century Arabs. He
did, however, label wine-drinking as unrecommended (Ahmed 2016, 57).
21 For a deeper discussion of the relationship between Sufism and the law in a medieval context see
Belhaj’s “Legal Knowledge by Application: Sufism as Islamic Legal Hermeneutics in the 10/12th Centuries”
(2013).
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of the caravan who had previously praised him, now condemned his impiety. The Sufi spent the
rest of the trip despised and on the outskirts of the group, freed from the temptation of ego.
This is a situation where a Sufi seemed to break the law while in reality preserving it, for
he was forced to make a calculation: whether to keep to the lesser law of the fast or to preserve
the greater law preventing anyone from being worshipped but God. Consequently, in order to
restore the proper order, he broke the lesser command. The story, therefore, signifies the ironic
importance of the law, for we see that the Sufi’s seeming antinomianism was actually nomian
fidelity; instead of being a rejection of the law, his actions sought to preserve it.22
From the above we see that while Islamic law is not always the central focus of a
worshipper’s ends, the worshipper must fulfill the ends of the law commands, even if one of the
other sciences provides a better way of doing so than the law itself. In the story above, Sufism
and the mystical connection the Sufi master had with God informed him that the avoidance of
idol-worship predominated over the command to fast and that in order to fulfill the true ends of
the law, the law had to be cast aside as insufficient to achieve its proper ends. In other words,
even though the law is central in Islam, it exists as part of a greater whole. While adherence to
the law does not obscure or eliminate other forms of piety, neither does adherence to other
forms of piety eliminate the importance of the law itself.
The ubiquity of Islamic law in the lives of its worshippers explains why it plays such an
important role in adapting Islamic practice to new environments and situations. Because Islamic
law deals so intimately with behavior and guides human action, it is the primary way Islamic
22 The creation of extra-legal solutions that may even contradict the law is common in all legal systems.
Islamic law actually possesses them under the terms istiḥsān and maṣlaḥah. In Anglo-American legal
systems, such rules are enforced as equity and often assigned to special courts that are explicitly outside
the Common Law legal regime. For more examples see Yntema’s “Equity in the Civil Law and the Common
Law” (1966).
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practice shifts to adopt new norms and habits. Its process of thought and its generation of
guidelines for practice gives Muslims an indication of how far they may go to meet the new life-
ways and habits of non-Islamic societies as well as indicating to them what aspects of the faith
they may not compromise. While the other religious sciences may tell them how to develop a
relationship with God (Sufism), interpret his designs for humanity (exegesis or Hadith) or what
God is like (theology), only the law can tell them how to exist in a God-pleasing way and what
compromises they may or may not make. Thus, it is in the field of the law that much, though not
all, of Islamic adaptation to new societies takes place.
Islamic Law as a Religious Science
Because of its status as one of the religious sciences, Islamic law follows a rigorous
methodology. As a science, Islamic law is referred to as fiqh, a word which literally means
“reason” or “knowledge” in Arabic. We can distinguish fiqh from Sharīᶜah by distinguishing a
process and product (fiqh) from its source (Sharia). Sharia is an ideal. The word literally means a
path to sweet water. To understand the significance of this, we must imagine ourselves in the
milieu of the original prophetic revelations to Muhammad. He received the message of God in a
society that inhabited the desert, moving from oasis to oasis either as pastoral nomads or as
long-distance traders. As a result, water, especially sweet water, was the most important
determiner not just of success, but of survival itself. In a religious sense, this is precisely what
Sharia is: the path to life.
Sharia is an ideal code. It is the code which God has ordained to govern the lives of
humanity while they travel through life, with the instructions of how to find it cached in divine
revelation. Sharia presents a problem as much as a promise to humanity, however; for just as it
is the guide to a perfect life, like perfection itself, its secrets are hidden from plain sight and
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never fully knowable or obtainable. While Sharia is perfectly understood and lived by those
prophetic messengers who are charged with its deliverance (those individuals who can access
revelation with their prophetic imagination rather than reason), all other individuals must strive
to build an interpretation of it using their own reason guided by the religious sciences described
above, especially fiqh, or the science of jurisprudence.
Sharia in its purest, truest form is, unfortunately, as inaccessible as it is unrealizable and
this inaccessibility presents a double bind to humanity. It is the highest human obligation to
uncover as many of the details of Sharia as it can since by doing so humanity can learn better
how to live in harmony with God. Consequently, the realization of an imminent, implementable
law from a transcendent, abstract code is an effort (jihād) that is as necessary as it is impossible.
One side effect of the Islamic law’s deviance from perfection in our everyday world is
plurality. Islamic law’s plural realization flows from the nature of interpretation and how it
differs from perfect knowledge. Interpretation, in this understanding, can be likened to
perception. Just as two individuals standing at different places may perceive the same object
differently, so might two jurists laboring in different societies at different times, solving different
aspects of the same problem, understand the legal solution to that problem differently.
Fortunately, in the traditional understanding of Islamic law the possibility for two jurists
to differ on a single point does not matter. We are told through a popular Hadith that if a jurist
exerts the maximum effort and derives a correct legal decision, he will receive two rewards in
Heaven. If he fails, he receives one (Sahih Bukhari 6919; Sahih Muslim 1716).
It is clear from this tradition that effort and rigor are what count in legal interpretation.
While accuracy is preferred, it is a near impossible goal to achieve regularly. Worse, without a
prophet to connect humanity to the divine, there is no way to know whether a jurist has
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succeeded or failed in deriving a correct ruling until the Day of Judgment, the final day when
humanity is called to stand before God to be judged, receiving either reward or punishment as
he decides. In the meantime, humanity must make do with the efforts of its legal scholars,
ignorant of what decision has earned the highest acclaim and is, therefore, absolutely correct.
The tension between the ideal and the real codes of Islamic law interacts with the
tension between reason and revelation described above to make Islamic law a flexible
instrument rather than a rigid, unalterable legal code. While the tension between reason and
revelation ensured that the implementation of Islamic law will not deviate too far from its divine
ideal, the irreconcilable tension between the real and the idea means that Islamic legal rulings
can differ from one another, even to the point of contradiction. This allows the law to permit
different courses of conduct depending on the society that realizes the law. We shall see many
examples of this below, including the problem of interest, which is prohibited in most places,
but allowed (with some restrictions) in the United States. This flexibility derives from the
inevitability of compromise.
Because the law will never be perfectly realized in this world, jurists must make
compromises, but because each society is composed differently and expects different behavior
from its members, the compromises each demands will in turn be different. This opens the door
for conflicting legal decisions that are valid only within the particular social context of the
judgment. This enables a jurist to give tailor-made, specific solutions to local problems that may
or may not reconcile with the determinations in other locations, giving rise to legal pluralism
within the Sharia itself.
The flexibility of the Sharia can thus be envisioned in two ways. There is a horizontal
flexibility of Islamic law that is based in the idea that compromises must take place between the
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divine ideal and specific social contexts that make the law adaptable across diverse societies.
There is also a vertical flexibility of Islamic law, which is the distinction between reason and
revelation that enables the law to be extrapolated through time and remain continuous while it
adapts to changes in life and religion. These two flexibilities are important for the American
context because Muslims in the US are not simply living in different circumstances than
originally envisioned for the Muslim community when the law was formulated, but they also live
in different circumstances than their brothers and sisters in Islamicate societies where the law
has a long history of implementation. When the two flexibilities of the law combine, the effect is
one that allows the law to adapt to the dynamic and diverse circumstances of the United States
to encourage assimilation without disappearance and ensures the maintenance of Islamic
practice and identity despite the differences between American and non-American Muslims.
The Divisions of Fiqh
Fiqh has two elements: a procedural element and a codified one. Codified fiqh is called
Furūᶜ al-Fiqh, which means in Arabic literally the “branches of jurisprudence.” It is what we most
commonly recognize as law. It is sometimes called substantive or positive law, though those are
inadequate terms. The Furūᶜ make up the law of those actions a Muslim should perform or avoid
performing to follow religion. Works of Furūᶜ inform an individual how to worship, what
constitutes a valid contract or marriage, how to divide an estate, what to eat and other issues
that pertain directly to the life of every Muslim. In this work, I will refer to the Furūᶜ as “Codified
Law.”
Fiqh as a process uses the Uṣūl al-Fiqh. This phrase in Arabic literally means the “roots
(or principles) of jurisprudence.” These principles consist of the methodology for deriving law
from its sources, specifying what sources are legitimate for the law, how to rank the evidence
32
found in such sources as well as how to reason in ways that restrict the liberty of interpretation
so that the meaning closest to the truth can be derived. I will refer to this law as “Processual
Law.”23
The existence of these two forms of Islamic jurisprudence allows their articulation to
create new law. New law is developed through a process with its own rules and guidance and is
particularly important in settings like the United States that do not have a history of Islamic legal
thought. In such areas, there is an active question regarding how one is to adopt Islamic law to
the new social environment and to what degree one should engage in innovation. While the
theoretical concepts of the two forms of flexibility described above set the stage for the
possibility of adaptation, they do not automatically makes such adaptation possible. Instead, it is
through the operation of jurisprudence that the law is actually adapted to new environments in
fact and this process is itself an area of contention both within the US and abroad.
The practice of creating and modifying rules for and by the Uṣūl al-Fiqh is called ijtihād,
which comes from the root j-h-d, connoting “to struggle.” The process of ijtihad is the
application of one’s reasoning faculties combined with the strict methodologies of the Islamic
sciences (including the sciences in their whole scope: exegesis, methodology of the Traditions,
theology and sometimes even mysticism) as well as the non-religious sciences (including history,
linguistics, the study of literature and poetry, logic, mathematics, astronomy, geography and
other sundry disciplines) to solve a legal problem. The combination of this knowledge in one
person enables them to conduct ijtihad and allows them to assume the title mujtahid, or
23 Laura Nader is famous for her discussion of law as process (see “Controlling Processes: Tracing the
Dynamics of Power” (1997)). I should indicate that my use of “processual law” and Nader’s use of law as
process are fundamentally different. Nader’s concern with law as process is how law functions within
society to structure and create social relations. My use of law as process here refers to the knowledge
process of legal production not its role in social control.
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someone who exercises ijtihad (Weiss 2006, 88-9). The result of ijtihad is the Furūᶜ, or codified
law.
The nature of ijtihad and its continuing validity is a controversial subject; one that has
sparked debates in both the religious and secular scholarship of Islam. Because ijtihad in its
widest scope means a reinterpretation of every aspect of Islamic law, there is a general
reluctance to recognize this authority as commonplace since its exercise threatens to reinvent
the entire Islamic legal tradition every time a qualified mujtahid uses it. Such a potential to re-
interpret the ground rules of Islamic law threatens its stability and consistency, which are
hallmarks of all effective legal codes. A widely discussed belief holds that the so-called “Gates of
Ijtihad” closed sometime between the tenth to fourteenth century of the Christian calendar (or
the fifth to the eighth century of the Islamic), preventing future generations from recreating
Islamic legal principles from scratch (Watt 1974, 676, Schacht 1964, 70-1, Ali-Karamali & Dunne
1994, 244).24
While the theory of the closure of the Gates of Ijtihad is often dismissed as an extension
of the belief that Islam had stagnated culturally and intellectually (Ali-Karamali & Dunne 1994,
256-7), the historical facts show the situation to be complicated. First, while major efforts to
conduct ijtihad do seem to have stopped except in individual circumstances (such as those
described by Hallaq, which will be discussed below (Hallaq 1984)), meaning that no individuals
founded independent legal schools after the so-called Closure, intellectual work to refine and
develop ideas within these major schools continued apace.
24 As with the rest of this dissertation, this discussion of Islamic law refers to the Sunni understanding of
Ijtihad, Shi’ites have a different understanding of the role of Ijtihad in the development of Islamic law and
who is capable of performing it.
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Instead of re-inventing the process of Fiqh from scratch, scholars channeled their efforts
into drafting sophisticated, multi-layered commentaries of already extant legal works, which are
often themselves significant exemplars of independent legal thought. While the emphasis
shifted away from producing innovative scholarship, scholars continued to work on perfecting
what scholarship was available.
Second, there was a strong intellectual reason for slowing down the production of new
legal thought. Given the general consistency of technological and social trends throughout this
period, it was felt by many jurists that a reinterpretation of the basic tenants of Islamic law
could do more harm than good (Weiss 1978, 208, Ali-Karamali & Dunne 1994, 241-7).
As scholarship has increasingly argued, the belief that the Gates to Ijtihad had closed
was not unanimous among Sunni Islamic jurists. Hallaq was the first to address this issue
forcefully in his famous article “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” (1984). In this essay, he clearly
indicates several examples of scholars, such as Suyuti (d. 1505), Shawkani (d. 1839) and Al-
Sanusi (d. 1895), who were recognized both by themselves and others as being practitioners of
ijtihad either at a level close to or equal with the original scholars of Islamic law. Hallaq also
indicates many scholars, such as Al-Bashbishi (d. 1730), Al-Manufi (d. 1722) and Ibn Al-Naqib (d.
1769), who viewed themselves as engaging in Ijtihad as broadly defined, seeming to refute the
previous arguments that the so-called Gates to Ijtihad had closed (Hallaq 1984).
Hallaq’s engagement with Schacht and earlier thinkers, who advocated for the closure,
in this article and others (Hallaq 1986) sparked a decades-long debate that is only now settling
into a consensus. While its technical points need not concern us here, understanding the state
of the consensus is significant because it sheds light on the importance that ijtihad as a concept
has for understanding the role of Islamic law in the lives of American Muslims.
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There are some crucial oversights in both the original arguments about the closure of
the Gates of Ijtihad and its defense. Primary among these is neglecting the details of ijtihad as a
process and the levels within which it is conducted, a point made by more recent scholarship
(Ali-Karamali & Dunne 1994, 254-7). In this vein, not all mujtahids are alike, nor is every exercise
of ijtihad identical. There are, in fact, three generally recognized degrees of ijtihad: Ijtihād al-
Muṭlaq al-Mustaqīl (Absolute Independent Ijtihad), Ijtihād al-Muṭlaq al-Muntassib (Absolute
Derivative Ijtihad) and Ijtihād fī al-Madhhab (Ijtihad Within a School). These three terms
represent levels of ijtihad with decreasing degrees of authority. The first is the most
authoritative and has traditionally been considered to be possessed only by the greatest jurists
in history. These individuals include the founders of the current schools of Islamic legal thought.
They are usually considered to be Abu Hanifah, Malik Ibn Anas, Al-Shafi‘i and Ahmad ibn Hanbal
along with, perhaps, the other scholars mentioned earlier who codified their writings. The
second category of ijtihad are those scholars who are well educated in the law, but not to the
extent that the founders of the school were, so that while they are constrained to using the
founders’ methodology, they may make decisions that conflict with the findings of their given
school’s founder. The third is the most constrained scholar: this is a person who is able only to
research the findings of the previous two categories within a school and then deliver a decision
copying those scholars (Kamali 2003, 489-94, Weiss 2006, 129-30).
As we see from the above, the question of who can exercise ijtihad it is far more
complicated than it might seem at the outset. The question of closing the Gates of Ijtihad is
likewise more difficult, for the authors involved in this question rarely describe which of these
three forms of ijtihad they imagine to have closed. It is clear, for example, that with the
exception of the emergence of very recent trends in Islamic thought, the Gates to the first form
36
of ijtihad are almost certainly closed. While Hallaq in his article cites scholars who considered
themselves free of the established legal schools (Hallaq 1984, 10-18), none of these thinkers
were successful in establishing a new school of legal thought.
While the above debate has been carried on largely within the secular auspices of the
academy, currents within the living Islamic world have been moving quickly. Most Muslims
follow a conservative path that partakes in the traditions Schacht, Hallaq and their colleagues
analyzed and debated. A minority follow a different path. Among this group, new intellectual
phenomena have emerged within the system of Islamic law to challenge and even overturn the
old consensus of legal schools and traditions. This challenge is a liberal current that has sought
to redefine Islamic legal and religious orthodoxy and has played a significant role in reforming,
for better or worse, Islamic thought throughout the world.
As colonialism emerged and Islamic institutions came increasingly into contact and
conflict with the European package of traits often called Modernity, strong reactive currents
developed within the world of Islamic legal scholarship. These trends built upon and interacted
with a revivalist movement called Wahhabism that was first preached in the Arabian Peninsula
immediately before the beginning of Islam’s encounter with colonial Europe. In its essence,
Wahhabism demands a radical revision of Islamic practice and its return to an idealized, even
mythic past, embodied by what its adherents consider the pure practice of the Prophet and his
companions. This call to return to the past captured the imagination of worshippers outside of
the confines of the Wahhabist movement, creating loosely affiliated schools of theology and law
called Salafism, some of which are aligned or even part of Wahhabist thought while others
oppose and even challenge it.
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Salafism is characterized by a rejection of the details of the Islamic intellectual tradition.
It demands revision of that tradition in the light of contemporary developments, often using
traditional Islamic thinkers, but rejecting the traditional interpretations of their texts or their
categorization in Islamic schools of thought, especially the legal schools. Far from its typical
portrayal as necessarily radical and fundamentalist, parties to this revision seek opposing goals
and have different levels of adversarialism. Some elements do advocate the rejection of
European culture, politics and even science entirely, while others advocate their adoption and
assimilation into the greater Islamic tradition (Mahmood 2011, 61, Wagemakers 2012, 2-10).
Salafist intellectuals like Muhammad ‘Abduh demanded a revision in Islamic law and
other Islamic traditions that would “update” Islam, bringing into the realm of modernity.25 Their
arguments, while assimilationist, were often extreme. ‘Abduh himself, for example, considered
Islam to be enslaved by its devotion to the past and corrupted by it, declaring that modernity
was so compatible with Islam that some modern, non-Muslim countries like France were in
many ways more “Islamic” than Muslim countries themselves, meaning that the principles they
adopted conformed to the Islamic ideal better than ostensibly Muslim countries’ values
(Encyclopedia of Islam, ‘Abduh).
The second part of this movement was more closely aligned with the Wahhabis. They
formed a fundamentalist trend that demanded the Islamic tradition as a whole be revised and
much of it jettisoned. Any aspects of the tradition that did not reflect a pure and unadulterated
25 Despite the current understanding of the word, reformers like Abduh and Al-Afghani have often been
considered Salafists, though whether they assumed this label themselves is subject to debate. For a
history of this term and how it has undergone change since its initial emergence as a school of Islamic
modernity see Lauzière’s “The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of
Conceptual History” (2010).
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image of life and religion as it existed at the time of the Prophet was to be abandoned and
current society restructured to reflect this ideal (Wagemakers 2012, 2-10).
These two trends, which were both initially referred to as Salafism, necessitated
wholesale revisions of the received tradition and, consequently, required a full re-opening of the
Gates of Ijtihad. This reopening was necessitated on the one hand by the need to re-evaluate
the entirety of the Islamic intellectual tradition to improve it and on the other by the need to
create new Islamically centered legal judgments. These new judgments would answer demands
made by a new set of political, social, economic and religious conditions created by the political
decline of colonized Islamic powers and the ascendancy of European, Christian colonizers.
Salafists felt this shift in the balance of power away from Islam and towards Christianity required
abandoning the structure of the four Sunni schools of law almost entirely. In doing so, however,
most of these thinkers did not reject the scholars who established these schools themselves and
many Salafists have recourse to their legal and other religious works, merely the formalization of
schools of legal thought and their subsequent organization that arose in their names.
While these Salafist movements are influential, they have only ever appealed to a
minority of Muslims. As such, they have been unable to supplant the traditional schools of
Islamic law. The influence of Salafism has caused some scholars to re-evaluate the assumptions
undergirding the system of the four schools, however, especially as it relates to communities
living outside the Islamicate world.
The divide between the traditional schools of Islamic law and Salafist thought is
particularly appropriate to the practice of Islam in the US. As we shall see, there are two major
approaches to Islamic law among American Muslims, the traditional schools brought over by
immigrants and indigenous schools of legal interpretation created by American jurists, including
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figures like Warith Deen (W.D.) Muhammad. These schools of legal thought divide largely,
though not exclusively, along racial lines, with Euro-American converts and immigrants following
the traditional legal schools and African-Americans following the school of W.D. Muhammad.
The latter tend to see themselves either as Salafists descriptively or engaged in a similar project
of creating wholly new or rejuvenated body of Islamic law while the former tend to see
themselves operating within the established tradition of Islamic legal thought established in
Islamicate countries.
This division, as we shall see, has serious social effects. Those associated with traditional
schools of Islamic law have a kind of cultural and social capital that is more widely recognized
than the followers of new schools of law. Those following traditional groups attend Islamic
institutes of learning in the Middle East and often have greater command not just of the
traditional religious sciences, but of the language of Arabic, which is a key determiner of
intellectual legitimacy in Islam. Those who adopt a more Salafist-like approach draw on their
own form of capital, however, and see themselves as building an Islam that is not beholden on
old countries and older ways of life, but that harkens back directly to the Prophet and his
Companions to build a way of being Muslim that is truly and authentically American without the
mediation of other societies. Ultimately, the key difference between the two approaches is their
relationship to the question of whether Islamic law remains an open field of investigation or
whether current scholars are bound to the traditions of their predecessors. The debate over
how to do this adaptation is an important one in the US, but also in the broader Islamic world as
it grapples with issues of modernity and unites American Muslims with their compatriots
outside the country.
The Process of Ijtihad
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Regardless where an individual’s expertise falls on the spectrum of the three forms of
ijtihad, understanding the basics of legal thought is essential to developing legal decisions. As
discussed, ijtihad is not merely the application of one’s mind to legal problems, but a system to
discover the ratio legis governing a matter. In order to generate this ruling, one must use the
Uṣūl al-Fiqh, the roots that anchor the branches in the law. Islamic jurists in the US, when
contemplating new legal debate, follow this process when facing a legal question for which
there is no precedent, therefore understanding its mechanics will help us gain insight into the
challenges of developing novel legal judgments.
Traditionally, there are four roots which both Salafists and traditionalists recognize
comprising the Uṣūl. They are, in descending order of importance: the Qur’an, the Hadith, Ijmāᶜ
(consensus) and Qiyās (analogical reasoning). 26 The first two are the highest in rank for
validating a legal opinion since they constitute the corpus of revelation. The latter two are more
complicated and less certain since they emerge from the context of the unrevealed world and
are therefore problematic. While they have the potential to be accurate sources of the law, they
carry a double burden compared with the single burden of revelation. One merely needs to
interpret revelation correctly, for the legitimacy of its foundation as a source is inerrant and
clear, being given to humanity by God through the Prophet. In the case of Ijmāᶜ and Qiyās, one
must not only interpret them correctly, but one must also derive them using one’s own reason.
This creates two chances to err: first when one creates the foundation for either consensus or
analogy and second when one actually undertakes to build the consensus or to analogize.
26 In Shi’i jurisprudence, ᶜAql replaces Qiyās, this fact being one of the major differences between Sunni
and Shi’i Islamic law.
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Ijmāᶜ represents the consensus of the community. Which community is included in that
consensus; whether it is all the Muslims in the world, just scholars or an even more restricted
group, varies from school to school and scholar to scholar (Kamali 2003, 233-36). Consensus is,
therefore, very difficult to establish and is cited as proof for only a limited number of decisions.
Despite its ambiguity, its validity is confirmed by a Hadith that says “my community (of Islam)
will never agree on an error” (Al-Tirmidhi 4:2167).
Qiyās is more involved both procedurally and practically than Ijmāᶜ. It is a source of law
which not all schools rely on equally and not all individuals view as fully legitimate but plays a
major role in the practice of Islamic law regardless; a much larger one than Ijmaᶜ despite its rank
as a lower legal source. Qiyās is analogical reasoning, a particular kind of reasoning that is
different from the unaided reason of human beings (Kamali 2003, 264-8).
The introduction of Qiyās into Islamic law was a way to expand the scope of the law
while simultaneously restricting the ability of unaided reason to expand it beyond the bounds of
revelation. Because it is the most reliant on individual reasoning of all the sources, however, it is
the most controversial. Consequently, most jurists subject it to strict limits. In large part due to
these restrictions it is very rigorous and extremely complicated to undertake.
Qiyās proceeds by identifying a situation for which there is no precedent in Islamic law,
then creates a ruling for the situation in question based on the its similarity to another for which
there is a certain ruling. This happens by identifying the known ruling’s “cause,” or ᶜillah
(identical to the Anglo-European ratio legis) and determining whether the new situation to
which the ruling will be applied is characterized by something similar. If so, the old ruling is
applicable to the new situation. If not, then a new ruling must be found to govern it (Kamali
2003, 267-8).
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An example of this process is the wide-spread prohibition of wine in Islam. In the
Arabian world there were two kinds of wine, khamr, a wine made from grapes and nabīdh, a
wine made from dates. According to the most authoritative source of law, the Qur’an, khamr is
prohibited to drink (Qur’an 2:219, 4:43, 5:90-1), but its prohibition does not mention nabīdh.
Should the verse be considered to prohibit both of these kinds of alcoholic drink or just the first?
Applying Qiyās helps us arrive at an answer. If we examine the prohibition with its context, we
note that the prohibition’s ᶜillah is the disrupted state of mind of someone who drinks. Because
this cause exists with both khamr and nabīdh, we can infer via analogical reasoning the latter is
prohibited just as is the former (Ormsby 2012 35).
Using reason to deduct rulings from texts for issues that are not clear is not limited to
Qiyās. Various other tools can be used to supplement the sources of the law, though their
validity is far less certain than the four roots of jurisprudence. Because of their questionable
authenticity, these methods are used to derive rulings only in the event that Qiyās renders an
unsatisfactory result. Such a failure could happen because an analogical ruling cannot be found
in revelatory sources or because the implementation of the analogical ruling would result in an
obvious injustice. In the latter case, the resources ijtihad uses are similar to the process by
which courts of equity have operated in Anglo-American jurisdictions. To highlight this similarity,
we should note that in medieval Islamic states these concepts were restricted to their own
special courts of equity called the Maẓālim which had their own staff and personnel (Tyan 1960
460-94), a fact which parallels the equitable courts of Chancery, Admiralty and the Star Chamber
that existed in England to fix shortcomings in judgments from Common Law courts. These
options for equity include preferring a less obvious ruling to an obvious one (istiḥsān) or
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pronouncing a ruling that does not exist in any text but is necessary to promote common
welfare (maṣlaḥah mursalah) (Kamali 2011, 323-69).
These concepts of equity are particularly important in the American realization of
Islamic law. Often the American social context presents conflicts to Islamic law. Interest-based
financing, courtship rituals, dietary habits and mixed gender interaction all place a burden on a
Muslim desiring to follow the Sharia scrupulously because each of these seems to require an
American Muslim to do things that directly contradict traditional rulings of Islamic law. How to
reconcile the demands of American society with a law-abiding existence, therefore, implicates
equitable principles in many of the most difficult problems facing Islamic jurists in the United
States.
Despite their need, recourse to these legal concepts is controversial. While all of the
four main Sunni legal schools recognize one or more of these sources of law, it is often with
great caution and restriction. Such caution exists because they have no textual source
supporting them or because they may prefer a less certain textual source over a better one. As a
result of their reliance on reason and inferior sources of law, they create legal rulings that put
the truth of revelation in jeopardy. They are, therefore, only used in cases where the more
technically correct ruling would result in an injustice so obvious it could not be part of the ideal
Sharia.
These rulings rely on a long-established theory of the Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah, or the “aims
of the Sharia,” to determine their justification. The Maqāṣid are considered to be five in
number: protection of life (Nafs), religion (Dīn), lineage (Nasb), property (Māl) and intellect
(‘Aql). The theoretical use of these is not without dispute, however, for they are artificial
categories not found in scripture. They are instead derived by scholars (especially Imam Al-
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Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah) who extract them from the basis of legal rulings within the Uṣūl
(Abu Zahra 294-301). The reliance this self-guided extraction provides to jurists provides them a
wide latitude to use these tools to reform and shape the law. Due to the creative potential they
have for jurists, the four traditional schools, which are conservative in their approach, use them
sparingly, while reformers tend to the more extreme ends of adoption or abandonment of these
Islamic tools of equity. Salafist fundamentalists eschew them as innovative while Salafist
reformers, such as ‘Abduh, view them as the justification for implementing various schemes of
“modernization” for Islamic ideas and society (Ibrahim 2004, 51-3).
Regardless of the stance one takes toward the Maqāṣid and the elements of the Uṣūl al-
Fiqh influenced by them, the Uṣūl remain a process of law without being by themselves a legal
code. While they allow the jurists to derive the branches, the literal meaning of furūᶜ, from the
roots, the literal meaning of uṣūl, the roots form a blank slate that informs rather than dictates.
Only after the processual law of the Uṣūl al-Fiqh have been applied can one obtains the codified
law of the Furūᶜ al-Fiqh.
As a product of the Uṣūl, Furūᶜ al-Fiqh is by its nature different from the rules which
produce it. While the Uṣūl is a set of rules to derive law, or a lawyer’s law, the Furūᶜ is a result of
that process and forms the actual code of behaviors that instruct the layperson how to act in a
lawfully Islamic manner. In other words, it is the layman’s law.27 In this capacity, the Furūᶜ covers
a variety of subjects which are divided into the two broader categories described above: the
27 It is very useful to think of the distinction in Islamic law between the “Lawyer’s Law” and the “Layman’s
Law,” not because the lawyers don’t use the Layman’s Law, which they have to obey themselves, but
because they are the concerns of different parties. Note here, however, that I use the term “Lawyer’s
Law” and not “Jurist’s Law,” which is used in opposition to “State” or “Statutory Law.” This is a distinction
that also applies to Islamic law, but both a Jurist’s Law and a State Law are forms for the creation of law
(either by an elite group of jurists or by a the state itself) and so should not be confused with the
distinction I draw here between a Lawyer’s Law and a Layman’s Law.
45
ᶜibādāt, or worship, which includes rules on how to pray, fast, eat, etc., and the muᶜāmalāt, or
interactions, which governs business dealings, marriage, criminal law, etc. These two branches
instruct the individual how to be a faithful Muslim in action and when combined with the other
religious sciences (such as Sufism or theology) create a holistic set of religious beliefs and
practices.
Because the Furūᶜ deal with how worshippers are to conduct themselves in their daily
life, while the Uṣūl involve a highly technical process requiring a great deal of education and
study, Furūᶜ are the parts of Islamic law that most worshippers encounter and deal with on a
regular basis.
There is a temptation in look at the difference between the Uṣūl and the Furūᶜ and read
a hierarchical relationship between them. If the Uṣūl are the foundations for the Furūᶜ, it seems
that the prior should be superior to the latter. In some cases, this is true: a master of Uṣūl is
definitely in the category of the Mujtāhid al-Muṭlaq al-Mustaqīl while the person who knows
only the Furūᶜ is a Mujtāhid fī al-Madhhab.
In reality, however, things are rarely if ever this clear. For example, both Uṣūl and Furūᶜ
have different sets of literature that a scholar must master. Moreover, given the complexities of
everyday life, there are often cases that fall clearly into neither category, meaning that while the
problematic issue is not entirely new, and therefore does not wholly merit the efforts of the
Uṣūl, neither is it identical to the issues dealt with in the traditional Furūᶜ.
An example that will be explored in more detail later is the permissibility of buying a
house using an interest-bearing loan in the United States. Clearly, it is in the interest of the law
to allow a Muslim to own a home. In fact, at least three of the Aims of the Sharia are applicable
to buying such a house (i.e. protection of self, property and lineage). Moreover, home
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ownership is nearly impossible in the US without contracting an interest-bearing mortgage.
Islamic law does allow some exemption to its rules on things like interest in cases where
following Islamic law is impossible, but these are supposed to be exceptions. What happens
when the exception becomes the rule, as is the case for American Muslims pursuing home
ownership? What is one to do in such a conflict?
The response that an individual scholar has to such a problem largely depends on their
intellectual and religious backgrounds. A Salafist or revisionist would say that one should have
recourse to the very basic elements of the law, calling for the use of Uṣūl to determine a brand-
new ruling, or fatwa, which will create new Furūᶜ. In this case, the scholar is relying wholly on his
own independent jurisprudence. These people are in the minority of Muslims, however. Most
scholars would instead look to the extant Furūᶜ texts, which are large and numerous, to derive a
ruling.
As I shall show later, these texts are likely to have decisions that roughly deal with the
situation in question. If they do not discuss it exactly, then they will do so generally. In the event
that one or more appropriate decisions can be found, the scholar will use them to issue his
fatwa. In the rare event that no decision can be found,28 then scholars would exercise their own
ijtihad and fall into the second category of scholarship, Derived Ijtihad because, unlike their
Salafist counterpart, they would use the strictures of a particular school to derive their opinion.
The Unicity (Tawḥīd) of Islamic Law
28 This is likely never to happen and almost all of the Imams I interviewed said they had not encountered
it. It would require a very drastic question to fall into this category, something very restricted to the
conditions of modern society, for even such questions as transgenderism and transvestitism, the licitness
of homosexual relations, the duty of citizen to self and group when they conflict and other subjects we
view as being uniquely contemporary or modern in origin are in fact covered in extent works of the Furū‘.
For an in-depth discussion of topics similar to these viewed through the traditional lens of Islamic
citizenship, see March’s Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus (2009).
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The pluralistic nature of Islamic law begs the issue of its coherence. Can we speak of a
single Sharia? It seems clear, if we focus only on how Islamic law is practiced, that we can’t. Not
only is Fiqh, both in its Uṣūl and Furūᶜ varieties, different across the various schools of Islamic
law (and its theological divisions between Sunni and Shi’ite), but the addition of national legal
codes with influences from colonial legal structures, particularly the French Code Civil and the
English Common Law, create a dynamic environment where the application of Islamic law differs
from country to country. Even in countries that have no colonial past, such as Afghanistan, the
adoption of the Ottoman legal code, the Mecelle, establishes a situation where the application
of Sharia creates variation and difference across the spectrum of its practice.
This diversity contrasts with the fundamental unicity which is so important in both
Islamic theology and practice. In Islamic thought, tawḥīd is the essential unicity of the divine
and, consequently, all existence (expressed in other terms as the waḥdat al-wujūd). It is,
arguably, the primary principle of Islamic theology. The principle of unicity derives from the
concept that perfection in being is reflected in God’s existence as an undivided being. Because
God is undivided, therefore, so must all aspects of his existence be undivided. This perfect
unicity means that Sharia, being God’s way, is theologically a single code, even if its practice is
multiplicitous.
The core of this paradox rests in the above-cited Hadith that a jurist who errs in his work
receives one reward in heaven while the jurist who is right receives two (Sahih Muslim 4261).
This Hadith establishes (1) that there is a right answer to any legal question, i.e. there is a single
code that is perfect and undifferentiated, (2) that deviation from it is possible and, due to the
imperfection of the world, acceptable even if (3) the answer in error is inferior to the ideal.
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The ideal of the unicity of Islamic law stands in direct contrast to the multiplicity of its
reality, which raises the question of which legal answer is closer to the truth and is, therefore
“better”? The answer to this question must depend entirely on the level of analysis chooses to
examine it.
The classic anthropological distinction between the etic and the emic helps square the
circle of our analytical paradox. It is clear that if one takes the etic perspective, it makes sense to
examine Islamic law as a multiplicitous phenomenon. Sharia from the outsiders’ analysis, which
ignores its claims to divine provenance based on anthropology’s agnostic principles, looks at the
law from a legal realist’s perspective: Islamic law is as Islamic law does. If the law demands
different results in different locations, then the law must be different and therefore not a single
set of rules.
If, however, we examine Sharia from the emic perspective, we arrive at a very different
conclusion. In the emic world of Islam, the law is singular in its truest, most real divine form. It is
only the fallibility of the human race that creates multiplicity where divine unicity is present.
Consequently, the law truly is one and the problem that must be reconciled is not recognizing its
separate divisions but understanding how they emerge from a single source.
The law from the divine perspective may be multiple as it is experienced, but at its font
it is perfect and continuously unbroken. In our world, this perspective is reversed; put on its
head. The law’s empirical multiplicity, which is less real than its true nature, must be reconciled
with its divine unity.
The analysis in which we engage here will be from the emic perspective. While it may
seem both theoretically and empirically naïve to assume the unicity of Islamic law, all of the
interlocutors and informants with which I dealt believed in the unitary assumption and acted as
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if it true. They viewed the divisions that existed in the implantation of Sharia in society to be
imperfections to overcome. In fact, many of them believed, as we shall see below, that the
unique conditions of the United States provided a realistic hope for the reduction of these
differences and the distillation of a single, unified perfection. In other words, they viewed the
Sharia as a thing that could be made as wholly perfect in the world as it was in the eye of God.
In light of this, my informants’, perspective, when we as anthropologists presume
Islamic law to be multiplicitous, while the assumption may seem to tally more closely to actual
observation, we will actually introduce more analytical difficulty into our work, for we will have
to explain why informants speak of Islamic law as one when it is clearly multiple. Far from
creating a rigorous analytical lens that reflects empirical reality, we will be injecting the bias of
the anthropologist for the empirical onto the preferred reality of the informant, which is one
that subscribes to the theological model of unitary perfection.
Therefore, in order to understand the perspective of America’s Muslims most directly
and completely, in this analysis we must assume that Islamic law is a single phenomenon that is
incorrectly understood to be multiple rather than vice-versa. If our goal were simply to
understand Islamic law as social practice, perhaps this approach would be imperfect, but if we
wish to understand Islamic law as lived in the community where I researched, positing the law’s
unicity is the only proper course.
A Note on the Anthropological Study of Islamic Law
The section above has discussed the theoretical elements of Islamic law in great detail.
While this was important to establish the groundwork of our discussion and to outline terms
that will be significant in later argument, it left less room to explore the question of what Islamic
law means to the average worshipper. A neglect of the average Muslim is not an uncommon
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trend in the study of Islamic law, a subject where most of the scholarly effort in the academy
has focused on researching its intellectual history and development, which is primarily a story of
cultural elites. Less often studied is how Islamic law is used and what it means to its
constituents. This is true even of anthropological efforts.
Many of the great anthropological studies of Islamic law including Rosen, Hirsch and
more recently Agrama, Bowen and Keshavjee have looked at judges and the apparatus of family
courts (Rosen 1989; Hirsch 1998; Agrama 2012; Keshavjee 2013; Bowen 2016). Fewer studies
have examined how individuals use and implement the law in their daily lives. Notable
exceptions to this are the recent ethnography published by Erie on how the Chinese Muslim
minority, the Hui, use Islamic law to govern social relations in China and the non-ethnographic,
but highly informative work by McFarlane on Islamic divorce in North America (Erie 2016;
McFarlane 2012). The third is Haeri’s work on temporary marriage among Shi’i Muslims in Iran
(Haeri 2014).
The lack of research into the quotidian use of Islamic law is unfortunate because the
creation of legal rulings by specialist jurists is only half of Islamic law’s story. Equally significant,
particularly in places where Islam is not the dominant religion and often has to rely on
mechanisms outside of the state for its authority, is how individuals use and implement Islamic
law in their own lives and why they voluntarily submit themselves to its rules despite its
requirements and restrictions. This project is an attempt in part to fill this gap by addressing not
only how Islamic law in the United States is produced, but also how and why it is obeyed. This
well-rounded perspective is important because Islamic law, like any other form of law, exists not
just for the elites who (re)produce and enforce it, but also for the constituents who subscribe to
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and implement it. In other words, the law, like the tango, is a dance that “takes two.”
Researching the one while neglecting the other will provide only half of the picture.
Here we will address that question broadly, identifying several trends within the
American population and examining how American Muslims use and identify Islamic law. While
some of the phenomena discussed here are unique to American Muslims, many of them are
found in communities of Muslims throughout the globe, especially those in places like Europe
where they exist as a minority within a larger, non-Muslim society.
As an introduction, we can say that the first and most obvious way American Muslims
use and understand Islamic law is as described above: Islamic law forms the basis for a
relationship between God and the individual worshipper. The law establishes a relationship
between the worshipper and God in two ways. The first and most obvious is by instructing the
worshipper how to approach God. The law, for example, not only dictates the time and form of
prayer, which is an obvious form of communion with God, it also explains how one should purify
and prepare the body for that communion. Islam also has very distinct and obligatory
purification practices for the body, rituals which are required not just before prayer, but on
other important occasions, such as before reading or reciting the Qur’an. These aspects of
worship form important elements of Islamic law and thereby provide the worshipper a
framework for rendering the divine a legitimate form of worship.
The law also regulates conduct on more uncommon but significant occasions. The law
determines how and when to conduct the Hajj, for instance. It also is essential for determining
the timing of the fasts during the holy month of Ramadan. The question of timing is important
because, as we shall see, the question of how and when to fix the timing of the fast is one of the
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biggest challenges the community of Muslims and Islamic legal scholars has faced in the United
States.
The law also instructs individuals how to work for their own salvation. In some
instances, the law actually seems to imply a ratio of rewards and punishments through
Prophetic traditions that claim, for example, that charity given during the month of Ramadan
will be rewarded seventy-fold (Ibn Khuzeimah 1887). The law further encourages correct
behavior to achieve salvation by establishing the conditions of permissibility and prohibition.
Knowing which action fits into which category is essential for Muslims to live a
blameless and holy life and earn the accolades that secure redemption of their souls before
God. Without the law, knowing which act is associated with which category is impossible, for it
is legal rulings that establish this connection. The system of allowance and prohibition covers
food, the regulation of which is extraordinarily important and is the subject of at least one fatwa
from every association of Islamic law in the United States. It also involves finance, which is also a
popular topic of legal inquiry.
A harmonious society is also important for salvation and honoring God within an Islamic
worldview. Toward this end, there are two kinds of legal obligations. Those outlined above,
which include following the rules for consumption, devotion and other individual acts, fall into
the category of Farḍ al-ᶜAyn, or “Individual Obligations.” These are requirements that are
incumbent on the individual to fulfill and can be communicated to the worshipper only by a
qualified legal scholar. Other requirements are considered Farḍ al-Kifāyah. These are obligations
that pertain to the community as a whole and must be fulfilled by at least one member of it.
These include, for example, having an expert in Islamic jurisprudence to determine Islamically
valid rules and forms of worship.
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Having a harmonious society, acting according to the mandate of God is not merely an
issue of fulfilling the Farḍ al-Kifāyah, however. There are also many issues relating to inter-
personal relations that the law must govern. These include modesty rules for women (when
applicable) as well as rules governing the interaction of the sexes. Particularly prominent in the
latter are rules for marriage, which will form a substantial part of our analysis. Establishing these
harmonious relations between people involves, in fact, three of the five aspects of the Goals of
the Sharia: the protection of lineage, wealth, religion; while only two clearly pertain to individual
concerns: intellect and life.
Islamic law and the jurists who specialize in it are therefore called upon to resolve many
interpersonal disputes, even in countries that have a secular legal system. As we will see, this is
especially true in the United States where civic authority will often support and even enforce
religious compacts if they are made under certain conditions, including divorce settlements,
business contracts, arbitration clauses and prenuptial agreements. Because of this fact,
American Muslims use Islamic law in many different ways to guide their interactions with each
other, both to please God and to ensure social stability.
This last point highlights a third major aspect of Islamic law for American Muslims: it
creates a community of the faithful and links them together through social solidarity.29
American Muslims, like Muslims in many places throughout the world, use Islamic law to create
cohesive community bonds. Some of these bonds develop out of the literal requirements of
Islamic law, such as the obligation to pray the Friday prayer communally in a mosque or
requirements to break the Ramadan fast communally. As I shall discuss below, other forms of
29 This is of course an ideal solidarity. In fact, the basic divisions that divide any society, including among
others, race, education, class, ethnicity, etc., divides Muslims among themselves, rendering such solidarity
far more complicated in fact. We shall discuss these divisions as they exist in American society below.
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solidarity develop as an indirect result of Islamic law requirements: the prohibition on the
consumption of alcohol eliminates certain venues where Americans typically congregate and
forces the Islamic community to replace them through Ḥilāl venues such as cafes or other
spaces, often within or near a mosque. Islamic prohibitions on certain kinds of social
interactions also encourage the development of alternative communities, especially for single
youth who cannot find spouses through dating and so must meet each other through family
members, singles’ events or youth groups. These youth groups are also important for socializing
in general; since one-on-one mingling of the sexes is discouraged, group events allow inter-
gender mixing for non-romantic purposes by providing a legally valid environment for such
interaction to occur. Islamic law also creates networks for business and commercial interaction
as recognized restaurants and groceries that sell Ḥilāl products become centers for possible
interaction. Banks and other finance vehicles offering Islamically approved options also create
business networks and other opportunities for members of the Muslim community that
strengthen inter-community ties.
Islamic law, therefore, is a key for individuals to build an Islamic community, not just in
countries where Islam is the predominant religion, but also in those areas where Muslims are in
the minority. Because of this fact, works that focus purely on the jurists and law-declaring
functions of Islamic law will miss the socially constitutive aspects of the law. Law, in other
words, is a thing that is as much used as it is declared. This ethnography will join the new trend
of ethnographies of Islamic law in looking not just at those parties to declare the law and reason
about it, but also discussing the population who uses it and what, exactly, that means for their








The biggest challenge to an anthropologist wishing to describe the American Muslim
community generally, or even a representative sampling of it, is its diversity. The Islamic
communities of Boston reflect this diversity, though many of them have a predominant ethnic
group. Considering this diversity, we will find the creation of a few sub-groups useful to analyze
the whole. It should be noted from the outset that this while this simplification is necessary, we
should bear in mind that it carries with it all the risks of any generalization and that many
individuals will either not fit neatly into one category or perhaps fit into several. We should also
keep in mind that this project focuses on the Islamic community in Boston. Despite this focus,
however, the general structure of the community in Boston is similar to the US at large,30
allowing us to discuss the two simultaneously.
The most general categorization of America’s Muslims one can make is into those
individuals who have either converted to Islam themselves or are descended from Christian
Americans whose ancestors have themselves converted to Islam while in the United States, and
individuals who are immigrants or descend from families who have immigrated into the United
States as Muslims, meaning that their ancestors converted to Islam elsewhere and they brought
their own, localized Islamic tradition to the US along with them as a part of their cultural
identity.
The first group people can be further divided into Americans who have converted and
practice within immigrant-dominated Islamic Centers (these converts are largely, though not
30 For more detail about the population of Muslims in the United States see the Pew Research Center’s
2017 report “U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society but Continue to Believe in the
American Dream” (2017).
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solely, Americans of European descent) and those who practice within predominately African-
American mosques. The first group tends to have a specialized role within the American Islamic
community as a whole. They often serve as mediators, interpreters, and even creators of
traditions, acting as a bridge between American and Islamic traditions.31 These are the people
communities tend to turn to most readily in forming an American Islamic identity or, as in the
case of the African-Americans, have the most experience and have made the most indigenously
American forms of Islamic life. Unfortunately for African-Americans, their great American
cultural expertise is sometimes overshadowed by racial stereotypes.
The second major group of American Muslims, who now form the vast majority of the
American Islamic community, are the descendants of immigrants who came to the United States
as Muslims. These individuals likewise fall into two categories. The first are the very early
immigrants to the US. These are the communities of mostly Levantine Arabs and Pakistani
Ahmadi Muslims who migrated in the last decade of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries before the imposition of religious and ethnic quotas governing immigration to the
United States (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 135-150;). These earliest immigrants largely settled in
southern Michigan, but an important community also emerged in Quincy and Dorchester,
Massachusetts (Rignall 2000, 51-52; Lahaj 2014, 2-7). The second group of Immigrant Muslims
immigrated in the 1960’s, coming to the United States after the ethnic and religious quotas
restricting immigration into the country that had been in place for most of the twentieth
century were lifted (Ahmed 2010, 229-33; GhaneaBassiri 2010, 292-95). These two groups had
very different ways of practicing Islam initially, but have largely merged with one another inside
America’s Islamic communities to become a single block.
31 Perhaps the most exemplary individuals of this group are Suhaib Webb and Hamza Yusuf.
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African-Americans
Of the Converts, the first group discussed above, the most significant group is the
African-American Muslim community. They represent the truest autochthonous community of
Muslims in the United States. Their origin is complex, tracing largely to the early twentieth
century and emerged from the dynamic and often hostile social environment African-Americans
encountered in American society at-large (Lincoln 1994, 47-62; Curtis 2002, 17-20).
African-American conversion to Islam was a mixture of political and social reaction to a
racially biased, oppressive environment as well as individual conviction that initially had few
connections to what is considered orthodox Sunni or Shi’ite practice. The earliest congregations
of Muslims were either influenced by Ahmadiyyah proselytism, giving the groups an Ahmadi
slant (Lincoln 1994, 221-222; McCloud 1995, 18-21; Curtis 2002, 71-72),32 or they were syncretic
creations of charismatic leaders whose project was as much if not more about rejecting a
religious tradition linked with slavery, i.e. Christianity, as it was about pursuing an Islamic life-
style (Lincoln 1994, 26-31; Curtis 2002, 7-8). This led to the creation of religious groups such as
the Moorish Science Temple of America and, most famously, its offshoot, the Nation of Islam,
which borrowed Islamic imagery, but ultimately paid little attention to formal Islamic traditions
and may not have even considered themselves to be within the larger Islamic religious tradition
32 Ahmadiyyah is similar to Baha’i in that it is a branch of Islam whose identity as such is controversial in
the Islamic world and for similar reasons. Like Baha’i, which was founded by an Iranian man claiming to
have received new revelation from God, Ahmadiyyah is based on the idea that a 19th century individual,
Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, was a messianic figure selected by God to reform the religion of Islam and create a
new spiritual order, fulfilling the intent of Muhammad and his original community. Because of the belief
that Muhammad was the final prophet, most Muslims consider Ahmed to have been at best heterodox
and at worst a heretic apostate. Currently the sect is under intense persecution in Pakistan, the territory
in which Ahmed initially began his prophetic mission. It is perhaps not insignificant, therefore, that this
branch of Islam, which was new in the early 20th century, would appear in Detroit and influence a religious
climate which as we shall see became characterized by a number of emerging charismatic leaders bearing
their own prophetic messages, some of which were only tangentially related to orthodox Islam. For more
information see Valentine 2008.
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(Lincoln 1994, 47-62). In this way, these new religions possessed a similar, though possibly even
more distant, relationship to Islam as another new American religion, Mormonism, possessed to
Christianity.
Of these new African-American religions, the Nation of Islam has had the strongest
influence on the black Islamic community. The Nation began when a stranger appeared in the
black neighborhoods of Detroit which were themselves exploring religious alternatives to
Christianity, some of which voiced themselves in vaguely Islamic terms (such as the Moorish
Science Temples). This individual, whose ethnicity was uncertain, was called Fard Muhammad.
He initially sold small consumer goods and claimed to be from a distant land that contained the
original religious practices of the ancestors of black Americans. The exact content of these
teachings are unclear, though they were based in a narrative of African-American supremacy.
His movement quickly gained steam and an early convert, Elijah Muhammad came to dominate
the new religion, taking control over the group when Fard Muhammad disappeared (Lincoln
1994, 11-15).
The Nation was always a fractious, contrarian organization. Several foreign
organizations including the Japanese Imperial government during World War II, the Communist
Party and even the government of Ethiopia attempted to co-opt the Nation at various times to
form fifth-column and other political movements within American soil (Lincoln 1994, 16). Elijah
Muhammad was able eventually to cohere the organization into an esoteric body (based of Fard
Muhammad’s teachings, including texts transmitted only orally to acolytes (Lincoln 1994, 14)
that served as a basis not simply for religious purposes, but also for political action. Particularly
in support of the Civil Rights movement. In this case, it functioned largely as an alternative to
the pacifistic, Christian-oriented movement of Dr. Martin Luther King. Under Elijah Muhammad,
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the Nation developed an increasingly complex and particular theology, embracing contemporary
obsessions such as the belief in UFO’s, a determination to implement racial segregation (but to
favor the black race) and a complex, alternative history of the world with a corresponding
cosmology (Curtis 2002, 73-79).
The Nation of Islam continued unified as an independent, idiosyncratic religious
community under the leadership of Elijah Muhammad until his death in 1975. In that year Elijah
Muhammad’s son, Wairth Deen Muhammad (né Wallace Dean Muhammad), became the head
of the group and began a systematic and conscious turn away from the syncretic practices and
beliefs of his father and toward an orthodox practice of Sunni Islam. He did this through
systematic personal study of the Sunni orthodox tradition, writing legal manuals and serving as a
social as well as a political activist that maintained the group’s tradition as a force to reform
American society and advance the position of African-Americans within it, while simultaneously
emphasizing their position within the broader Ummah of the international Islamic community.
As a result, W.D. Muhammad, as he is often known, created a group of loosely affiliated
mosques that not only have a following within the community of African-American Muslims, but
also draw (on a much more limited basis) from immigrants who otherwise would have no
affiliation with the Nation of Islam as a racially focused group (Curtis 2002, 107-08).
It would be a mistake to assume given the above that W.D. Muhammad’s efforts simply
resulted in making his community orthodox Muslims like those from the rest of the world. As we
shall see later when we discuss the various interpretations of Islamic law that exist in Muslim
communities throughout the United States, W.D. Muhammad’s work is unique and substantial.
It is also, as a result, not uncontroversial. Far from simply adopting orthodox Sunnism within an
American context, W.D. Muhammad went a long way toward making Islam American. He did
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this in much the same way other proselytizers in early Islamic communities in India, Africa,
Europe and elsewhere made Islam a part of the local way of life in the early centuries of the
religion. Like them W.D. Muhammad’s ultimate goal was both to Americanize Islam and to
Islamize America. The mosques that follow W.D. Muhammad’s form of Islam are consequently
in many ways the most complete and holistic blend of Islamic thought and American culture.
Unfortunately, this is also a source of strain between them and their immigrant counterparts
and often brings African-American Islam into question for being overly heterodox and ignorant
of the larger Islamic scholarly tradition.
W.D. Muhammad’s school of Islamic law and practice is not the only way America’s
African-American Muslim populations practice Islam and Islamic law, however. In fact, by both
statistical and anecdotal accounts, the share of W.D. Muhammad’s school is declining both in
terms of the American Muslim population at-large and among the African-American population
specifically. Increasingly, African-American Muslims are turning to immigrant Islamic centers to
learn Islam both when they convert and when, even though born into W.D. Muhammad
mosques, they explore the varieties of their faith (Bagby I 2011, 12, 14).
The reasons for this are various. Some black Muslims I interviewed express concern
about the qualifications of W.D. Muhammad as an Islamic legal scholar and are afraid that his
practice of Islam is insufficiently rigorous. One frequent complaint was the conduct of Imams
and congregants during Friday sermons. Sermons in African-American mosques, informants told
me, often partook of a kind of call-and-response style that reflected Christian church services.,
Explaining why he stopped attending black mosques one black Muslim told me that parishioners
were more casual and would move around and chat during the sermon creating problems for
the validity of Friday prayer: the prayer is shortened on Friday to allow time for the sermon and
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this individual felt if the sermon were not observed respectfully and correctly, this would make
the removal of the sections of the prayer invalid and thus invalidate the whole exercise. Others
simply find the Islamic traditions in immigrant mosques deeper and richer. There are also likely
other, unspoken reasons for preferring immigrant mosques; including their placement within
suburbs and generally more affluent congregations removed from the inner-city environment
where many W.D Muhammad mosques are found.33 Consequently, while some scholars talk
about the need to move beyond a distinction between black Muslims and immigrant Muslims
because of their increasing sympathy ( e.g. Howe 2018, 7), what they are actually referring to is
the gradual decline of an autochthonous black Islam in the face of growing and increasingly
native-born immigrant populations which can assimilate individuals who were formerly
associated with African-American mosques.
The immigrant mosques where I personally saw African-Americans worship and whose
congregants I interviewed seemed to accept these worshippers very seamlessly, but in each of
these instances I interviewed these individuals in multi-ethnic Islamic Centers with other
worshippers present. During interviews with other subjects conducted away from these Centers,
I found that relations between these groups were not always so easy. Some of this was based on
direct statements made to me about racism in the Islamic community made by both African-
American Muslims as well as immigrant Muslims themselves. Sometimes the acts were more
concrete. African-Americans were turned away from immigrant congregations due to a variety
of reasons stemming from a combination of ethnocentrism and racial prejudice. Sometimes
these acts of ethnocentrism seemed rather devoid of race bias, in other instances a racial bias
33 We will discuss the nature of the locations of these various categories of mosque and Islamic Centers
later when discussing these organizations specifically.
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was anecdotally strongly present: In a few instances, African-American converts who
worshipped at mosques dominated by South Asians were told they needed to learn Urdu in
order to be “proper Muslims.” While a claim that learning at least some Arabic, the language of
the Qur’an, could be a reasonable and universally accepted requirement to establish one’s bona
fides as a Muslim, Urdu has nothing other than a social connection to Islamic practice and the
expectation to learn it would not be recognized or expected among the average Muslim. One
African-American informant joked about these proclivities, saying that South Asian Muslims
“smiled in an Islamic way,” which meant in a South Asian way. This was absurd, he said, because
all humans smile in the same way and definitely so too do Muslims.
In another case a previously arranged marriage with an Arab Moroccan woman was
called off because the groom claimed his future in-laws were unhappy with his race. This same
individual worked as a social outreach coordinator for a North African Islamic Center but
reported extreme conflict with the worshippers. Part of the reason, this African-American man,
reported was a lack of understanding about the details of interacting with the city, which was a
major part of his job, but another was suspicion regarding his race, both as a black man and as a
convert.
While I personally noticed little open bias in my fieldwork, bias against African-American
Muslims exists was confirmed by a number of non-African American, immigrant Muslims whom
I interviewed. These individuals rarely gave specific examples and spoke in generalities, but it
was a feeling that was common among many informants and more common among informants
born in the United States than those who immigrated from abroad. Whether this was strictly a
racial issue or whether it was because of concerns about the legitimacy of W.D. Muhammad’s
Islam was never expressed, though immigrant Imams often referred to a general ignorance
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among African-Americans of proper Islamic ways and knowledge, which could be interpreted as
a veiled reference to purported failings of the W.D. Muhammad school.34
European-Americans
The second major group of converts are European, Hispanic and other Americans who
convert to Islam usually as adults. These individuals form a very distinct minority of America’s
Muslims; of the non-African-American Islamic community only one-in-seven are converts (Pew
2017, 37). Total convert numbers are at 21% of the whole community, including African-
American converts. Despite their minority status, they make up an extremely important part of
American’s Islamic community. In fact, most US-born Muslims are still converts, indicating the
relative youth of the American Islamic community as a whole (Pew 2017, 119). They are usually
found in immigrant-dominated mosques35 and often play prominent roles in them, either as
Imams or as intermediaries between the congregation and American society-at-large, a group
which can sometimes include the immigrants’ own children. The role of intermediary is likely to
decrease significantly in importance as Muslim communities come to have more first and
second-generation immigrants and thus begin to form longer, more stable and deeper American
identities.
On the whole, converts form a much more idiosyncratic group than African-Americans.
While African-American conversion can be viewed within the context of the broader effort to
34 It should be emphasized here that in these conversation, immigrant Imams almost never mention W.D.
Muhammad’s name specifically, though they did make disparaging references to some practices he
promoted, most particularly polygamy.
35 One of the major changes W.D. Muhammad made in the Nation of Islam as a result of its conversion to
orthodox Sunnism was its opening to white worshippers (or at least to combat the racial exclusivity of the
Nation) and while I did occasionally see a non-immigrant white worshipper at the W.D. Muhammad
mosque I visited, he was an irregular attendant. This contrasted with all of the immigrant-dominated
mosques, each of which had between one and five (out of approximately 60 people present) white
apparently American worshippers each time I attended.
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define the African-American place and role within American society, non-African-American
converts tend to come to Islam for very specific, very personal reasons which are highly variable.
What is remarkable is how often these individuals take to the scholarly traditions of the Islamic
religious sciences. Many of the most prominent Islamic scholars in America, such as Hamza
Yusef and Suhaib Webb, are American converts who came to Islam as young men and engaged
in rigorous, classical studies in Muslim countries in the traditional Islamic curriculum. These
individuals have been instrumental in fashioning an American way of being Muslim that fuses
traditional American folkways with an Islamic life, defining both for themselves and for the
children of immigrants what it means to be both American and Muslim.36
Of course, not all of these converts have this level of dedication to the faith, but virtually
every long-term convert I interviewed did share the role of cultural intermediary (the most
prominent exception is described below), one they played with even the most highly Islamically
educated. They performed this role in both an official and unofficial sense. Officially, these
individuals were often needed to navigate the unique American interface between social and
especially religious institutions and government, particularly municipal, bodies. As we shall
discuss below, most mosques in Muslim-majority countries are established and maintained by
the state. In the United States, as observers as diverse as Tocqueville and Weber have noted,
while there is a tight relationship between religious communities and the broader polity, the
relationship is highly informal, with religious institutions being required to provide their own
formal governance and representation which has certain duties to and rights from the
36 Suhaib Webb’s personal website is a testimony to this mission. It can be found at:
http://www.suhaibwebb.com, accessed January 20, 2019.
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government as a body, the consequence of this arrangement is that religious bodies often
perform quasi-governmental roles (Weber 1985; Tocqueville I 2012 467-478).
Given the uniqueness of the political and civil society relationships between the state
and religious institutions in the United States, immigrants are often unfamiliar with what is
expected of them as an organization, how to build a formal body as well as how and what to
request from local government. Converts serve as an important and sometimes necessary
source of important information about official American society for these institutions and work
as mediators between the mosque and the government or society-at-large. They fulfill these
duties in both salaried as well as unsalaried capacities. Salaried intermediaries occurred in
Boston most often in conjunction with large Islamic Centers, such as the Islamic Society of
Boston, Cultural Center. These individuals coordinated formal events, as described below. They
also work in social organizations as community activists to bring attention to particular Islamic
issues. Unfortunately, Islamic activism was not a point of focus in my work and so examples of
this role are less prominent.
Unofficially, converts serve as cultural mediators between parental generations of
immigrants and their American-born-and-raised children. The cultural conflict between
immigrant parents, raised in a country far-away with often radically different norms and
traditions, is well documented (Dinh et al 1994, 485-87; Zhou 1997, 83-86; Besteman 2016, 262-
64; Howe 2018, 31-32). It is dealt with in different ways by different communities. One of the
ways that American Muslims deal with bridging the gap is the use of converts as intermediaries
between the worlds of Islamic and mainstream America. This is particularly important with
children. While the Muslim parents can give advice on the Islamic half of their hybrid identity,
they are ill-equipped either to give advice regarding the other half, a fact readily admitted to me
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by many informants, all most all of whom were anxious to have their children adapt to their
American home. This difficulty is especially true when it comes to those aspects of American
adolescent life that are the least Islamic, such as dating, the consumption of alcohol and
increasing independence from the family.37
Converts can serve as mentors, and even, as one particular convert expressed to me
quite uncomfortably, as surrogate parents in terms of emotional support. They can serve this
way officially, if they are an Imam, or unofficially, if they are members of a congregation.
Significantly, the immigrant generation of Muslims, while expressing some ambivalence about
this role of converts, generally recognizes it as a positive value the converts bring to the mosque
as a whole and often cite it as a benefit, occasionally asking these converts to speak to their
children when they experience these inter-generational conflicts. This is especially true where
the convert serves as an Imam, which is both an avowed mission of popular Imams like Suhaib
Webb and a source for their popularity within the young community. These figures are viewed
as being particularly influential as they combine an American upbringing with traditional Islamic
education. A regular refrain I heard among older immigrants was the need to adapt Islamic law
to the new American context, and it was these educated intermediaries (along with future
generations raised in America) who were best positioned in their minds to accomplish this goal.
The role of cultural intermediary does come with some costs, however. Particularly
ironic was the position of the man described above, who took on a surrogate parenting role,
advising children about dating. He was single and unmarried himself despite his being middle-
aged. I did not broach the subject with him as our time was short and the question seemed too
37 For ways that children manage to cope see the book Keeping It Halal by John O’Brien (2017). It should
be noted that O’Brien is himself a convert and as leader of a youth group in his local Islamic center, served
in part as a cultural adviser himself.
68
personal for such a short acquaintance, but discussions with other converts indicate a variety of
reasons for bachelorhood that we will describe below. Many of these issues stem from the very
ambiguous intermediary character that these individuals possess: while the fact that they are
Americans by birth and non-Muslims by family allows them to mediate American cultural norms,
it prevents them from being fully immersed within the Islamic/ethnic community. The middle-
aged man above expressed this feeling to me. Indeed, while he was a practicing Muslim and at a
community Iftar, he said he no longer attended the Islamic Center regularly because he felt
pulled in too many directions: he was sometimes not Muslim enough for his fellow congregants
and too Muslim for his neighbors, who often refused to believe he was actually part of the faith.
Implicit in his words were that while his fellow Muslims may not have said so much out-loud,
there was likely that suspicion lurking within.
It is likewise not enough for a convert simply to be an intermediary. They must also
inhabit an intermediary position. This means that, unless the individual is an Imam where such
dress and behavior is appropriate, they must dress like an average American. There are many
converts who when they convert begin to adopt cultural trends from Islamicate societies or
attempt to dress in a way that they imagine the Prophet to have done, which includes growing a
beard and shaving the mustache, always wearing a thawb, or Middle-Eastern tunic, to pray and
generally renouncing Christianity and Christian norms. These individuals form a not insignificant
portion of the convert community and are never intermediaries. While I did not inquire as to the
reason for this, it is easy to assume it has to do with their piety. Converts in Christianity, Judaism
and Islam have a reputation for being the most zealous of practitioners, enforcing rules that
even those born to the faith do not.
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This group may also suffer from feelings of inferiority, which the group of converts who
maintain a more outwardly American demeanor lack. One convert who was highly
assimilationist in garb and demeanor expressed a deep-seated feeling of ignorance about his
adopted faith. He hardly knew any Arabic, just enough for the prayers, he learned to pray simply
by watching others and he taught himself much of what he knew.38 He said he felt less qualified
to be a Muslim than most children.
The group of highly assimilationist converts therefore are likely not to serve as
intermediaries for a variety of reasons, including a sufficient intermediary position and because
of a sense of inadequacies vis-à-vis other Muslims born into the faith. It is important to note,
however, that this observation largely extends only to white Muslims I observed who adopted
assimilationist practice. While most African-Americans did not, I did encounter a couple in
mosques and Islamic Centers who were dressed in Islamicate garb and obviously did so in an
attempt to model themselves after prophetic practice, including one individual who wore
leather socks (one of the only worshippers I saw doing so), which has important ritual
connotations and a direct connection to the practice of the Prophet and his companions.
African-Americans who were dressed in Islamicate garb did not seem to have the same
demeanor or sense of inferiority as white converts so dressed. They were often more
comfortable in the presence of Imams and other Muslims born into the faith. While this
difference was marked, I unfortunately was unable to explore it, in part because there were
many fewer African-American Muslims who adopted these habits than white converts. My
presumption is that the African-Americans did it for more religious than cultural reasons (black
38 though he had a North African wife, which inclines me to believe much of this was an exaggeration,
though that may serve to reinforce potential feelings of inferiority.
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Muslims tend to identify more strongly with Salafist and Salafist-like practices), while white
converts often dressed and acted in these ways more to assert their aspirational identity as
Muslims than did their black counterparts.
The importance of converts as intermediaries between an immigrant generation and
native-born American Muslims is probably decreasing as the number of American born Muslims
increases. While direct immigrants still make up the majority of the population (about 58%), this
number is decreasing (Pew 2017, 22-23). As the native-born population increases, they take on
more prominent roles within the community, especially as Imams.
While most Centers have immigrant Imams (of the 19 Centers surveyed here only three
had native-born Imams and one was an African-American mosque), every advertisement for
new Imams I observed, which included a nation-wide sample, listed familiarity with “American
culture/society” as a major requirement for the position. The only Center where I conducted
interviews that had an Imam who was not fluent in English relegated him to leading prayers and
reciting the Qur’an alone. They placed immigrants with long residencies or native-born
Americans in positions of importance for administration and to provide all of the educational,
social and counseling services, functions normally associated with the Imam in an American
mosque.
Significantly, the youngest Imams in the Centers I observed were all converts or
American-born Muslim children of immigrants who spoke English without a trace of accent,
though each had extensive religious education in the Middle East. They also usually sought
brides in countries from outside the US.
One striking problem many non-African-American converts have with American Islamic
society is finding a place and social group where they “belong.” As discussed above, while their
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liminality allows them to help others, their “between-ness” means they lack a natural and easily
found social group. This fact sometimes separates them from their own spiritual satisfaction.
Many leave Islam after being unable fully to socialize into an Islamic community. In fact, about
as many converts leave the faith as convert to it (Pew 2017).39
In some cases, their very American-ness is the barrier to integration. Many communities
conflate aspects of Islamic law with cultural practice, something that can happen as a result of
the prominence of ᶜurf, or customary practice in Islamic law. As a result, these converts are told
that a range of behaviors is required of a Muslim when actually they are dictated by cultural
norms rather than Islamic law. These can include learning languages other than Arabic (even
though learning Arabic beyond a very rudimentary level is not required of any Muslim), dressing
in a certain way (converts in some communities can be scolded if they wear American-style
clothing to prayer) or behaving according to foreign cultural customs (being told they must eat
Arabian or South Asian food, to eat food in a certain way, to avoid socializing with certain groups
of people, etc.), including engaging in certain rituals for marriage or other life-events that are
not stipulated in any of the source of Islamic law.
Converts, being new to the religion, often have very little sophistication in Islam and so
are unable to sort out what the Sharia requires and what it does not.40 Often, Muslims
themselves find this difficult, which is why converts can be given mixed-messages about which
39 Statistics on the overall rate of abandoning Islam are hard to find. For a particularly personal narrative
of an anthropologist who fell away from Islam as a result of his failure to find an accepting community
(though the reasons for his initial conversion were somewhat self-interested) see Young’s epilogue to The
Rashaaydah Bedouin (1996).
40 An interesting example of how compelling these narratives can be is the story of Yusuf Islam, a.k.a. Cat
Stevens, who abandoned his lucrative singing career on being notified by his congregation that making
music was prohibited by Islamic law. This was despite the fact that his Imam assured him it would be OK.
It was not until he had matured in his faith that he felt comfortable returning to the music industry,
though playing only morally acceptable songs (Stroumboulopoulos 2007; Akbar 2010, 317-18).
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rules are religious and which are primarily cultural. When faced with these seemingly
insurmountable barriers, many perceive the religion as too difficult to practice and either leave
the faith altogether or, like the middle-aged convert described above, reduce the intensity of
their practice.
In an interesting twist of the relationship between converts and immigrants’ children,
many Imams make it a special project to minister to these often-forgotten converts. A veritable
trope among former converts to Islam (as well as some who remain) is the Ramadan iftar of a TV
dinner eaten alone in an apartment, the equivalent of the same on Christmas for an American
Christian. These stories abound and are often fodder for Friday sermons where Imams urge the
congregation to welcome such individuals more warmly. Unfortunately, while the isolation of
converts is a common topic of conversation within the Islamic community, there is no
scholarship produced exploring it. I likewise rarely directly encountered such individuals for
obvious reasons: they tend not to hang around Islamically-oriented places.41
Immigrants
Immigrant Muslims form the second major group of America’s Islamic communities. Like
the native-born Americans, this group can be largely divided into two categories. First is recent
immigrants and their first/second-generation offspring. Second is long-established communities
whose presence in this country dates to the late nineteenth century. In Massachusetts and
41 For a general description, see MV Media 2011
(https://muslimvillage.com/2011/08/21/13146/ramadan-a-challenging-time-for-muslim-converts/).
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elsewhere, these two groups have very tight interactions42 and are much closer to one another
in terms of social interaction, formal institutional affiliation and general status recognition than
either is to the native-born groups, despite the special, cultural intermediary role some of the
converts play in immigrant-dominated Islamic Centers.
The discrepancy in influence between the older community of immigrant Muslims and
the new converts presents an interesting issue, for, while American-born converts play the role
of cultural go-between for immigrants, the long-established American immigrant Muslim
community tends in my research group not to have the same, privileged status of cultural
interpreter. The discrepancy of influence raises the question why, if there is a long-term
population of immigrant American Muslims, should they not play the role of assimilating Islam
to American life themselves rather than newer converts? In order to understand this point, we
must explore the history of Muslim immigration into the United States.
The likely answer is that younger immigrants consider the older immigrant communities
to have been corrupted by their experience in America. In the eyes of the newly arrived waves
of Muslims, the established groups of Muslims in the US adopted too many American customs
at variance with Islamic religious values, such as mixed-gender dances. This heterodoxy caused
the older groups to have been de-Islamicized, making them religiously subordinate to the new
immigrants.
This de-Islamicization stands in stark contrast to the Islam of converts. Late-coming
waves of Muslim immigrants perceive the new American converts as free of the stigma of loss of
Islamic orthodoxy. These new converts are imagined to be able to use their new zeal and
42 For the relationship between this group and long-established immigrant communities in Detroit see
Nabeel Abraham’s “Arab Detroit’s ‘American Mosque’” in Arab Detroit: From the Margins to the
Mainstream (2000).
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ignorance of non-Islamic cultural practices as a way to generate proper Islamic conduct in the
novel situation of the United States. Their ignorance is a blessing because it means the new
converts who are just learning Islam “the right way” can act as a filter without the bias of
corrupt cultural practice.
In other words, immigrants do not consider the Islam of the new converts to be tainted
by their American experience while these convert’s own aspirations to become proper Muslims
is fresh and genuine. The old immigrants, on the other hand, who have an Islamicate
background, are seen by new-coming immigrants who form the bulk of the American Islamic
community as having both their Americanness tainted by their Islamic faith while their Islam is
tainted by their Americanness.
The Early Communities
The first wave of Muslim immigration into the US happened in the last decade of the
nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. These individuals came before the
imposition of ethnic quotas restricting immigration to Western Europeans and mostly
immigrated from the Ottoman Empire, though there were also large contingents coming from
Pakistan who created a significant Ahmadiyyah community in the US (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 135-
52). A large portion of these immigrants came from Lebanon, it being part of the Ottoman
Empire, and were Shi’a, which created a religious demographic composition that continues to
cause the US to be very different from the Muslim world as a whole (Haddad 2011, 3-4). For
reasons previously mentioned, like the rest of this project, the history that follows will focus on
the Sunni population of the United States.
These Muslims largely settled in Michigan as a result of the wide range of manufacturing
jobs available there. A significant number settled elsewhere, including Boston, where I was able
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to obtain both oral and written histories of one major community. Perhaps the most famous
member of the Boston group was the poet Khalil Gibran who, though Christian, formed part of
the Lebanese diaspora in Boston when he was just two-years old. He was likely a member of the
early community of Boston Lebanese immigrants whose history I was able to obtain, which
included both Muslims and Christians (Lahaj 2014).
Early in the community’s existence in America, Islam both in Boston and Detroit
remained a largely folk-based practice disconnected from the formal concerns of Islamic law.
This was a product of the relatively relaxed nature of Islamic orthodox practice at this time,
being before the wave of conservative religious thought that swept much of the Islamic world in
the advent of the rise of Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century; the relatively small, though
concentrated, population of Muslims in the US; and a lack of emigrating religious scholars,
leaving these communities without clear guidance on technical issues of the law.
While these communities met regularly for prayer and even built mosques, these
institutions were not like the large Islamic Centers we see today. In the absence of trained
religious scholars, the early immigrants tended to rely on the most knowledgeable member of
their community, individuals who usually knew the prayers, a few verses of the Qur’an and had
a good, but casual knowledge of the faith. As a result, the mosques the early immigrants created
were often highly informal, often little more than groups who met in each other’s houses, and
when they took the shape of formalized buildings, they occasionally served the same role that
churches did in the communities of their Christian neighbors, meaning that their role was as
social as it was religious. According to several oral histories, these mosques even held western-
style, couple dances (Nabeel 2000, 293; Lahaj 2014).
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Islamic practice in the United States before the 1960’s was marked by the highly
assimilationist character of the time. There was a strong tendency among these Muslims to de-
emphasize their difference from the Christian neighbors among whom they largely lived.43 A
significant personal indication of this trend is in the naming conventions these early
communities used for their children. Names have an important, though informal place in the
Islamic religious tradition. Often when converting to Islam, individuals will change their given
names from a non-Arabic to an Arabic name. Likewise, it is common among many non-
Arabophone societies to adopt Arab given names (though not surnames) as part of their naming
traditions.44 African-American Muslims exemplify this trend within the United States and
regularly adopt Arabic names after conversion, a trend which was reinforced with the idea of
renouncing one’s English name, sometimes called a “slave name,” as a sign of casting off the
oppression of a non-Black society (Muhammad 1973, 185-86), an act most famously performed
by Malcolm Little, who became Malcolm X after converting to the Nation of Islam and the more
orthodox El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz after his Hajj and his conversion to orthodox Sunnism; and the
boxer Cassius Clay who became Muhammad Ali.
It is thus important to note in connection to the earliest, Levantine immigrants to the
United States that while they kept identifiably Arabic last names, they usually adopted standard
American first names like “Mary” or “John.” This naming tradition often continues until today
and can be used to distinguish these individuals from the larger Muslim population of the
United States. It is important to note, however, that while the adoption of American names
43 For many essays detailing this experience, see the various essays in Arab Detroit as well as Mary Lahaj’s
description of the early Islamic community in Boston.
44 For an example of this in the Early Period of Islam see Bulliet’s Conversion to Islam in the Medieval
History: An Essay in Quantitative History, Ch. 6 (1979).
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indicates their assimilation into the broader American culture and the relatively loose formalism
with which they practiced Islam, such an adoption did not represent a full renunciation of their
Islamic identities as these individuals maintained a last name that could have linked them to
Islam or, at least, the Middle East. Rather, their adoption of American names combines a
foreign, Islamic and often Arabic identity with a new-found sense of Americanism.
The New Immigrants
Interestingly, the immigrant population since the 1960’s has seemed largely not to have
adopted this trend. This may be due to a variety of factors, though no one informant indicated a
clear explanation. Prime among them is likely the greater tolerance of American society for
foreignness. American society has diversified in terms of ethnicity, race, and religion greatly over
the course of the twentieth century, making what was formerly strange and unusual
commonplace. As a result, it is easier and more socially acceptable to maintain traditions and
names that might sound unusual or even exotic to the average American. This would allow
traditional Islamic naming conventions to continue in the present in ways impossible only a few
generations before.
The Muslim communities that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries remained very much undisturbed by new influxes of immigrants for several decades.
This stasis was the product of changes to immigration laws after their arrival that cut off new
inflows of immigrants from the Middle East and Islamicate countries until relaxation of such
restriction resulted in new immigration policies for the United States in the 1960’s. This created
a new wave of Muslim immigrants. During these years, not only was passive immigration
created through the relaxation of ethnic quotas for immigration, but immigration from many
Islamicate countries was actually encouraged as a result of America’s rising status as a super-
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power and desire to educate citizens of Muslim countries in soft-power campaigns to fight
Communism. As a result, previously unrepresented countries began to send immigrants to the
US (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 292-293).
This increase in immigration was significant not just for increasing the number of
Muslims in the country, but because in the interim between the first major wave of Muslim
immigration into the US and the second, serious transformations had taken place within the
mainstream Islamic world itself. Particularly, the rise of the Deoband school in South Asia and
the Wahhabi proselytization of Saudi Arabic created a serious revivalism of Islamic law and
orthodox practice through the whole Islamic mainstream spectrum of practice. It is significant to
note in connection to this revivalism that, in contrast to the earlier immigration movements, the
immigrants of the 1960’s came not just from the Levant like earlier groups, but increasingly from
South and Central Asia as well as non-Levantine Arab nations.45
The reasons for this revivalism are too many and too complicated to enter into here in
detail. Suffice to say, with the rise of modern communications and travel technology;
decolonization and the struggle against political and religious cultures associated with colonial
oppression; as well as the rise of political Islam, local Islamic practices which emphasized non-
legal aspects of worship (especially those associated with non-Islamic folklore and Islamic
mysticism) began to be suppressed or denigrated and Muslims throughout the world became
more interested in orthodox religious practices. This was a significant shift from the Islamic faith
45 The effects of this revivalism on local cultural are well documented in a variety of places by a variety of
authors. E. Evans-Pritchard discusses it in reference to the Sanusi in his famous monograph (Evans-
Pritchard 1954, 1-9) as does Musil in his description of the Rwala (Musil 1928, 580-81). Donald Cole also
describes the effect of Islamic revivalism among the Al-Murrah Bedouin in Saudi Arabia (Cole 1975, 148-
50). The effect of this mission on an American Islamic community specifically is described, as cited above,
by both Lahaj and Abraham. For a general description and history of this mission see Farquhar’s Circuits of
Faith: Migration, Education and the Wahhabi Mission (2017).
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practice within which the antecedents of America’s Muslim population were raised.46 As a
result, when these new immigrants came to the US and observed what they considered the lax
standards of American Islamic practice, especially including loose modesty and gender-mixing
norms, they began serious reform efforts at reform within these older Islamic-American
communities.47
These efforts often produced serious frictions. In many cases, they manifested
themselves as literal power grabs: new-comers seized power from the establishment, often
using mosque elections and by-laws (which had been drawn from churches and as a result had a
very typical American-style organization with boards of directors elected by the congregation for
fixed terms who retained ultimate control over the institution’s affairs) to take control of Islamic
religious institutions to enforce what had become the standard orthodoxy of Islamic lands and
to change the status of their religious organizations. These changes often had the effect of
converting, at least initially, the Islamic centers from an equally social and religious institution to
what was primarily a place of worship, conforming to all the requirements of Islamic law.48
This transformation had a profound effect on the Islamic community in the United
States as whole, especially as the new immigrants grew greatly to outnumber the earlier-
immigrating members of their communities. Boston was no exception. As a result, the earlier
groups of immigrant Muslims, who had been in the 1980’s had been in the US for nearly a
century, more in some cases, eventually became subsumed into the new immigrant religious
46 For a critique and review of the theological and intellectual nature of these changes see Shahab
Ahmed’s work What Is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (2016).
47 The descriptions below derive from the above cited work of Mary Lahaj describing a community in
Boston and Nabeel Abraham describing a community in Detroit (Abraham 2000; Lahaj 2014). The story of
the Boston Islamic Center told by Lahaj will be analyzed in greater detail below.
48 These institutions in my research study had universally converted back to social spaces, though they
were forever changed by the intervention of the new immigrants.
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community. The most obvious indications of this transformation were the gradual adoption of
more formal Islamic traditions. While the earlier immigrants rarely if ever wore the hijab, or
Islamic head-covering, many began to. They also began to use more orthodox Islamic names for
their children and ended many of the social institutions of the mosque that were most
unorthodox, such as dances.
The assimilation of the old Islamic community for the most part merged the old
community of America’s Muslims into the new, restricting the older community’s ability to serve
as intermediaries between the new in-coming Americans and the older group.49 This had the
consequence of enhancing the new American converts’ roles within the Muslim community as
cultural intermediaries. While the older Muslims in the US certainly are as deeply American in
their roots as many of the converts (their families may even have immigrated at the same time
as the converts’), the different quality of their religion causes them to have different roles.
While the older immigrant groups could have served, and may have been expected to serve, the
same intermediary role that the American converts of today do, the presumed heterodoxy of
their practice made the new immigrant Muslims suspicious of the earlier generations’ ability to
play the role of intermediaries legitimately without leaving traces of their unorthodox Islamic
practices in the new-comers’ communities. New American converts were a different story,
however, especially those converts who received rigorous advanced religious education from
famous institutions of Islamic learning like Al-Azhar in Cairo or the maḥāḍar of Mauritania. Their
Islam was sufficiently strong enough in terms of legal knowledge and practice for the new
converts to be trusted to filter acceptable American folkways when long-time American Muslims
49 There are some exceptions in Boston, where many of the older community who were more moderate
in their religious practice, especially in terms of the requirements of the law, separated from the new
immigrants and formed their own communities, most notably the Islamic Center in Weymouth, Ma.
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were not, and their religious training was often more rigorous than even the new immigrant’s
own, enhancing the convert’s religious prestige even more.
In fact, the new immigrant Muslims often found themselves teaching the old American
Muslim families how to be Muslim, reducing the ability of long-term immigrants to become
teachers themselves. The enmity between new-coming immigrants and multi-generational
immigrants was sometimes bitter, particularly when the new immigrants opposed the practices
of these long-time American families so much that they engaged in serious, prolonged political
battles to have them thrown out of the very religious institutions the American communities
had established generations before the new arrivals came into the US. We will explore this when
we discuss the history of two exemplary Islamic Centers below.
Boston’s Immigrants
The Boston area is an excellent microcosm of these larger trends in the American
Muslim population.50 As previously mentioned, its original core population came in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from the Levant. They established tightly connected
communities where Islamic practice was heavily influenced by folk-origins, worship spaces were
informal, and social practices had a very strong and stereotypically American flavor, including
fraternal and patriotic organizations. Dating and dances were common. Sunday was the
preferred say of worship and religious organizations often took the guise of clubs. God was
worshipped in a generally Islamic way, but the community’s emphasis was on worship, not the
law.
This form of practice continued until the 1950’s and ‘60’s when a new wave of
immigrants arrived. Like many places, the major fount of this immigration consisted of
50 The story below is drawn from Mary Lahaj’s history (Lahaj 2014).
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international students the US invited to its universities in an attempt to exercise of soft power
during the Cold War. These new immigrants originally formed societies centered on college
campuses that served their particular needs and were connected with other, similar societies
across the nation in the form of the Muslim Students’ Association.51 As these students
graduated, many remained in the United States and established roots. When they left the area’s
major universities they needed places of worship. Some established new Islamic Centers using
their connection with the Muslim Students’ Association, while others found older mosques
where they gradually came to outnumber the original community.
As they grew in number, they began to assert their influence more strongly over these
older communities, gradually taking control of the boards and bringing in formally trained
Imams who advanced a more orthodox, law-oriented form of Islam. While there was often a
high degree of tension in these communities at first, as we shall see when we discuss the history
of two Islamic Centers during the transition between older and newer immigrants, eventually
compromises were reached resulting from a combination of demographic pressure and religious
revival in the earlier communities. Older families accepted the newer practices of a law-centric
orthodox Islam and either ceded authority to the new-comers or joined/created less law-centric
congregations. Meanwhile, the new immigrant Muslims, acknowledging the extreme divergence
in American society from their societies at home, began the process of reconciling their Islamic
practice and cultural traditions with their (and especially their children’s) new American life.
This pathway of development is exemplified by the Islamic Center of New England
(ICNE) in Quincy. This congregation began as a semi-regular meeting of the descendants of
51 For a history of the MSA, an all-important organization in the story of post-1960 American Islam, see
GhaneaBassiri 2010, 265-70.
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Levantine immigrants in the early twentieth century. Over time, they became more serious in
their religious devotions, bought a building and formed a regular religious community. This
community was guided by an individual who took the position of Imam, though he had no
formal religious education. During the 1960’s and ‘70’s, with the arrival of new Muslim
immigrants, these families began to attend ICNE as their primary family mosque and harbored
the expectation of more orthodox religious practices. They specifically objected to a number of
traditions at ICNE including mixed gender prayer and social events on the mosque grounds.
Eventually this dispute came to a head during a set of elections for the board when the
immigrants bussed in sympathetic, fellow-orthodox Sunni Muslims to pay membership dues and
vote, which the then by-laws permitted them to do. They cast their ballots for sympathetic
board members in an attempt to bring a new Imam to the community, one more amenable to
their position and who had a formal education in the Islamic religious sciences. This effort was
narrowly defeated by the original community, which spurned a change to the mosque’s by-laws.
Eventually, however, demographics weighed so heavily against the original community that the
changes the newcomers required were implemented and little remains of the original ICNE
community at the Center today, though the Center itself is flourishing with a second site and a
new Imam.52 It is, in fact, one of the most active and vibrant Islamic communities in the greater
Boston area with a congregation of several hundred families highly aware and highly adaptive to
the American conditions within which their community lives and functions, though they are
adapting in a different and more overtly orthodox way than the originators of their community.
Immigrants and African-Americans
52 The two centers are now referred to as the “Quincy Mosque” and the “Sharon Mosque,” referring to
their locations, though both form very much a single community.
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The lack of integration into the African-American Muslim community by these new
immigrants is significant in the above story. In fact, there has historically been tension between
the communities of immigrant Muslims and their African-American counterparts. This tension
derives from different sources. Chief among these sources in my research sample and
anecdotally in others is a skepticism on the part of immigrants concerning the rigor and depth of
understanding of the Islamic sciences on the part of African-American Muslims and racial
tensions inherent in both American society and the societies from which the immigrants hail.
The distinctions in Islamic practice between African-American Muslims and their
immigrant counter-parts is important both in terms of its consequences for the interaction of
their communities and their implementation of Islamic practice. One of the biggest differences
between the communities has been how they integrate Islamic practice with American social
life. This integration has been far more difficult for immigrants than for African-Americans and
as a result the two have developed very different and sometimes opposing views on the role of
Islam and Islamic law within American society.
While immigrant Muslims often have to navigate the tensions of being strangers in a
new society, being forced to learn and adapt to new ways while considering how to preserve
their old habits, African-Americans have faced no such conundrum. While they have had to
consider what of their own lives to change and adapt to Islamic ways, their life-ways have
always been and are quintessentially American. As a result, their Islamic practice is less
comparable analytically to their immigrant co-religionists and far more comparable to their
immigrant fellows’ ancestor’s practices of Islam many centuries ago when they originally
adopted Islam en masse.
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Just as many South Asians, Persian and Levantines converted to Islam in the Early Period
as a way to escape an inferior social position (Bulliet 1979, 43-63), many African-Americans
converted to Islam as a way to escape what they perceived as the oppressive and racist
traditions of Christianity. From this perspective conversion to Islam was a result of the captivity
that ended in centuries of slavery and that has, from certain African-American perspectives,
been used to keep them in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis European-American society
(Lincoln 1994, 32-46). In other words, while immigrants often struggle to unify their Islamic
identities to mainstream American society, African-American Muslims use the same identities to
separate themselves from it.53
Race is obviously a key component in this differentiation. While immigrant Muslims and
their descendants will always remain somewhat separate from the majority of American society
because of religion, the skin-tone of many and their often professional, highly educated
backgrounds place them within social and geographic ambit of the bulk of middle-class America.
Many of these Muslims, for example, live in suburbs54 while their African-American counterparts
live in the inner-city (Bagby I 2011, 11-13). Immigrant Muslims tend to have professional jobs
requiring high levels of education (Pew 2017, 41). Based on my own research, African-American
Muslims usually have a similar economic and educational profile to their non-Muslim counter-
53 For a brief, but good general discussion of urban Islam in largely black communities see Kahera (2002)’s
“Urban Enclaves, Muslim Identity and the Urban Mosque in America.”
54 For a particularly good ethnography of these communities see Howe’s Suburban Islam (2018), discussed
above. While the majority of Islamic centers are still located in urban areas, the share of suburban centers
is radically increasing and the numbers of centers being built in suburbs is now equal to the number being
built in urban areas. These suburban centers also see the highest rate of conversion activity (Bagby I 2011,
11-13). It is almost certain that these centers are largely if not wholly comprised of immigrant Muslims.
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parts as either low-wage, unskilled laborers or service-workers or operating within the informal
economy.55
Immigrant Muslims also have the example of an assimilated and accepted religious
minority to look toward for guidance in placing themselves within the American social order that
African-Americans lack because of their long-term presence in the United States. Jews have long
lived in the US and while antisemitism has been exercised against them, it has been remarkably
less prominent in the United States than in Europe. From relatively early in the Republic, Jews
held prominent position in business, politics, law and other professions. African-American
Muslims, on the other hand, have only the model of other African-Americans to look toward.
Their new status as Muslims does not over-ride their old status as blacks. This is seen quite
easily when we consider the case of African immigrants, the major exception to the success of
Muslim immigrants in general. While there is not much formal data on African immigrants who
are Muslims in particular, African immigrants in general are in better socio-economic conditions
than native-born blacks, there is still an appreciable racial gap with white Americans (Cora &
Borch 2014, 117; Pew 2015, 9), against whom immigrant Muslims tend either to be similarly
situated.
The location of the core of each group of Muslims’ activity in the US is particularly
evocative of this difference. If immigrant Muslims can trace most of their organizational
prominence back to Muslim Student Associations located on college campuses. In contrast, my
fieldwork and the work of others (McCloud 1995, 121-26; Ammar et al 2004; Kusha 2009, 135-
72) shows that two of the primary sites for conversion and religious awakening for African-
55 For a more detailed statistical exploration of the socio-economic disparities between African-American




American Muslims was in America’s prisons and the military, both institutions predominately
populated by lower-income and lower-educated demographics. In other words, immigrant
Muslims, at least of the last few generations, began their American Islamic experience in the
best possible position to start life, while African-Americans tend to start in the worst (Pew
2007).
This difference is significant in the interpretation each community takes toward Islamic
law both in practice and in terms of their rhetoric regarding society outside their individual
communities. While immigrant Muslim communities tend to emphasize the similarities between
Islamic and American law, African-American Muslims often emphasize the differences. The latter
group sees the justice and social harmony that Islamic law promises as a challenge to the lack of
equality and social stability that mainstream American society presents to African-Americans,
especially those in the inner-city.
The distinction between subjects of Friday sermons was indicative of this distinction.
While sermons in both communities discussed basic elements of Islamic practice, including how
to pray, fast, exhortations to attend the mosque/Islamic Center for prayer and the importance
of observing dietary rules. In contrast, sermons in Islamic Centers which discussed the non-
Islamic community and the United States at large, tended to emphasize the importance of
outreach. Imams in Islamic Centers told their congregants that they should respect the laws of
the United States and observe the customs of the country, no matter how different. While
sermons in African-American mosques didn’t argue for disrespect of American laws, Imams did
sometimes argue that the nation-state was an illegitimate form of political organization, that the
Islamic community or Ummah was far more important to individuals, and that man-made laws
were a primary cause of social strife. In conversation and during interviews, immigrant Imams
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emphasized the importance of religious freedom and respecting that freedom by observing the
strict limits of Islamic law in society as a key part of the Muslim experience in America. This
included abrogating important parts of Islamic family law such as polygamy and the role of
religious legal scholars in mediating family issues like divorce. African-American Muslims, on the
other hand, emphasized the conflict between these systems and often pointed out how, for the
African-American experience at least, Islamic law allowing polygamy spoke more accurately to
the lived experience of black communities than did American law generally. In this way, Islamic
law predicted and provided unique solutions where American law offered only incarceration and
privation.
Immigrants, therefore, tend to look at Islamic law as emphasizing the essential justness
of American society. If there are elements of Islamic law that conflict with or suggest
alternatives to American legal norms, such as laws against polygamy or the failure to criminalize
apostasy, they argue those Islamic elements can be neglected because American society and
government is intrinsically just. This was a constant refrain among both immigrant Imams and
congregants in my interviews. Perhaps the most common example of this phenomenon focused
on the argument that just process mattered more than results: that the American legal system
functioned in a way that was more often just than the system in Islamic countries, therefore the
system itself satisfied the requirements of Islamic law. Informants often indicated the strife in
Muslim countries between religious groups and the state, such as between the Islamic
Brotherhood and the military in Egypt, as examples where Islamicate countries fell behind
America in the pursuit of Islamic ideals. This argument, which was so common it must have had
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a single source,56 reinforced the argument that nothing in being Muslim was inherently in
conflict with being American or vice-versa.
One particularly young Imam, raised in the US and educated in Turkey, emphasized the
above point when discussing how he handles disputes within the community. He gave the
example of a Muslim man who let a room in his house out to another Muslim and the deal had
gone bad. The two were fighting and brought the dispute to the Imam to resolve. This individual
was one of the most highly educated Imams in Islamic law that I interviewed and could easily
have relied solely on Sharia to resolve the dispute, as he acknowledged, but he said this would
be improper. If they were not able to resolve the dispute in the Islamic Center with discussion,
he told the renter to call the police. He argued that such an act would be halal and acceptable
under the Sharia because of the essential justness of the American legal system. The need for
such recourse was made all the more important, this Imam emphasized, because of his lack of
power to compel the parties. In this case, the goal of justice outweighed the importance either
of resolving the dispute under the Sharia or of avoiding allowing a non-Muslim to intervene in
the dispute of Muslims, something strictly prohibited under almost all practices of Islamic law.
In other words, while African-Americans tend to look at Islamic law as an anodyne to
correct the injustice found in American society, immigrant Muslims in my sample tend to look at
Islamic law as a means to perfect the already strongly functioning social and legal order found in
American society at large.
56 This refrain echoes, and perhaps has its origins in, the famous quote by the Egyptian reformer,
Muhammad Abduh, concerning his visit to France: “I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I
got back to the East and saw Muslims, but not Islam,” a quote which emphasizes the idea that the
justness of law is more intrinsic to the model of Sharia than the actual components of the law itself, which
is precisely the point my informants wished to emphasize.
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Perhaps the place where the conflict between these two communities’ understanding of
the relationship between Islamic law and American society becomes the most apparent is in the
practice of polygamy. While immigrant Muslims unanimously decried the practice of polygamy
in the United States both in interview and documentary research, African-American Muslims
were inclined to accept the practice.57 The reason for this difference is complicated and
profound and hits on the wide difference in what Islam and Islamic law mean to these two
groups.
In discussion, immigrant Imams and Muslims emphasized that polygamy is a strictly
forbidden practice in the United States. The primary reason for this prohibition has to do with
the idea of the “law of the land.” This concept stems from the idea of local justice discussed
above: if the “law of the land” is just in a general sense, meaning it fulfills the “aims of the
Sharia,” the Maqāṣid al-Sharīᶜah, and it doesn’t directly contradict any elements of the Sharia,
then Muslims when they live in that country as a minority are required to adapt their practice of
57 I rarely directly encountered polygamous African-American Muslims in the course of my research, but
their presence was never far removed. The African-American Imams I interviewed both acknowledged it
existed and while they did not endorse the practice, they were the only Imams I interviewed who said
they considered polygamy in the US to be legitimate Islamic practice. Almost every African-American I
interviewed knew many individuals who were polygamously married and the subject was discussed with
relative openness. I personally have observed, both in Boston and in Philadelphia many groups that I
considered to be a man and his several wives, but never had the opportunity to engage with these
individuals directly. For the primary work on this subject see Debra Majeed’s Polygyny: What It Means
When African American Women Share Their Husbands (2016).
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Sharia to the local laws. This concept can be subsumed under the idea of the Fiqh Al-Aqaliyyāt
or the Jurisprudence of the Minority (Parray 2012, 91-2, Al-Qaradawi 2003).58
Because American law prohibits polygamy and polygamy is against American custom,
American Muslims of immigrant extraction generally view polygamy as a prohibited option for
American Muslims.59 Note that I use the term “prohibited” and not “illegal.” Illegal in this sense
would mean most closely “against the Sharia.” No American Muslims would or did say polygamy
in the form of polygyny is a violation of Sharia, for the Qur’an, the highest source of Islamic law,
specifically allows the possibility of a man to marry up to four wives.60 Consequently, the
theoretical option for polygamy cannot be removed from the law itself absolutely. However,
according to the Qur’an, polygyny in Islam is not required. It is at best an option; one condition
by certain prerequisites (Qur’an 4:3). This means that it is only appropriate under certain
conditions. According to traditional understandings, those conditions included a charitable
need, e.g. if there are uncared for widows or single women in need of guardians (keeping in
58 It should be noted here, and will be discussed below, that the Imams I spoke to were very ambivalent
about the Jurisprudence of the Minority as a formal legal concept. While none of the immigrant Imams
disagreed with it, many felt it was superfluous and potentially divisive, implying that there was one law
for American/European Muslims and another for everyone else. Consequently, while they often reached
outcomes similar if not identical to the Jurisprudence of the Minority, using often identical reasoning, the
label was something they did not adopt themselves, either because of the theoretical objection above or
because it was simply too theoretical and not useful enough. They did make reference to thinkers such as
Al-Qaradawi and Tarek Ramadan who are architects of the theory, however, and so I maintain it as a label
for convenience and the sake of highlighting a kind of intellectual continuity among thinkers.
59 This was true of every immigrant Muslim I have interviewed as well as every piece of documentation
produced by this group that I have been able to review.
60 Many Muslims I spoke to made this point clear: that it was the circumstances of life in the US that
prohibited polygamy, but that it remained theoretically possible under Islamic law. One Imam in particular
discussed the effect of a formal ban on taking a second wife in a marriage contract. He explained that, at
least in what he understood to be the position of the majority of Islamic schools of law, the marriage
contract cannot remove the right of the husband to have a second wife. Consequently, even though he
would not marry a couple in the US polygynously (because he required them to have a marriage license
and for the marriage to be legally valid in the US), he would not consent to witness or ratify a marriage
where the marriage contract prohibited the potential of polygyny as this invalidated the marriage
contract according to his interpretation of Islamic law.
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mind the original context for this ruling was a society with traditional male-female asymmetries
in gender roles of work and power) (Sahih Al-Bukhari 7:62:2), or, in the event of a man having
excessive wealth or political needs, an individual might marry as many wives, up to four, as he
desired so long as he maintained all four equally. These conditions are difficult to meet. As a
result, polygamy in Islam was expected to be, and was in practice, the exception rather than the
norm.
In addition to the long-standing tradition that Muslims should conform themselves to
the laws of where they live whenever possible to re-enforce this prohibition, immigrant Muslims
also point out that American society will only recognize one of the polygamous marriages
legally, making the marriages unequal by default and thus impermissible according to the Sharia
due to the requirements of the wives being treated equally and the potential for injustice that
emerges when marriage go unrecognized by the state and thus wives and children have no legal
recourse against the husband in cases of abandonment.61 The issue of unregistered marriages is
not a prominent one in the US, as we will discuss below, but is an issue in the UK and presents
serious problems there (Vora 2019).
In practice, Imams generally enforce this restriction by refusing to marry anyone who
does not present a valid marriage certificate from the appropriate local government office,
meaning that every marriage conducted in an Islamic Center complies to all the laws of the state
61 Informants usually provided the two arguments against polygamy in tandem, such as described in the
footnote above.
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of Massachusetts, in the case of the Imams I interviewed, or the state of residence for the
Imams elsewhere whose views I was able to obtain via documentary research.62
African-American Muslims deal with this issue very differently. While they acknowledge
their position within the United State as minorities (doubly in their case of being both Muslims
and African-Americans), they view the role of Islam primarily as a corrective to society, at least
that part of society which they contact directly. As a result, African-American Muslims tend to
emphasize many aspects of Islamic law that immigrant Muslims de-emphasize. In fact, one
African-American Imam told me that he felt this area was one of the biggest points of conflict
between immigrant and African-American Muslims: the degree to which each was willing to
challenge established American norms in the pursuit of religion, a discrepancy which included
polygamy, but went beyond it to include general condemnation of behavior and policies
considered non-Islamic, but given state support such as gay marriage, police activities, financial
inequality and other issues.
African-American mosques and Imams in this study varied on their acceptance of
polygamy, but almost all were at least tolerant of it even if the Imams themselves would not
oversee the ceremony or drafting the contracts for a polygamous marriage, and polygamous
marriages were evident in the various communities either visually or by casual reference. The
explanation given for these marriages tends to mirror those given to justify the practice in the
early community of Muhammad. The most common reason given was that, just as the Prophet
allowed polygamy because at his time there were many widows and unmarried women since
62 At least one Imam confirmed he also does this in the case of divorce. He will only issue a formal
recognition of divorce (which is required by some Islamic countries to come from an Imam, not a state
court because of the differences between American and Islamic law) when presented with a court order
dissolving the marriage in order to prevent limping marriages or other unjust marital phenomena, which
will be described in greater detail below.
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many men died in wars, in the current structure of African-American society, there is a similar
lack of marriageable men because many of them are in prison or removed from good Islamic
life-styles as the result of drugs and other temptations that violate Islamic law. As a result, there
is a shortage of good Muslim men to marry Islamic women and so polygamy is a necessary and
proper recourse lest these women and their offspring fall into unIslamic lives that cut them off
from their faith.
American Islam and Salafism
Another reason, though one not directly mentioned to me in my research, for the
African-American position on polygamy has to do with a strict interpretation of Islamic law.
African-American Muslims are more likely to identify as Salafist than their immigrant counter-
parts (Bagby I 2011, 20). This term is important to define because it has been used in very loose
and usually malign ways. Salafism is often associated with terrorism or Islamic extremism. While
it is true that virtually all Sunni Islamic terrorists are Salafists, not all Salafists are terrorists.
Salafism, as properly understood, is simply a very literal interpretation of Islamic law that
eschews the canonization approach taken by more orthodox Islamic legal scholarship and
emphasizes the need to review, renew and reinterpret the Sharia in order to return to an
earlier, purer Islamic practice. While this adherence to literalism can mean a total devotion to
Islamic law to the exclusion of other legal codes, this is not necessarily the case (Lav 2012, 6-8;
Wagemakers 2012, 3-10).
Divergence on the exclusivity of Islamic law and other legal systems is an excellent
example of the importance of the distinction between Islamic law and Islamic theology. Those
Salafists who hold that they are mutually exclusive believe that following any law but God’s is
tantamount to polytheism since one is placing an artifact of human creation, i.e. non-divine law,
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in the place of God’s creation, making one guilty of the sin of shirk. The definition of shirk and
what constitutes polytheism is a theological question that is quite separate from the pure legal
questions of how to worship or conduct one’s life, however. One need not believe that law and
worship are identical like the most radical Salafists described above do. If one doesn’t, then one
can follow non-Islamic legal systems without falling into the commission of shirk.
As a result, one can be a Salafist, as some African-American Muslims are, without
subscribing to the notion that following non-Islamic law is inherently a sin since they do not view
following non-Islamic law as ipso facto a form of polytheism. In other word, they differ in their
theological understanding of what constitutes shirk. One might ignore certain aspects of the
non-Islamic legal code if they come into conflict with the Sharia, such as the case with polygamy,
but these conflicts are rare. So long as force is not used to bring a Muslim into conflict with
Sharia, these Salafists (and those who do not use the label, but are sympathetic to their
position, which is the case with many African-American Muslims) do not believe that violence is
a proper recourse to defend the faith against the claims of secular law.
This absolutist tendency means that certain of the accommodations many more
orthodox Muslims make as part of the Jurisprudence of the Minority are impossible for Salafists.
Included in this are rules prohibiting polygamy. Because polygamy is authorized by the Qur’an,
which is the highest source of legal authority to a Muslim, no law with lower authority may
circumscribe its proclamations. Moreover, according to the verses authorizing a man to take
multiple wives, it is clear that is the man’s, not the state’s, option. Consequently, the only
proper authority to decide is the individual husband. That is a right given by God in the Qur’an
and it is one that cannot be limited by any other authority.
96
Not all of the polygamous Muslims in the US identify as Salafist, but all subscribe to a
method of thinking about Islamic law similar to many Salafist tendencies. Indeed, the founder of
the most prominent African-American school of legal thought, W.D. Muhammad presided over
the formation of at least one polygamous marriage (Majeed 2016, 100), but he certainly did not
call himself a Salafist and spent his career emphasizing the harmony of one’s life as an American
and one’s life as a Muslim. Yet he and many other African-Americans use the same conflict-of-
laws principle to justify the practice of polygamy (as well as other Islamic practices that conflict
with American laws) that is common in Salafist thought (Majeed 2016, 61-73). The result of this
conflict of laws is marriages that exist in a grey zone of legality.
We should note at this point that this legal grey-zone, especially in terms of the practice
of polygamy, is not unique to Islam. Many fundamentalist Mormons exist in the same pocket of
legal uncertainty, engaging in marriages that are illegal if officiated formally, but nevertheless
present in practice and governed by the laws of their tradition. Interestingly, the state largely
ignores this violation of the law and allows patently illegal relationships (ones that violate
bigamy laws) to exist. How and why this situation has come to be will be explored later in the
dissertation for the present it is sufficient to note that this grey-area exists and creates a lacuna
in the state’s enforcement of its own laws.
This lacuna does not entirely solve the problems presented by polygamous marriage in
terms of Islamic law, for there is the inherent issue of inequality and injustice in the nature of
the relationship of several wives only one of whom is married in the eyes of the state. This is
especially true in cases of divorce, medical situations and other areas where marital status
means the difference between the validity and invalidity of certain legal rights.
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When discussing this issue with African-American Imams, the lack of legal recognition
for these marriages was raised from time to time as an issue for potentially polygamous couples
to consider, but it was not cited as a hard and fast ban to the marital arrangements. While this
nonchalance is remarkable compared to the emphasis placed on it in the reasoning of anti-
polygamist immigrants, one should remember that African-American Muslims often occupy
inner-city spaces where there is a questionable relationship between the law and the
community. These individuals are often poor and therefore unable to use legal services. They
may have had many negative interactions with law enforcement and as a result tend to eschew
involvement with the formal elements of the state. As a result, the barriers created by an
unrecognized marriage may not weigh as heavily as an obstacle to their formation and a simple
solution to the problem may simply be not to register any marriage with the state at all. The fact
that the only immigrant group that seems to engage in polygamy (both in the greater Boston
area and elsewhere) are similarly poor, recent immigrants who do not interact with the
American state (aside from immigration and, like African-Americans, social services) seems to
confirm the above.
Difference in Muslims’ Socio-Economic Status
The basic differences between African-American and immigrant Muslims, as we can see,
has a high degree of salience for their practice of Islamic law. The prime cause for this is their
social position within American society. While immigrants are often educated and live in the
suburbs, having a profile much like white Americans (Pew 2017, 41-2), African-American
Muslims, like their non-Muslim racial fellows, tend to be more marginalized from affluent
society, live in inner-cities and have negative experiences with the American legal system. As a
result, their attitudes to the authority of American law differs considerably. While immigrant
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Muslims tend to make much friendlier use of American law and have much to lose by its
alienation, African-American Muslims by contrast imagine they have little to lose by challenging
it or living outside the bounds of its protection.
These two groups also have radically divergent relationships with American society at
large. African-American Muslims have only a single national identity as American; they cannot
claim another immediate origin. Immigrant Muslims on the other hand, with the exception of
the very small number whose roots in the US go back many generations, have a much more
complex relationship with their American identity. While they clearly consider themselves to be
American and are generally proud of the fact, most are still immigrants (Pew 2017, 18-22) and
many of those who aren’t look back to their home countries for spouses or return regularly to
visit family and have some identification with their nation of origin.
As a result, both groups have very different concerns when it comes to establishing
Islam as an American tradition. African-American Muslims have no need to establish their
“American-ness” and can make Islam legitimately American through their purely American
cultural practices.63 In this way, African-Americans have a kind of “privilege” that immigrants
lack. They have identity capital that enables them to make claims based on an American identity
that immigrants would find difficult because they lack such an identity. Immigrants, on the other
hand, have a much more complex relationship with the United States and must first establish
themselves as American and only then can they be perceived by society at large as legitimizing
63 It is true that earlier movements of black Islam, including the Nation of Islam, were founded on various
ideologies emphasizing the separateness and Africanness of African-Americans. As described above in the
history of the Nation, this racialized view of religion and black Americans was largely if not wholly
abandoned by W.D. Muhammad when we brought the Nation into orthodox Sunnism. At that point it
became his explicit mission to deracialize the Nation and to become an ambassador for Islam to America
and for America to the Islamic ummah. In effect, he reversed course completely and rather than seeking
to separate black Muslims from their American context, he sought to emphasize and deepen that
connection (Curtis 2002, 107-08).
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Islam.64 They have their own issues of “privilege,” for while they lack the identity capital to make
bold claims about Islam’s potential tensions with American folkways, they have a certain
amount of financial and educational that most African-Americans lack that the immigrants can
use, but must also protect, which causes them to think about their relationship to the American
mainstream in very different ways than their black co-religionists.
This difference manifests itself in many ways. On the most superficial level, one sees it in
food. At African-American mosques, I was offered typically American foods like corn-on-the-cob
and soda. Imams wore American-style clothes when preaching as did the male congregants. The
women wore American-style clothes insofar as their observation of Islamic modesty standards
allowed. Immigrant mosques, on the other hand, offered either foods from their native lands
and American dishes or foods that were purely foreign to the American culinary landscape. Both
Imams and congregants dressed in the flowing robes that distinguish the dress of majority-
Muslim countries. While African-American mosques were purely English-language oriented, with
“Islamic” Arabic phrases, such as In shā Allah, being uttered only occasionally, foreign languages
were a constant at immigrant Islamic Centers, sometimes including Arabic-language sermons on
Fridays.
In fact, the cultural difference is so strong that it sometimes becomes a clash. I
encountered several African-American Muslims who preferred worshipping in immigrant Islamic
Centers since they believed that many of the traditions or elements of knowledge at African-
American mosques were insufficiently Islamic and they appreciated the dress and other cultural
traditions of Islamic Centers as more authentic to the religion. As previously mentioned, while
64 And more than half of American Muslims do not feel that American society at-large considers Islam to
be part of its mainstream (Pew 2017, 5).
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many were able to integrate seamlessly into these immigrant spaces, others reported extreme
cultural clashes, either issues attributed to latent racism (such as marriage contracts with
Arabian women being cancelled) or instances of cultural superiority such as a South Asian
Islamic Center’s insistence that an African-American man learn Urdu in order to participate and
be a “true” Muslim.
The difference in these two positions has many ramifications for the two groups’
interpretation of Islamic law. As the immigrants tend to have a more precarious relationship vis-
à-vis mainstream America, they are at pains to emphasize both reach out to the non-Islamic
community (a constant theme of Friday sermons I attended) and to stress as well as the
harmony between Islamic and American law. African-Americans, on the other hand, already
have a firmly established (though lowly) place within American society and often, from their
perspective, little to lose and much to gain from challenging it. As a result, they tend to
emphasize Islam’s mission as a reforming element within American society and the challenges it
presents. Their mosques are the only place, for example, where I heard sermons that were
critical of American society and the American government. Social justice concerns are likewise
far more prevalent in African-American mosques. One prominent African-American Muslims
activist and community organizer in Detroit explained to me how his conversion from
Christianity came as a result of his concern about economic injustice and how Islam presented
both serious challenges to what he considered an unjust capitalistic order while simultaneously
offering serious suggestions to reform. This refrain about the possibility of Islamic finance, as a
challenge to capitalism itself, operates in stark distinction from more common discussions of
Islamic finance which, while they do touch on ethical arguments to show the superiority of
Islamic over conventional financing, tend to focus much more on how compliant Islamic finance
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is both with capitalism and maintaining dominant economic and social order. In other words,
the activists’ concern in Islamic finance was challenging the system for reform while the




Demographics, while significant, are not the only major factor shaping Islamic law in the
United States or the only factor in organizing the community. Islamic institutions are also hugely
important. These institutions range from the community level, the mosque and Islamic Center,
to the regional and national stage, various Islamic social and political organizations that seek to
organize American Muslims as a whole community.
These two levels of organization, while often being very different in practice, e.g. the
first, smaller level is often more homogenous, immediate and reduceable to discrete, physical
units while the second comprises broader, more heterogenous wholes, are frequently involved
in similar questions of Islamic law and life. Both serve as sources for mediating disputes,
providing worshippers guidance to resolve interpersonal issues and to help harmonize the
requirements of Sharia with American life. Despite this similarity in function, they operate with
very different effect. While the larger organizations serve to build community on broad scales,
they are often less effective in resolving issues on a personal level and many Muslims may be
totally ignorant of their existence, while local institutions, though frequently fragmented, have
great and powerful impacts on the local community and their congregants lives.
These institutions are often most effective when they work together, though this is
frequently a point of difficulty for the two levels as many national organizations have few
enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. Likewise, individual Imams tend to follow
larger groups only insofar as they are personally engaged with or involved in their work, which is
frequently not very much. Despite this fact, it is important to understand how these structures
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function to build a coherent set of expectations among America’s Muslims and the role they
play in creating the landscape of American Sharia.
The Islamic Center and Mosque
The Islamic Center is at the heart of American Muslim communities in both a religious
and social sense. These institutions are not unique to the United States for they, or institutions
like them, exist in many European and North American contexts, but they are very different than
the typical mosque found in Islamicate countries. The most salient difference between the two
contexts is that in most Islamicate countries, mosques are supported by the state and function
as publicly provided religious services. In the United States Islamic centers are not state-run
institutions, but rather, like Christian churches, are institutions founded and managed by
individuals within a local community to serve that communities’ needs.
We discussed in the previous chapter how important Islamic centers and mosques were
in the early days of Muslim immigration to the US in the beginning of the twentieth century.
They served as venues for games, meals, socializing and even dancing. They fulfill many of these
functions today (with the exception of dancing) but are primarily used for religious purposes.
The most central is a place for gathering to say communal prayers. The Friday prayer, which
includes a khuṭbah, or sermon, is of first importance and happens in the early afternoon, just
after lunch-time. Most have some kind of “Sunday school” (which are often held on Sundays in
deference to the Christianate weekend and holy day) that consists of Arabic, Qur’an and
religious classes. They also host community events to include picnics and other social
celebrations. Islamic religious services, including the special prayers during Ramadan, are largely
held in these buildings. They also offer other ritual-specific facilities, such as rooms to wash
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bodies and prepare them for burial. Mosques and Islamic centers in the US are normally led by
an Imam and governed by a body of congregants.
Islamic Centers tend to be multi-ethnic congregations, with only 3 percent nation-wide
listing a particular ethnic affiliation (Bagby I 2011, 4). Congregations without a general ethnic
affiliation were, at least in my sample, the largest both in terms of absolute numbers attending
Friday prayers, community events and square footage. The largest Islamic Center in the area was
multi-ethnic. It is important to note, that multi-ethnic Centers often have a marked lack of
African-American worshippers, though this is changing as the W.D. Muhammad mosques lose
popularity and population.
Despite the cosmopolitanism described above, I found most of the Centers in the
Boston area to have a general ethnic identity, though none were exclusive. The most prominent
ethnic group in these congregations were Arabs. Three Centers were primarily Arab. Two of
them were predominantly North African and one was largely Levantine. The first two recruited
Imams directly from Arab-speaking countries and had Arabic-language sermons on Friday. At
least three of the congregations in Boston were predominantly South Asian, one of the largest
Muslim groups in the United States. None of them had Urdu sermons on Friday, but one did
have a close affiliation with the Rahmat-e Alam Foundation, which is a South Asian religious
organization in the United States. Two Islamic Centers were predominantly Turkish. The Imams
of both were Turkish, though they did not use Turkish in their sermons. Another significant
group of Islamic institutions were African-American dominated mosques. As described above, I
will usually use “mosque” to describe an African-American dominated institution and Islamic
Center to describe those where immigrant and convert groups are more prominent.
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African-American mosques were certainly the most mono-ethnic institutions of those I
encountered, but even here the congregants were not completely homogenous. Present at
Friday prayers were both American and African-born individuals. One of these mosques housed
a Qur’anic study group conducted in Fula, an African language. The times I attended prayer
sessions in one particular African-American mosque, the worshipping group averaged fifty
individuals, but only five or six were immigrants not of African origin. These non-African people
were all Arab men who owned businesses in the area and came into the mosque for the main
Friday prayer during the day. The women at the prayer were entirely African or African-
American.
The predominant reason that African-American mosques are so homogenous is their
particular form of Islamic practice. Because they follow the school of W.D. Muhammad, these
individuals partake of an Islamic intellectual tradition that is distinct and often not highly valued
by other practitioners. This causes a strong self-selection among mosque attendees that attracts
people affiliated with the W.D. Muhammad school, which the reader will remember came from
the Nation of Islam and tends to deter others who may view W.D. Muhammad as an improper
religious guide. The fact that the Imams at these mosques often refer to his works for religious
interpretation reinforces this trend.
Despite these misgivings, Islamic Centers and mosques share many similarities: both are
foci of local Muslim communities. Both feature prayer spaces as their central and primary
rooms. These rooms are large, open, carpeted areas, occasionally with a division in the space to
separate the sexes and a few rooms off the main hall that serve as offices for the Imam or
meeting spaces.
106
A major difference between mosques and Islamic centers is size. Mosques in my sample
tended to be smaller. I believe this is due to the fact that mosques tend to be located in inner-
city environments and have poorer members, thus they are unable to afford the large spaces
and extra facilities that characterize Islamic centers. Despite the difference in size, mosques
offer their communities the core functions of the Islamic center: a place to pray, a locus for
community formation and interaction as well as an Imam to provide legal advice and spiritual
guidance, to lead prayers and deliver the Friday sermon.
An Islamic center is usually a fully operational community center. Even the smallest
Islamic centers in my study were more than simple places of worship, just like many churches
are more than just a church. Each of the Islamic center served as a node for the Islamic
community they contained. The centers regularly created picnics, hosted community events and
served as educational centers for both youth and adults to become more closely involved in
Islam as a religious practice. They also served as sites for political activity, hosting political
candidates or providing spokespeople to present Islamic perspectives to the non-Islamic
population outside their communities. One of the primary ways Islamic centers did this was
through “Islam 101” classes and inviting non-Muslims to tour through the centers’ prayer rooms
to see what the inside was like.
This openness was in contrast to the average mosque. While the congregation did not
close itself off from the outside, indeed I was easily able to visit and talk with the Imam and
congregants and always felt welcome in a mosque, it did not go out of its way to welcome
people into the building or proselytize to the community at large. This relative closedness is
likely also in part a consequence of the socio-economic geography of these sites. They tend to
be situated in the inner city where outsiders are less inclined to visit. A further reason is the
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general narrative of many African-American Muslim communities that places the group inside
the mosque in moral conflict with those people outside of it, both in terms of the drugs, alcohol
and sexual immorality that African-American Muslims see as the consequence of the racialized
poverty that afflicts their community and as challenging the general social system that exists
more broadly in the United States that they perceive as oppressing and reducing African-
American communities to poverty. Instead of hosting Islam 101 and community events to
proselytize, mosques tend more often to focus their proselytization efforts on prisons and other
locations where they can serve and politically enlighten the inner-city and African-American
community.
The tradition of openness in Islamic centers also stands in stark contrast to the closed
nature of mosques in Islamicate countries where such facilities are often strictly off-limits to
non-Muslims, a prohibition with deep historical roots that was part of a larger complex of rules
that separated the Abrahamic, but non-Muslim population from their Muslim counterparts
(Triton 1942 37).65 This closure is due to a variety of reasons, most of which are not strictly a
part of Islamic law, though the Sharia is often used to justify such closure. Indeed, the Sharia
says little to nothing about the prohibition of non-Muslims entering Islamic spaces such as the
mosque. In fact, in the Sīrah of Ibn Hisham, the Prophet himself invites a deputation of
Christians from Najran into his mosque at Medina (Ibn Hisham 1955, 270-2).
The difference between the prohibition of non-Muslims entering mosques in Islamic
countries and the openness of Islamic centers in the United States is no doubt one of context. In
65 This prohibition was balanced, as Triton observes, by a counterpoint that it was considered improper to
ask about another’s religion, meaning that in a time when the Middle East was more diverse religiously
than it is today, individuals who were not Muslim, but willing to pose as such if necessary, were able to
enter mosques so long as they had no other obvious badges of their status that were sometimes required
(such as riding mules, wearing particular badges or kinds of clothing, etc.).
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Islamic countries, Muslims have no need to allow individuals to enter the mosque and so many
prefer to keep visitors out. Sometimes these reasons are a result of negative experiences. In
1996, the Grande Mosquée in Jenne Jeno was closed to tourists except under limited conditions
after a Vogue magazine shoot held there that involved young models dressed in negligees
(Dorsey 2015). In many other cases, however, the prohibition stands for reasons of purity or
simple exclusionary preference, a way of cementing the community of Muslims as apart from
religious minorities, one element of exclusionary rules among many in the medieval and early
modern Islamicate world that were intended to separate the Islamic and non-Islamic
populations from one another (Triton 1942).
In the United States, the Muslim population lives under different circumstances. By
cutting off access to Islamic institutions, these communities risk being ostracized from American
society and labelled as at best individuals who refuse to adopt an “American” lifestyle, at worst
as “terrorists.” Consequently, openness in the American Islamic center is an intentional way
both to proselytize to the American public and to inform the greater American community of
what it means to be Muslim and how Muslims fit into the fabric of American life.
Islamic centers are quite open about the second part of this mission and much less open
about the first. Many of the Friday prayer sermons I attended involved some element of
outreach to the non-Muslim community. Imams regularly exhorted their congregants to meet
neighbors and be friendly, to be excellent representatives of the Islamic community. In these
sermons, with the exception of African-American mosques, I never heard a mention of anti-
Islamic sentiment in the US (though I am sure it is an occasional topic) or reprobation of the
American cultural stance against Islam, despite events occurring during my time of research,
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such as a police-shooting of an African-American Muslim suspected of supporting ISIS, that
might have been the cause of such discussions (Allen et al 2015).66
Instead of sermons about the danger of American society, congregants were exhorted
to welcome individuals into the Islamic Center as a way of teaching neighbors about Islam. Most
of the Islamic Centers in my group had special pages on their websites where an individual could
contact a member of the congregation for a tour of the premises (which is how I often made
initial contact with them). One Islamic Center had a special Ifṭār, or Fast-Breaking during
Ramadan, to which local notables (and some less than notable, such as myself) were invited.
Since it was an election year, all of the candidates for local elections came and gave stump
speeches. The Police Chief even talked about his experience in the Middle East with Muslims as
a member of the US military, which the audience received approvingly. All of these services
were intended both to situate the Islamic Center within the community as well as to familiarize
outsiders with its operation. Ultimately these events intended to make the individual Muslims
less exotic and more American. To that end, one Islamic Center with a predominantly Turkish
ethnic composition even placed small American flags in stands edging the prayer room. Many
other Islamic Centers had an American flag somewhere on the premises, not unlike an American
church. Others refused, feeling national symbols would be disrespectful of the sacred space (a
feeling many Christian churches share).
The proselytization duty of Islam was a constant undercurrent throughout these
discussions. The Imams and congregants used the Arabic term for proselytization, or daᶜwah, to
refer indiscriminately to outreach intended to situate Islamic communities in their environment
66 To be clear, the African-American Islamic community spoke out against this shooting and used, as we
shall discuss below, an Islamic Center as a press platform to do so, but the immigrant community
remained silent.
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as well as to actual attempts to convert individuals to the faith. This was particularly clear in the
Islam 101 classes these Centers often hold ostensibly to educate the general public about Islam
as a religion. While these classes were not explicitly aimed at converts, the classes I attended did
contain a significant number of recent converts or people considering converting to Islam.
The welcoming atmosphere at these Centers was partly aimed to make new potential
worshippers feel at home. Indeed, the Imam of the major Islamic Center in Boston immediately
preceding my research period, Imam Suhaib Webb, was himself a convert who emphasized the
welcoming and culturally syncretic aspect of the Islamic faith, arguing very strongly that
American folk-ways could be equally Islamic as any other. In terms of my own experience,
worshippers regularly asked me questions that indicated they were interested in me as a
potential convert. Converts were particularly open about their proselytization efforts and would
explicitly challenge me to convert, a thing the immigrant Muslims never did. 67
These efforts at proselytization occur only at the margins, however. Unlike the sermons
of many Christian churches, especially evangelical ones, I never heard an Imam encourage
proselytization with the aim to convert a non-Muslim to Islam. In fact, in discussion with
American converts, rare was the individual whose conversion story involved an initial approach
by a Muslim. Most often, the convert initiated the conversation or exploration that sparked
conversion. The only exceptions were African-Americans who proselytize widely and openly
67 I could compare this to my experience doing fieldwork in Mauritania where attempts at conversion
were sometimes incessant.
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within their own community, especially in prisons where Muslims make up a substantial
proportion of incarcerated black Americans.68
As discussed above, African-Americans are the most aggressive American Muslims both
in their condemnation of the non-Islamic community and in proselytization. This is in part an
inheritance from the Nation of Islam and its engagement as part of the black struggle against
structural inequality (Feddes 2008 506-510). It should be noted, however, that the current W.D.
Muahmmad mosques no longer continue the tradition of anti-white animus that the lineal
tradition of the Nation of Islam to this day maintains. I, as a white man, was never subjected to
any animus or bias while attending prayers in these locations and was always welcomed into the
community. I was also, as in immigrant Islamic centers, never subject to proselytization efforts
myself, which might have had something to do with the fact that my ancestry is predominantly
European rather than African.
Islam and Civil Society at Home and Abroad
The racial and ethnic distinctions between Boston’s Muslims did not mean that these
groups had no communication or overlap with one another, however. In fact, Boston’s Islamic
centers and mosques formed a complex network where individuals attended different centers
for different purposes according to their needs. This cross-pollination meant that most Muslims
attended more than one location and in doing mixed with individuals from different
backgrounds and locations.
68 The best estimate of the religious population of American prisons is a 2012 Pew Forum survey of prison
chaplains, which is at best a rough guide. These chaplains estimated the population of Muslims in US
prisons at 9% compared to 1% of the general population. (Pew Forum 2012, 23). One can assumed, given
prison demographics, that the overwhelming majority of these individuals are African-American. Another
study holds that the annual conversion rate to Islam in prisons is 30,000 with a total population of
300,000 Muslims (Feddes 2008, 505). These numbers are striking but may be contained to prison.
According to one informant who worked as a prison chaplain, the reversion rate of these prisoners on
release is high.
112
This was most obvious in the relationship between the largest Islamic center in Boston,
the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center (ISBCC) and outlying centers, particularly the
Islamic Society of Boston (ISB) in Cambridge which was loosely affiliated with the larger
institution. The ISBCC’s history is demonstrative of the inter-ethnic and racial nature of the
greater Boston Islamic community. The land upon which the center stands was originally
purchased from the city by a group of African-American Muslims who intended to build a
mosque and a school. Unfortunately, they were unable to raise the required financing for the
project. Lacking the necessary funds, they petitioned the Islamic Society of Boston, which was
largely an immigrant-dominated body, to raise the necessary money and build the school and
the worship center, which the society did in the early 2000’s. The construction of the Center was
delayed, however, by 9/11 and accusations of Islamic extremism levelled at the ISB. Eventually,
in order to move the project forward, a new organization, the Muslim American Society of
Boston, took control over the project and completed construction in 2009 on what is today the
largest Islamic center in New England. The Center continues its plans for development by adding
what may become one of the major Islamic seminaries in the United States69 for students to
study Islamic law.
The ISBCC holds pride of place as the central meeting place for social and other major
events for Muslims in Boston. While it is far from the oldest center in the area (that distinction
goes to the Quincy Mosque70) it is the largest in terms of absolute size and congregation. Its
prayer hall is massive and was full for every Friday prayer service I attended. Prayer is perhaps
69 Though a liberal arts college and not a seminary, Zaytunah College in California could be considered the
first generally recognized Islamic seminary in the US.
70 This is an immigrant-dominated center, but it is general referred to simply as the “Quincy Mosque, so I
maintain the appellation here.
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one of the least significant offerings the ISBCC provides in terms of community-building among
Boston’s Muslims, however. Far more important is its role as a community hub, evinced by the
fact that many Muslims who I interviewed did not regularly attend prayers at the ISBCC but
regularly attended its social events. It usually has the highest profile Imam in the Boston area. In
fact, its last imam, Suhaib Webb, a convert trained in Al-Azhar, was a nationally known figure
who attempted to create a tighter synergy between Islamic ways and American cultural
practices.71
The ISBCC maintains several amenities that support Boston area Muslims. These include
infrastructural opportunities, such as a café and managing the Islamic portion of the cemetery in
Roxbury, along with more spiritual and religious activities, such as extensive classes and lecture
series. It also hosts youth-oriented activities such as a film club, summer camps, and religious
classes. I have known many individuals who also use it as a kind of social base, meeting friends
there for unorganized activities,72 going there in order to spend unplanned spare time as well as
to have a meal when the café is open.
The ISBCC also serves as a fulcrum for functions that require a particular institutional
mass. Because of its size, it can engage in programs like a halal farm share where a farm from
western Massachusetts delivers boxes of halal items that it produces to members of the Islamic
center. It even provides a matchmaking service for Muslims looking for a spouse. It also serves
as a focus for the Islamic community of greater Boston to speak to non-Muslims with a common
voice. When a young African-American Muslim was shot by the Boston Police for threatening an
officer with a large knife, saying he was intending to behead the police officer, African-American
71 For greater details on the ISBCC please see Stephen Young’s dissertation Islamic Identity in the Islamic
Society of Boston.
72 In this case, “friends” include anthropologists as well!
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Muslims who are most frequently associated with W.D. Muhammad mosques, used the ISBCC as
a platform to release an official message. While the ISBCC staff did not officially participate in
the public relations itself, it allowed its mailing list and other facilities to be used to broadcast
the notice.
Islamic center and mosque attendance is a significant area of difference between
America’s Muslims and its Christians and Jews. Most of the Muslims I interviewed regardless of
background attended more than one place of worship, which is in contrast to their fellow
Abrahamic worshipers who tend to associate with a single church or synagogue. The Muslims in
my research population usually had a weekday center to attend during work or perhaps for the
Friday prayer. These were places where they could be considered a casual visitor; their names
were not on the roles as dues-paying “members,”73 nor did they or their children partake of the
social or educational opportunities afforded by that particular center. Instead they attended
these locations because of the proximity they had to their workplaces. Most individuals also
attended special functions at various places including the ISBCC. These functions might include
classes on spiritual development, aspects of Islamic law or theology or other social and religious
events. Finally, individuals had a “home mosque,” or an Islamic center that they attended most
frequently. This center was usually located a convenient distance from their homes. Individuals
who attended these places paid dues to them, contributed to the general fund, particularly if
that fund included building a new center, and participated fully in the social life of the center.
This often meant sending their children to “Sunday School,” which often actually takes place on
Sunday, in order to be educated in their duties as Muslims. Very few, only one or two, also had a
center where their children attended school, but as there were only two full-time Islamic
73 What this constitutes we will discuss below
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schools in the greater Boston area, one on the North Shore and the other in Worcester, these
were not regular options for most congregants.
American and Islamicate Religious Institutions
While peregrination between worship centers is a practice shared by Muslims both in
the US and abroad, the reasons for movement are different for each. In Muslim majority
countries, mosques have different and much more limited functions. They exist strictly for
prayer and the Friday sermon. While some mosques may have schools attached to them and
furnish the place where legal experts gather, Imams in these locales tend to be nothing more
than prayer leaders and the institutions of Islamic knowledge are incidental to the mosque itself.
In fact, in many places these sites of Islamic knowledge are not collocated with mosques at all
but are housed in wholly separate compounds.
Moreover, mosques in Islamic countries are generally not community institutions.
Instead, they tend to be publicly funded and serve as government institutions, provided for use
by the community. Consequently, they are completely related to the function of prayer. While
individuals may gather in mosques for some community functions, these are sometimes not
orchestrated or encouraged unless directly connected to a religious function. Indeed, there are
actually some traditions that suggest that social activity is not appropriate within the confines of
a mosque at all.74
Islamic centers in the US are very different. The first and most obvious difference is their
funding and governance structure. Islamic centers in the US are not public institutions whose
funding and organization comes from the state. Like all American religious institutions, Islamic
74 For an example of this debate unfolding in a Detroit community, see Abraham’s “Arab Detroit’s
‘American Mosque.” (2000).
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centers are self-funding, requiring the congregants to provide for the institution. This self-
provision means that the Islamic center in the United States takes on a number of different roles
that the mosque in a Muslim majority country does not.
First of these is financial. The fact that Islamic centers must self-fund presents a novel
difficulty to American Muslims. Since payments for mosques in Muslim majority countries come
out of taxes, mosques in these countries need no charity. This is not the case in the US. Without
donations, Islamic centers cannot survive. Consequently, Islamic centers require their
congregants to pay periodic dues. These dues are always fairly modest, usually around thirty
dollars a month for the Islamic centers whose information I was able to gather. This low-demand
is to ensure that even very low-income people can afford to be members of the center.
Unfortunately, such small amounts do not contribute substantially towards the centers upkeep
or improvement, especially if a large construction effort, such as building a new worship center,
is desired. Consequently, these centers must ask for donations above and beyond their usual
dues like a church.
The need to fund and govern places of worship is one of the biggest changes in the
religious institutions between Islamicate countries and the United States. While churches in the
US, even churches with strong centralization like the Roman Catholic church, are well used to
requiring parishes to support their own expenses, relying on the central treasury only for
emergency and unexpected costs, this self-governance model is not one to which Muslims are
accustomed. Consequently, while churches have long been a legitimate target of the tithe
Christians are required to pay from their income, Islamic centers and mosques have not
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traditionally been a legitimate beneficiary of the zakāh, or the Islamic version of the tithe which
is about 2% of an individual’s yearly profits.75
There is currently a minor debate among America’s Muslims whether an Islamic center
can be an appropriate target for these charity payments.76 Traditionally, “charity” in this sense
meant needy people, not institutions, but this context also assumed state support for places of
worship. Given the lack of state support in America, institutions are just as needy as people.
While most of the informants I discussed considered the Islamic center an appropriate target for
charity because of this fact, some people instead donated over and above the 2% rule in order
to preserve their charity for the poor and give a surplus, which they considered would return an
extra reward to them, to the center.
Because of the importance of financial self-sufficiency, Islamic centers in the US often
make their most significant pushes for fund-raising during the month of Ramadan. Ramadan is
traditionally a month where Muslims are encouraged to give out charity. This makes the month
of Ramadan not unlike Advent or Lent where Christian churches also often hold fund-raising
drives. In Islamic centers, this is the time when congregations are reminded of basic needs, such
as fundraising for a new building or for new educational and religious programs. Of course,
charity for the poor, especially poor Muslims who may not be able to afford a large meal for the
Feast of the Slaughter, the ᶜEid al-Aḍḥā, is also emphasized during this period. Funds are also
asked for the various Ramadan related activities that serve as some of the major focal points for
75 “Profits” in this sense means the amount of money an individual has this year that they didn’t have last
year. If this is a positive number, they must pay a percentage, if it is negative or zero, they owe nothing at
all.
76 For examples of this debate see: http://dar-alifta.org/Foreign/ViewFatwa.aspx?ID=635;
https://archive.islamonline.net/?p=687; http://www.icoi.net/wp-content/uploads/Zakat-for-building-
masjid.pdf; https://www.seekersguidance.org/answers/general-counsel/can-i-give-zakat-to-my-husband-
parents-grandparents-or-children/ (All accessed September 4, 2019)
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community gathering; every mosque and Islamic center has a variety of religious prayers, fast-
breaking and other traditions that are brought into the community space of the Islamic center
and mosque during the Holy Month.
American Civil Society
Churches are a primary form of community organization in many countries. This is
especially true for the United States where such communities form a major part of the structure
of civil society. The fact that such organizations are removed from the state promotes the
potential for such organizations to serve as personal, active networks of social relations. Many
communities in the US, such as the Satmar Jews and Amish Christians, use their churches and
religious lives to create lifeways that are alternatives to the broader, mainstream American
context. Historically other groups, such as the Mormons, used their churches to move beyond
their immediate communities to build political entities that sometimes came into conflict with
the American state. Consequently, when Muslims first came to America, it was perhaps natural
that they would form religious communities as a way to develop and coalesce their community
and create an Islamic-American civil society.
This was certainly the case with Boston’s Islamic population, which began with the
Quincy mosque (Lahaj 2012).77 Initially, the Muslims in Boston formed informal ties. The
community was tightly knit but lacked functioning institutions to formalize these ties. Initially, in
the very early years of the twentieth century, the informal connections that dominated in the
community were sufficient to keep it together since its members were strangers in a strange
land, connected to one another by their common roots and their difficulties navigating their
77 I am breaking my use of “mosque” in this case because the Quincy mosque was built at such an early
stage that the term “Islamic center” with its connotations of a developed, truly orthodox Islamic
community is not appropriate to the early stages of this center’s development. The source of this story is
Mary Lahaj’s master’s thesis, cited in the bibliography.
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new-found American context. As time progressed, however, they began to assimilate and this
assimilation posed a threat to their identity as Muslims and as Levantines. In order to establish
more lasting solidarity and continuation of religious and other cultural traditions, the creation of
a formal society became necessary.78
The Boston Islamic community did not begin with people explicitly deciding to build a
center of worship. Instead, community members gradually coalesced, meeting first casually with
one another to engage in religious worship and social activities, only later realizing, once a
particular critical mass had been reached, that they needed a dedicated religious organization.79
This point came in the 1950’s when a collection was taken from among the members of a group,
the Arab American Banner Society, who were interested in building a specifically religious
building.
Of course, an organization needs more than a building. Given the large number of
people involved and the requirements of American law for the incorporation of non-profit
groups, a charter delimiting the leadership and regular bureaucratic processes for meeting
became necessary for the new group. As there were no real models for Islamic centers in
Muslim majority countries that would work well in coordination with American law, new
78 It is not just Muslims in Boston who experienced this tension between wishing to assimilate and remain
apart. The existence of many ethnic, fraternal organizations, such as the Sons of Italy or the Sons of
Norway demonstrate that many communities felt similar tensions and, like the Quincy Muslims, turned to
civil society to resolve these issues. As time goes by, however, and American ethnic identities among non-
immigrants disappears, these same organizations are disappearing. Very few people belong to the Son
of… groups any longer. Likewise, the cultural elements of the Arab American Banner Society, the society
created by Quincy’s Muslims, has totally disappeared, replaced by a non-ethnically aligned religious
organization, the Islamic Center of New England.
79 This was a pattern reflected in every Islamic center I encountered with the exception of ISBCC: the
Center started with a core group of people who met informally until the group grew to such an extent
that they required a formal religious space.
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arrangements were required.80 Consequently, the Quincy group, like many others, was forced to
look towards the nearest example they had: Christian churches. The earliest Islamic centers,
including the Quincy Mosque, tended to borrow more or less verbatim the charter of churches,
changing only the language where necessary. As time has passed and charters have become
formalized by organizations like ISNA, the influence of the church structure remains and every
Islamic center whose charter I examined looks essentially the same as those of a Christian
church.
The church organization bifurcates religious and social power within the institution.
Accordingly, the Quincy charter, like all such charters, created of board of directors who are all
lay members of the center. The Imam, who functions as the religious leader, is usually not a part
of the board, except occasionally on an ex-officio basis to deal with issues pertinent to religion.
The board hires and fires the Imam, which can create obvious conflicts of interest, especially if
the Imam is at odds with the community. A powerful Imam (just like a powerful minister) could
easily overwhelm the rest of the board in controversial issues, forcing the institution to fission,
perhaps threatening its very existence. This dual-tracked structure was written into the
governing documents of the Arab American Banner Society.
The Quincy Mosque demonstrates both the potential advantages and disadvantages of
this structure. While the Society was founded in the 1950’s, this organization soon proved to
need modification. While they were able to build a building to house the growing religious
community, in the 1960’s and ‘70’s the community became increasingly diverse. As the reader
will recall, before this period American Muslims tended to be from the Levant and practiced
80 One might adapt certain institutions like the waqf, or charitable trust, to the needs of an Islamic center,
but the intent of a charitable trust is quite different and its organization not normally easily compatible
with American law.
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what could be considered a “folk” version of Islam, in this case that means it was a religion the
emphasized ritual practice and de-emphasized legal knowledge. In part the emphasis on ritual
over law was driven by the new American environment and a desire to appear more like
American society at large, but it was also a result of the lack of religious specialists in the United
States, which forced Muslims to fall back on the often non-technical knowledge of Islam which
they brought with them, knowledge which focused on the basic requirements of the faith, how
to conduct prayers and similar practices and lacked deep expertise in the often narrow and
highly technical field of Islamic jurisprudence.
As the new wave of immigrants came to the United States in the 1960’s, they settled in
university communities since their initial bridge into the US was on student visas. Naturally,
Boston was a major focus of this influx given the number of universities in the area. As the
Quincy Mosque was the only Islamic institution at the time, many newly arriving immigrants
settled in the city, creating the first new, major influx of Muslims in at least fifty years. The
influence of this new, incoming community wrought a great number of changes to the Quincy
Mosque, which had a primarily social focus up to that point.81 Many of these newcomers, who
were themselves influenced by rising movements in the Islamicate world that were either
directly Salafist, Wahhabist or heavily influenced by them, demanded a purging of these social
activities, considering them to be an anathema to the proper role of the Mosque.
This conflict eventually came to center over the then-current religious leader who was a
member of the old community of Quincy and consequently largely self-educated in the Islamic
sciences. As a result, many members of the community felt that his knowledge of Islam as legal
81 This is a virtually identical story to that of many Islamic centers and mosques in Detroit during the same
period.
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practice (which is the focus of much contemporary Islamic praxis) was inadequate. In fact, many
felt they themselves were more qualified to lead the mosque than he. Ultimately, a new
religious director was hired from India who began what he considered a series of reforms within
the institution. While this resonated with many older members of the congregation, newly
arrived immigrants by this time formed a majority of the community. The board members, who
held most of the power, but were now a minority bloc of older community members who
tended to be less concerned with the issues of revivalism that the new director favored. As
could be predicted, a power struggle between the two factions emerged.
In the course of this struggle, the issue of voting became crucially important and the by-
laws saw real use and modification. Ultimately, the immigrant members called for a vote to
which the board agreed, eager to reduce the tensions in the mosque. Since the by-laws defined
membership very loosely and all one had to do was pay dues and sign a letter to become one,
the immigrants were able essentially to pack the vote by bussing in sympathetic Muslims from
the area who were not yet members of the Quincy Mosque but who became so upon their
arrival when they signed the letter and paid their dues.
This scheme very nearly worked, for the board had no way of excluding these newly
arrived members under the by-laws as then formed. Despite the heroic bussing efforts, there
were not enough influx of new members to out vote the old and the Indian religious revivalist
was removed from the community. Afterwards the by-laws were amended to require a history
of community participation to become a voting member.
Numbers and time were against the original members of the Quincy Mosque, however.
While the new immigrants were turning the congregation increasingly conservative, the old
immigrants wanted what would today be considered a more liberal practice of Islam. They
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wanted a form of religious worship that did not involve gender segregation or other elements
that are common in Islamic centers but are considered too socially conservative by many
American Muslims. As a result, virtually all the original families left the Quincy Mosque. Those
who still practice attend the most “progressive” (i.e. westernized) Islamic center in the area, the
Islamic Center of Boston, Wayland.
The above events, or fear about them, were referenced in virtually every Islamic center I
visited as a concern and a reason why the Imam was not usually allowed on the board. The
current Quincy Mosque, ironically, was often cited as an exception and a place where the Imam
has a great deal of power over the actual Center’s administration. The board members at other
centers said this was because their Imam was very well trusted. When explaining this trust,
individuals pointed out his long residency in the position, his ability to communicate in English,
his understanding of American customs and his flexibility on issues of the law. Despite the
Imam’s functional involvement in the Quincy Mosque’s administration, its formal charter lists
the Imam as an ex-officio board member, meaning that while the Imam was part of the board,
the general suspicion of his potential abuse of power led the board to restrict his involvement in
its decision-making.
Five of the Islamic centers I researched had experienced problems with Imams that were
either unwilling to Americanize or considered too harsh for their congregations and were forced
to leave. This often happens because there is a shortage of properly trained American Muslims
to serve as Imams in these Centers, a fact which is quickly changing. The consequence of this,
however, has been that most Imams are hired from outside of the country.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the above, the biggest problem cited with Imams in my
population was their lack of familiarity with American culture. Every ad to hire an Imam I viewed
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stated that knowledge of American society was a requirement for hiring. Perhaps the most
extreme distance between the governing body and the Imam I witnessed was in a Moroccan-
majority center where the Imam was hired not to be an expert in Islamic law, but simply to lead
the prayer. This Imam spoke no English and had no desire to learn. He did not deliver the Friday
sermon, members of the community did, and his only role was to lead prayers and recite the
Qur’an. The members of the board liked this arrangement as it avoided any conflicts between an
ornery Imam with religious authority and a board with political and economic authority. On a
more personal level, it also prevented the miscommunication that often arises between Imams
used to the cultural patterns of their home countries. Foreign Imams often consider these to be
properly Islamic and American ways, where the differ, to be unIslamic. This bias against
American folk-ways creates friction between the Imam and the congregation, particularly the
children, whom many people fear may be turned away from Islam as a result. The most
successful centers, however, were those where the Imam and the board shared a cordial
relationship. Such a relationship was the rule rather than the exception. Still, in almost all of
these institutions a strict separation of powers was observed, which likely promoted harmony.
This separation of powers is interesting because in all of my interviews, each of the
board members said that the by-laws were only loosely observed. Many Centers held elections,
but some did not, though all were required to according to their charters. In fact, the board
members at one center told me that the charter only existed because having one was a
requirement to become a 501(c)(3), or non-profit, corporation. The rules, they said, became of
importance only in the rare event described above at the Quincy Mosque. They were functional
only in times of dispute and as a means to resolve the same.
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Despite this extreme deprecation of the charter and, consequently, the board’s role, in
most Centers the board does a considerable amount of work. Board members are usually
assigned particular portfolios within the center, such as fundraising or interfaith outreach, and
normally are quite engaged in these areas. Their efforts that consume a lot of their time, which
is a reason some Centers do not hold elections: there are only so many people in the community
willing to take up these roles and those that want them already holds them. In all of these ways,
Islamic centers function very similarly to American churches, with the exception that in highly
liturgical traditions, like the Roman Catholic Church, the minister plays an important
administrative role.
Everyone interviewed agreed that by-laws were most important in times of conflict
because it was then that these rules allowed the center to maintain its identity as a coherent
unit without fissuring, which can happen from time to time. In fact, as mentioned above, the
Islamic Center of Boston, Wayland was the result of an earlier fissure from the Quincy
Mosque.82 Sometimes these splits are inevitable and happen as a result of the natural
antagonisms, jealousies, religious concerns and convictions of various members.
We can again see a parallel with Christian churches. My wife, for example, grew up in a
Mennonite Church, Swamp, that had fissured well over a century and a half ago to create West
Swamp in rural Pennsylvania when the members of Swamp changed the church locks, locked
the dissenting congregants out of the building and later physically barred their entrance. The
members of both congregations were aware of this history, which serves as the basis for a
joking relationship and whose animosity was officially ended by an exchange of keys in the early
82 Sometimes this fissuring is amicable. The Quincy Mosque is more or less split into two with one campus
in Sharon and, as described above, the Islamic Society of Boston effectively fissured part of its activities
when it formed the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center.
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2000’s. Consequently, such fissuring should be seen as a product of the associational nature of
these groups rather than something that has to do with the religion of Islam specifically.
The civil associational nature of Islamic Centers provides both a barrier and an
opportunity to newly arrived immigrants. It serves as a barrier because of the civil associational
burdens required with maintaining and developing the institution are foreign to their personal
experiences. Given that most Muslim immigrants come from societies with weak civil societies
and where their mosques are part of the state rather than civil society, they often find
themselves confused with how to build relationships and interact with local officials.
While Americans often take it for granted, much of our education in the US as children
involves learning civics through practice. Our civic education does not just come from a formal
class, but from participating in civil society institutions like church youth groups, extracurricular
activities like student government, yearbook organizations, youth sports, scouting and many
other forms of American associational life that we take for granted. In most of these immigrants’
home countries this associational life is largely non-existent or even prohibited, and easily
avoided if one does not take an active interest in it. Consequently, understanding that an
individual can and needs to file for a permit to use certain spaces (or even that spaces are
available in the first place), or that one can petition the city or state government for certain
privileges accorded to a religious institutions, like the right to marry, all form barriers of
education which members of these institutions need to learn.
One avenue to advance an institution’s competency in dealing with civil society and the
government was hiring an American as an interlocutor. I knew of one such man who was hired
by the Islamic Center of Malden. His primary job was to interface with city officials and serve as
a kind of community organizer for the center, which had an active life in local civil society. In
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fact, I have described its largest Iftar for Ramadan above, which was held in a local school’s
cafeteria and was attended by a plethora of city officials and candidates for office. The event
was organized by him.
More often, immigrants tend to assume the burden themselves, as indicated by the fact
that every Islamic Center whose board composition I was able to survey had at least one
immigrant as a member. While the learning curve for these individuals is often steep, men and
women (but mostly men) who immigrate are fully conversant in American civil society within
just a few years, appearing before zoning board meetings, applying for permits, incorporating
non-profit corporations and doing an array of tasks that would baffle the average citizen from
their place of origin.
Many who have children are greatly assisted by their offspring who learn these skills the
same way that other American children do, through their schools and extra-curricular activities.
These positions often lead to business and social advantages for the individuals involved:83 they
find easy outlets for advertising their butchering, service businesses and even learn how to
engage in those activities that have civil society components, such as union or professional
licensing, as a result of their experience working to organize the Islamic center.
In other words, the Islamic center becomes a site for socializing American citizens who,
coming here as adults, do not receive the lessons in American associational life that American
children do. Islamic centers in this way resemble other immigrant institutions like 19th century
political machines, Sons of Italy (or Norway or Sweden, etc.), fraternal organizations or Christian
83 For a discussion of how church membership has long advantaged American business people see
Weber’s “Church and Sects in North America.”
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churches and Jewish synagogues, which played the same role for incorporating earlier
generations of immigrants into a broader American social framework.84
The Islamic center as a locus of civic education is only the beginning of the differences
between an Islamic center in the US and a mosque abroad. As described above, Islamic centers
in America serve an essential social purpose. These centers act as a way for the community to
bond, for families to provide mutual support, for couples to meet and reproduce the community
and for children to become educated in what it means to be a Muslim while incorporating these
individuals into a fundamentally American way of life.
This social function dates back to the earliest communities of Muslims in the United
States. As discussed above, religion was an amorphous thing for early American Muslims both in
Boston and elsewhere in the country. This means that Islam was associated with folk practices,
both in the rituals and the community-oriented events, as much as the law. Indeed, given that
this pattern predates the global revivalism of Islamic legal orthodoxy led by Saudi Arabia after its
rise in the second half of the twentieth century, this was an understanding of Islam that was
none too different from the practice they had in their countries of origin. Consequently, early
Islamic centers were as much about community organization and solidarity as they were about
religion.
We see an excellent example of this in the story of the Quincy Mosque described above.
It had its beginning in the Arab American Banner Society, which was a weekly social gathering
that was initially ecumenical, including both Muslims and Christians. When they built their
house of worship, this sense of community extended through gatherings such as annual picnics
84 For how civil associational groups integrated immigrants see Andersen & Cohen “Political Institutions
and Incorporation of Immigrants” & Cornwell “Bosses, Machines and Ethnic Groups.”
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that were ended when the immigrants came in the 1960’s with ideas of religious orthodoxy that
conceived of the mosque as a purely religious institution that should be removed from profane
social practices. Ironically, these same reformers were themselves influenced by American social
practice and the annual picnic was ultimately revived and is a major event within the Quincy
Mosque community.
Islamic centers still play a social role within the community that is unknown to mosques
in Islamicate nations. Picnics, such as that at the Quincy Mosque, are important summer rituals
for Islamic centers in Boston. One center holds a mass excursion outside of the city for their
annual gathering. Also common are communal dinners after Friday prayers and outreach
events, such as open houses where the congregation welcomes non-Muslims into the building
and presents refreshments and other items to the visitors. Especially common are social events
related to religious needs. These can be match-making parties where young people are able to
meet one another and mingle without the problems of individual contact that would be
precluded under Islamic law but are expected in all forms of American courtship. Breakfasts
during Ramadan are also a regular event during the holy month as are feasts for the Day of the
Sacrifice.
Sunday Schools
Like most religious institutions, Islamic centers make children a particular focus of their
efforts. Each of the Islamic centers where I conducted research had “Sunday School.” This trend
shows the adaptations Islam has made to the Christian context of the United States, for Islam’s
sabbath, if one could call it that, is Friday, but in many Islamic centers, Sunday School actually
happens on Sunday. In part this is because Sunday is a weekend day, but this explanation is
insufficient since Saturday is equally an acceptable day as Sunday and yet while some centers
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had their children’s classes on Saturday, for the majority of centers, they were held on Sunday.
Specific questioning revealed in each case that this was done to align Islamic religious practices
with Christian ones, though this may have been as practical as cultural since Sunday morning
was for a long time kept free of children’s activities such as sports games in order to allow
families to attend church. The fact that Sunday mornings are no longer free of activities, yet
many Islamic centers continue Sunday School (even if in name only) is indicative of the stickiness
of this trend.
The subjects covered in these classes were standard across all Islamic centers, though
this was not because they subscribed to a set of standard educational practices. Indeed, centers
varied on how frequently they held the classes, with some holding classes once, twice or even
thrice a week. Teachers largely created their own materials, though some textbooks were used.
By and large, however, the subjects were the same. They covered the basic elements of the
religious sciences discussed in our introduction with the most common topics being Qur’anic
interpretation, Islamic law (the elements of furūᶜ but not fiqh), including how to pray, what to
eat, etc., Qur’anic recitation with recitation contests and performances being a common feature
in Islamic center gatherings, and Arabic language instruction.
Arabic language instruction took place in all centers regardless of their ethnic affiliation
given the religious importance of the Arabic language in Islam, it being the language of
revelation. None of the centers I attended had classes in any other language, though I have
heard South Asian Islamic centers sometimes offer Urdu classes. While parents volunteer to
teach most of the classes, ultimately, the Imam is responsible for overseeing all the educational
activities, a function which is a major part of the job.
The Imam
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Though the Imam does not sit on the board of the average Islamic center, he (in my
sample the Imam was invariably male) is the center of life there. He is usually the leader at all
informal social gatherings, though sometimes a board member might take charge. He is also the
primary deliverer of the Friday sermon. He always has a private office, which board members
usually do not. He also holds meetings, providing advice and dealing with religious concerns. He
presides over weddings, guides funerals, advises on the slaughter for the holiday and generally
convenes all religious occasions. Because of this position, he wields a considerable amount of
moral authority, which is sometimes helpful and sometimes disruptive depending on the
organizational structure of the center and the knowledge and comfort level of the Imam with
American society.
In my research pool, the degree of integration the Imam had with American society was
the decisive factor in determining how much influence and power he had within his
congregation and how much support he could draw from them. As a result, all but three Imams
of the approximately twenty I interviewed were what I would consider well-integrated. This
does not mean that they embraced American social phenomena such as dating, which they all
roundly condemned as strictly unIslamic. Instead, integration meant that they acknowledged
the necessity of Islam’s adapting to the new environment of the United States and viewed their
role as a religious leader as an interpreter and a harmonizer, bringing the traditions of Islamic
law and worship to a new land.
Integration into the American environment was a fact both of those Imams who were
born within the United States as well as those born outside. Education also made little
difference since all the Imams in my research pool had at least some education in Islamic
institutions outside the United States. Location of foreign birth or education also made little
132
difference. Imams in my pool were born in or educated in virtually every part of the Islamic
world with the exception of South-East Asia.
Instead, personality and affability seemed to be the main criteria to consider when
hiring a new Imam and such compatibility was not always easy to predict. It is easier for a center
to know that an Imam would be compatible with American lifestyles and Islamic practice if that
person were born here, but there is a shortage of American-born religious scholars to fill the
role. As a result, Imams often have to be recruited from outside the United States, though with
the growth of Islamic seminaries and universities in the US, this fact is likely to change in the
near future.
Unfortunately, there seemed to be little indication of which Imams would comport
themselves appropriately once in the United States. I met four who came from abroad and were
clearly unable to shepherd an American congregation and others who were quite adept.
Strangely enough, religious orthodoxy also seemed not to be an indicator, for some of the
foreign-born Imams were what might be considered more liberal while others were more
conservative in their approach, but both liberals and conservatives were capable of successfully
integrating. The successful Imams all spoke English, easily interacted with Americans and non-
Muslims and were capable of leading a civil association through personal charisma and
dedication to their respective institutions. These are not skills that are necessarily associated
with Imams abroad.
This role placed the Imam in a very different position than he would have held in his
home country and perhaps this explains why some succeed upon arrival and others fail. In their
home countries, Imams would most likely be responsible for very menial roles: simply leading
prayer and potentially delivering the Friday sermon, which in many countries is disseminated to
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them from a bureau of the state’s government. They are trained in the religious sciences, but
only to a slightly greater extent than the average member of their congregation. The difference
in the role of an Imam in the US and abroad was frequently cited by American Imams as a
source of difficulty.
In the US, the Imam becomes much more. Not only must he become a leader of his
association, a body with which he may have no familiarity prior to his arrival in the country, but
the Imam must also serve as an expert in the religious law. This task is made even more complex
by the fact that the Imam is not providing legal expertise in a country where the institutions and
population are essentially Islamic. Instead, the Imam is working in an environment where the
majority of the population is of a different religion and its institutions are structured around the
moral prohibitions of either Christianity or the secular trends which are informed by a Christian
moral base.
The consequence of this is that the Imam must be highly flexible, not just in his
personality and ability to get along with strangers in a strange land, but he must also be
particularly adept in Islamic law, knowing the subject so well that he can deal with issues that
are entirely novel. In fact, this makes the American Imam’s job in some ways more difficult than
his fellow jurist in a Muslim country, for abroad this individual will always have reference to a
set of opinions and colleagues that are likely to cover every permutation of a question he
receives. He need only research deeply enough to find the answer. In the United States,
however, the Imam constantly encounters new situations for which there may be no reliable
guide and as a result must rely on his own intuition to answer the problem.
This intuition poses an interesting problem, for as described above, in order to solve
novel legal problems, one must have recourse to a faculty referred to as ijtihad. The practice of
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ijtihad is a loaded one, however, for it involves entering into legal depths reserved, traditionally,
only for the most elite and highly knowledgeable scholars, some consider only epoch-making
scholars capable of exercising this virtue. As a result, while American Imams do often create
novel solutions to novel problems, they all declined characterizing their activity as ijtihad, saying
that what they were truly doing is taking elements of the opinions of previous scholars and
combining them or applying them in new ways, qualifying them not as exercising the so-called
ijtihād al-muṭlaq, but as the more restricted ijtihād al-muqallid, which deals only with the
decisions of scholars who have themselves performed the greater ijtihad. Despite this nuance,
none of the Imams said they had anything to do with ijtihad or that they were creating novel
legal decisions, arguing that they were largely issuing old decisions in a new context.
This description of their activities was partly correct, but in many cases, by their own
admissions, though told to me in separate narratives than those where I raised the question of
ijtihad, it was clear they had to have recourse to the basic elements of Islamic jurisprudence to
determine the answer to a particularly difficult question. At least one Imam attends
jurisprudential conferences where the aim of the conference is to produce legal rulings on
unaddressed topics, a hallmark of the highest level of ijtihad.
Often, as if to distinguish what they were doing from what the more highly qualified
jurists were, the Imams I interviewed presented their legal findings as optional rather than
binding. Two Imams told me that since one topic (using interest in finance) had multiple,
sometimes contradictory opinions, it was up to the worshipper to determine the ruling for
themselves. This was perhaps said in order to avoid giving the impression that they were
qualified to issue binding opinions, as would a scholar possessed of the highest levels of ijtihad.
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All cited this element of American life, the unprecedented questions it presents, as one of the
most challenging aspects of their jobs as Imams.
It can also be the thing that breaks Imams. All but two of the centers in my research
pool had struggles about or with their Imams. One center had terminated an Imam’s contract
before the research period and was in the process of terminating the contract of his successor.
As mentioned a predominantly Moroccan center grew so frustrated with the inability of Imams
to deal with the problems of American Muslims that they hired one who would learn no English
and give no sermons, but would only lead the prayers for the center, deciding that it was better
for the community to solve its own problems and rely on other centers for help than deal with
the difficulties of an un-enculturated Imam.
This ouster of a difficult Imam was an extreme remedy, but if the reader looks above to
the story of the Quincy Mosque, we have a perfect example of the problems such an Imam can
pose. If the Imam is too radical, he may drag some of the congregation with him and create a
power struggle, which is why many centers do not put him on their boards. If he is too extreme
and un-enculturated he becomes an abrasive presence that is seen as out of touch and
threatens the cohesion of the congregation.
Ideally in such an event, the Imam could simply be discharged, but when the Imam is
hired from abroad and he enters the country on a contract, such a termination becomes difficult
both legally and ethically. Two of the Islamic centers in my pool had legal fights that ended in
the centers retaining lawyers as a result of breaking contracts with their Imams. If the Imam has
a formal position on the board, then it may be impossible for the center to act as an
organization to oppose him.
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A good Imam, on the other hand, becomes an integral part of the community. In some
cases, Imams of long-standing Imamship may be welcomed onto the board informally, though
the bylaws are not usually changed to reflect this addition, ensuring distance for a possible
successor. In fact, if the Imam is sufficiently trusted, he may take over much of the
administration of the center himself, becoming much more like the priest of a liturgical-rite
parish. In doing so, the Imam wields considerable moral and formal authority not only over the
day-to-day functions of the institution, but also in the lives of its members. Couples and
individuals rarely went to Imams whom they felt to be too distant from American life, but
regularly consulted Imams who identified with American society with deep and seriously
personal questions. As a result, they relied on him to a considerable degree not just for advice
with Islamic practice, but also on how to integrate such practice with life in the United States.
Congregants sought such advice even at times when they had lived in the US for longer periods
than the Imam himself.
The Islamic Center as Place
The Imam is of course not possible without the Islamic Center itself. While there were
two major forms of Islamic center in my research pool, those with stand-alone, purpose-made
buildings and those in strip centers, there is also an incipient variety: prayer groups who meet in
an individual’s apartment or other private area before reaching a critical size to create a
separate community. All of the Islamic centers in my research group that did not emerge from
previous organizations through a fissioning movement (such as the ISBCC or Wayland Islamic
Center) developed from this process. It initially happens when individuals meet casually for
prayer, but then stabilize at such a number that they no longer comfortably fit in a single
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dwelling and then have to rent a space. It usually rents this space on a part-time arrangement
until the community grows sufficiently large that it rents a full-time space. This is usually in a
strip mall, though one Islamic center used a former Wendy’s fast-food restaurant, which it
converted for its own purposes.
The interior layout of both immigrant Islamic centers and African-American mosques is
essentially similar and all sites of worship, no matter how small, had two basic components: the
first was the main prayer room where men and boys old enough to pray alone worshipped and
where the Imam delivered his Friday sermon. With the sole exception of the Wayland Islamic
center, where men and women worship together, every center or mosques contained a second
area or room, behind or below the main area where women, girls and boys unable to pray on
their own worshipped. This area was sometimes entirely separate, either a room, occasionally
the basement, or it was a behind partition where the men prayed. Only in one Islamic center,
the Quincy Mosque, did I ever hear of an actual curtain being put in place, which was
extraordinarily controversial and occurred after conservative elements took the center over. I
did not attend any prayer services there, however, so I am not sure if there is a more permanent
division that has been erected or whether the curtain remains.
The gender division of space follows common interpretation of Islamic law and is
absolute. This was the main reason while during this iteration of fieldwork I was largely unable
to collect data from Muslim women. The gender segregation was so complete that even the
community picnics and meals I attended were strictly gender segregated. I have already
discussed the Ramadan breakfast as one example. I also attended a group picnic at the Quincy
Mosque which was segregated. At the Lowell Islamic center, they had regular after-prayer meals
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in the evening, where the men prayed and ate in the ground-level prayer space with the Imam
and the women prayed, with the help of an intercom system, and ate at the basement level.
At the African-American mosques, the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center and a
couple of the other centers, women pray in a separate, demarcated area located behind the
male worshippers. At the ISBCC, the lack of a separate room resulted in more gender-mixing
than at the other spaces, but in the black mosques, there was about as little gender-mixing as in
those locations where the spaces were separated.
This rigid gender separation included the Imams, who often feared meeting with
women alone. In most centers, the Imams tried to meet with women in pairs or left the door
open except when a man was just outside, in which case Imams usually kept the door closed.
Imams did not seem to think this affected their accessibility to women, though I find this is
unlikely to be true. The few women I interviewed concurred, saying that they felt intimidated
and had less access to the Imam than they would as men. Unfortunately, due to the intense
gender segregation, I was unable to interview more than a handful of women to explore how
this bias might affect their interactions.
It was clear, however, that it was not simply a preference from the Imam that led him to
meet with women only semi-publicly. At least two of the Imams feared rumors might spread
about their using the seclusion of private conferences as cover for illicit rendezvous in violation
of Islamic law. The Imams who mentioned this were evidently more comfortable with their
ability to meet women alone than did the community at large, but perception was a motivating
fear for exclusion. Some Imams, such as the Imam at the Quincy Mosque, did not have such
concerns and regularly met with women in private. This Imam had been with the community for
over twenty-years, however, and was one of the Imams who served in a de facto nature on the
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board of trustees. As such, it is likely that his confidence was a result of the trust he had built
with his community over a long history of interaction and their confidence in his personal moral
rectitude.
Other rooms commonly found in Islamic centers include an office for the Imam, which
only a couple of the Islamic centers lacked, classrooms and libraries. Only two of the Islamic
centers I was able to access fully had kitchens, the ISBCC and the Quincy Mosque and one, the
ISBCC had a café. Libraries were important features in these spaces and they were particularly
used for proselytization efforts. In fact, the ISBCC library was reserved largely for converts to
strengthen their religion, though it also had a bookstore that sold religious texts and other
items. It was the only Islamic center with such a store, which is not uncommon in Christian
churches. It would certainly not be present in mosques in Muslim majority countries due to
concerns about selling items in a religious building, particularly the potential for doing
commerce during prayer time, which is forbidden. It did serve as a source of revenue supporting
the ISBCC, demonstrating some of the adaptations to the new fiscal environment of the US
required for these organizations.
The main physical space of the Islamic center is the prayer room. It is almost always
open and devoid of furniture. At most, a few folding chairs will be placed along the wall, but
these are uniformly restricted for the use of visitors. I was regularly offered such a chair, but no
worshiping Muslim except the aged used one, not even multi-generational Americans. Partly
this could be explained by the physical requirements of prayer as one must kneel prostrate on
the ground (if one physically cannot, a worshipper would mimic the motions while seated), but
the preference for sitting on the ground continued into the sermon, which could be lengthy.
This is likely partly convenience, since gathering chairs would be a disruption in the smooth flow
140
between prayer and sermon, but also an indication of religious practice of the prophet and a
custom of mosques overseas.
Dress was also often a distinct marker of prayer attendance. While many individuals
came in their regular, every-day American clothes, many worshippers, including multi-
generational Americans, came in dress that would typify an Arab or South Asian Muslim country,
at least traditionally. Imams particularly wore these garments and it was very unusual to see an
Imam dressed in western clothes. African-Americans were the largest exception to this and their
garb was more often mixed. Black Imams were also an exception to the rule that Imams wore
Islamicate dress. While some did, it was not uncommon to see African-American Imams wearing
American-style clothing. This clothing preference is a function of the Sunnah, or the traditional
practice of the Prophet, which is considered particularly beneficial.
When asked whether Islamicate style clothing was their preferred dress, most
individuals responded that they almost never wore this garb outside of the specific religious or
cultural environment and wore American-style clothes to work or school and on an everyday
basis. Consequently, the specifically Islamic clothes assumed a religious purpose that
demarcated space and time, indicating that when worn, one was in a worshipful state and
mindset.
Changing dress for women was less demarcated. Women’s wear tended to change less
between the worship context and the street context. This continuity largely resulted from
modesty requirements: women’s garb in Middle Eastern contexts tends to be either very simple
if the modesty requirement is very high or to be not so dissimilar from American-style women’s
garb (i.e. dresses) that the change is significant enough to be noticeable. The main caveat to this
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is that I observed no woman wearing slim pants or tight clothing to worship. Otherwise, flowing
dresses, trousers that were heavily blousy or long sweaters were most often worn.
With the exception of the Wayland Mosque where purdah was not practiced, women
always generally covered, though the expectation for outsiders seemed mixed. Non-Muslim
women were expected to cover their skin and wear a scarf over their hair, though this
expectation led sometimes to strange results. While interviewing one female chaplain, we were
standing in the main entrance hall to ISBCC and a non-Muslim woman journalist was
interviewing an ISBCC employee. She was wearing a skirt that came just above the knee with no
stockings but had a scarf over her head that ISBCC had provided. My interlocutor rolled her eyes
and commented, wholly of her own initiative, that the picture was a little ridiculous: if the ISBCC
were concerned wholly with modesty, it should require her to wear pants or, alternatively, not
worry about the scarf requirement.
Islamic Associations
There are a variety of Islamic associations in the United States, a fact which reflects the
robust and well-developed nature of American civil society. These associations played a
relatively small role in my own research pool, but they are important to discuss, particularly as
they inform indirectly if not directly many of the activities of institutions and individuals that I
did encounter.
Islamic associations in the US can roughly be divided into two types, those that intend to
serve a specific part of the community and those that intend to serve the Islamic community in
the United States as a whole. The latter tend to be older and have a more diffuse impact on the
groups I studied while the former tend to be newer, but much more highly focused.
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National-level Islamic associations have been crucial in the development of the Islam in
North America. The first major national-level group was the Muslim Students’ Association that
was founded in 1963 as an association to support the new influx of Muslim students into
American colleges as a result of the post-war opening of American higher education to the
world. Because many of these individuals remained in the US after their education and many of
them came as graduate students with families, the MSA served as an important base for
organizing the new immigrant communities. In fact, the MSA at Boston universities played a
significant role in the Quincy Mosque controversy described in earlier pages.
The MSA had important limitations given that it was primarily a student organization
and as a result, in 1982 a broader organization, the Islamic Society of North America, was
founded. Since the MSA has a narrower purview, I found little influence it has over Islamic law
or related subjects. ISNA, on the other hand, is heavily involved in elements of Islamic law and
its presence cannot be ignored.
ISNA’s project is to create greater unity among American’s Muslim, a task which, given
the ethnic diversity discussed above, is more difficult than it might seem. As a result, some of
ISNA’s projects have been more successful than others. Its most successful of its efforts are
those that bring the Muslim community together rather than those that attempt to guide the
community’s actions.
Perhaps the most successful of ISNA’s activities is its annual conference, and many of
my informants brought the conference up in discussions or mentioned attending. The
conference is an important place for individuals from across the United States to meet and
discuss their ideas, for Imams to learn how better to adapt and operate in an American
environment and for worshippers to gain access to religious materials, ideas and each other.
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This connection enables the conference to serve as a conduit for the dissemination of ideas and
best practices in organizing Islamic centers as well as to provide a way to advertise for and hire
Imams.
ISNA also runs significant matchmaking events at these conferences that bring many
individuals from across the country together in a space that is compliant with Islamic law. The
wide-reach of the conference affords a more diverse dating pool for individuals to meet and
associate, providing a middle-ground between American courtship practices and the
arrangements often favored as a result of the Islamic prohibition of the mixing of the sexes.
ISNA also provides various guidance documents describing and providing guidelines to
worshipers for handling issues such as alms, prayer questions and other concerns. This guidance
is provided to Islamic centers for distribution and used to help answer congregants’ questions,
though this material was often only indirectly traceable to ISNA and was not supported
specifically because it came from the organization. I did encounter such material often in the
Islamic centers where I conducted research.
Outside its guidance documents, ISNA’s attempts at directing the community have had
less effect than its function as a networking association. These attempts at community direction
include both legal guidance as well as institutional support.
ISNA has attempted to increase unity in the American Islamic community by creating a
network of directly affiliated Islamic centers that use a common set of by-laws and are affiliated
with one another through ISNA’s network. In return, ISNA provides dispute resolution services,
Imam assistance and other aid to the centers. This program has not been particularly successful.
Only one Islamic center in my sample participated in the ISNA program and when asked,
members of the board of directors were unsure the details of the relationship, saying they had
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inherited the arrangement and did not make use of it. Despite their ignorance, their by-laws
were based on a form provided by the organization.
ISNA has attempted more directly to influence Islamic law in the US through the
creation of the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), which was described above in its attempt
to create a unified council to determine what rules should govern moon sighting. Unfortunately,
the FCNA has been even less successful than ISNA in coordinating the action of Islamic centers
and individual Muslims. None of the Imams or individuals I spoke to had heard of it and its
website is rudimentary to say the least. While it does have regular conferences, meetings and
activities, often involving very highly placed figures in the American Islamic community, its
efforts, at least from the perspective of my sample, seem to be wholly obscure and unattended.
The most influential Islamic associations are more specialized in scope. While these
associations were only tangentially involved in my research pool directly, this was largely a
question of geography and the most prominent association in the northeast, the Sharia Board of
New York has a very prominent presence in New York City.
The Sharia Board of New York is actually a New York City-based sub-organization of a
larger association called the Rahmat-e Alam Foundation which is headquartered in Chicago. Its
exact affiliation to the parent organization was unclear to me, but they link to each other one
their websites and acknowledge the mother-child relationship.
In addition to the geographical specialization, the Sharia Board of New York (SBNY) also
has an ethnic affiliation. It is composed primarily of South Asian Muslims and many of its
programs are offered in both English and Urdu. Despite this restricted focus on a specific
community, SBNY offers rather generic services that are of interest to the Islamic community at
large. The most publicly visible service it offers is halal certification to slaughterhouses, largely in
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the greater New York City area. In order to grant a certificate, it requires site inspections,
records maintenance and a variety of other proofs that a slaughterhouse or restaurant conforms
to the halal standards of the organization. SBNY requires periodic renewals and announces via
its mailing list when an institution’s certification has lapsed.
The halal certification at SBNY offers an interesting example of interfaith collaboration.
The halal meat requirement has long bedeviled the Muslim community in the US and not just for
its lack of availability. As we will discuss below, determining what constitutes halal slaughter can
be a long, involved and fraught process. Worse, when halal certification became more of a draw,
slaughterhouses began to certify themselves without having to submit to any kind of rigorous
process of certification. This created a great amount of uncertainty within the Islamic
community for it meant that while products could be labelled halal, there was no guarantee that
the production was actually halal. There was also no standard way to verify what halal meant,
what slaughter methods were used or which school of Islamic law supported the designation.
This problem mirrored an issue that arose with American Jews who have similar
requirements for kosher slaughter. In their case, their long presence in the United States has led
to the development of robust civil society institutions to govern, control and certify processes
for kosher slaughter to ensure their dietary requirements were met. Fortunately for the SBNY,
which made certifying slaughter a top priority upon its founding, the major center for the Jewish
efforts in the US towards slaughter certification was New York City. As a result, the SBNY was
able to collaborate with Rabbis. It used their procedures as a template similar to how Muslims
previously used church by-laws as a template for Islamic center by-laws. Thus, The Sharia Board
of New York was able to create its own slaughter inspection and certification plan following the
Jewish original.
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In addition to slaughterhouse certification, SBNY also provides arbitration services for
both couples and businesses. Arbitration is the main function of most conflict-oriented elements
of Islamic law both in the United States and in Europe. Islamic arbitration also raises the most
controversy in the United States under the guise of a fear of encroaching Sharia law. Arbitration
is actually encouraged in the United States by federal law, however and, as we will explore
below, is an element of that government’s encouragement of “private ordering,” or the ability
for citizens to be able to create their own resolution to conflict outside of the court system.
Arbitrators need not be lawyers or even legal experts, though all Islamic arbitration boards have
lawyers to provide advice on how such arbitrations should be managed. Family arbitration is far
more common than commercial arbitration, though both are possible. The former, however, is
an integral preliminary to any divorce in the United States and since it is not available through
the courts, these boards are the only place where it is available.
The final major service that SBNY provides comes through its parent organization, the
Rahmat-e Alam Foundation, is moon sighting advice. This is an example where the FCNA
attempt to unify America’s Muslims under a single practice for moon sighting has failed.
Because organizations like the SBNY have closer ties both in terms of ethnicity and geography to
the Islamic centers and individuals it serves, its moon sighting criteria are much preferred over
FCNA’s and so the larger and more distant organizations are ignored in favor of the closer and






How Individuals Use Islamic Law to Build and Create Community
American Muslims rely on Islamic law to accomplish various functions. Most obvious is
the fulfillment of their religious duties as Muslims. This is the functional purpose of Islamic law.
There is also a structural purpose to Islamic law that these communities benefit from, however.
While the functional purpose of Islamic law correlates to how Muslims use the law within their
lives, the structural purpose of Islamic law is to be seen in the way Sharia operates within the
Muslim-American community to establish cohesion, integration and boundary-making from the
rest of American society.
While Islamic law’s functional purpose is most obvious, its structural use is equally
important for building communities and allowing Muslims to identify with each other and co-
operate as believers in a shared community. This use of Islamic law is not unique to American
Muslims, nor is it unique to the Sharia. In some ways, every form of law operates to create a
coherent community and facilitate human cooperation and interaction. Since we explored this
idea of law in the preface, we will move directly into how this aspect of the law is implemented
by American Muslims. We will discuss how Muslims in the US use Islamic law functionally in the
final chapter.
The major structural use of Islamic law in America is to cohere the Muslim community. It
does this in ways that are common throughout the Islamic world and in others that are more
specific to the American and European context. While Islamic law has both a functional and
structural component in both regions, different elements of it are important in minority
contexts than in majoritarian countries. In fact, while in majority-Muslim countries the
functional aspects are the most important because the larger Islamic cultural identity is
149
sufficient to cohere Muslims together and the organs of the state are built around Islamic legal
models, in minority Muslim countries, the structural component of Islamic law is at least as
important due to the dispersed nature of the community.
In general, the Sharia functions to create a community of Muslims, the Ummah, with
common expectations, behaviors, rituals, and habits of living. The practical effect of Islamic law
is to create a world where people share a certain set of symbolic acts (praying five times a day,
attending a central place of worship on Fridays, celebrating certain common holidays such as
Ramadan, etc.) as well as conducting similar actions in terms of charity, business habits, family
structure and other basic elements of human relations.85 We see this intention from the earliest
times of the Islamic community embodied in documents such as the Constitution of Medina and
developed later through models of community relations that envision huge, potentially multi-
polity bodies through concepts like the Caliphate and the Dar al-Salām.
While many of these common expectations are colored by local practices and traditions
that are idiosyncratic to each cultural group within the Islamic whole, Islamic law prescribes
certain basic actions that ultimately transcend these differences and make them commensurate
with one another. It does this, for example, in business by establishing the basic requirements
for contract, for distribution of wealth and requirements for sound, non-usurious investments.
In terms of family law, Sharia accomplishes unity by requiring a certain pattern for marriage,
basic rules for divorce and establishes the expectations of treatment between spouses as well as
between parent and child.
85 I have purposefully left beliefs out of this description. Creating a common set of beliefs is not the role of
Islamic law, but rather is in the domain of theology, philosophy and mysticism. While these other religious
sciences have an important bearing on the law, the Sharia is primarily concerned with proper human
action and interaction, not the inner thoughts and beliefs of a worshipper.
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While the creation of a God-oriented harmony and unity within society is the main end-
goal of the rules for interaction of Sharia (muᶜāmalāt),86 in countries where there is a Muslim
minority, it also serves to differentiate Islamic communities from the larger whole. It can
perform this function to a greater or lesser degree. In the most extreme examples, Islamic law
functions as a tool for self-segregation of the community. This happens as the result of certain
very extreme interpretations of the Sharia that are common among radical Salafists who argue
that it is unIslamic and a sin, a true contravention of Islamic law, for Muslims to vote, participate
in the civic life of non-Islamic states, to marry in non-Islamic systems or to countenance in any
other form non-Islamic forms of law. This type of extreme Sharia-induced self-segregation
mostly happens in communities of European Muslims. In both cases it is followed only by a small
minority of the communities in any one country (Frampton et al 2016; Koopmans 2014, 47-50).
It is almost entirely absent from the American Muslim population (Pew 2017, 51-6). I
encountered no individuals in the course of my research who believed this was a proper
function of Islamic law.
In the United States, Islamic law functions to set Muslims apart more as a result of the
special set of behaviors and customs it prescribes than through any perception that Islamic law
must be dominant over civic, American law. Perhaps the most visually striking mark of
distinction coming from the Sharia involves women’s wearing of head-coverings. While this
tradition was once far more common cross-culturally than it is (a century or so ago it was
common for Christian women of Eastern Europe to cover their hair, such as the well-known
Russian babushka, though this practice was a cultural as well as religious) and is practiced by a
variety of other religious communities, including Orthodox Jews and certain Christian groups like
86 As opposed to the rules for worship, the ᶜibādāt.
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the Anabaptists, the Muslim head-covering is distinctive in its appearance and its ubiquity
(Almila 2017, 1-6).87 Not only does this visually set Muslim women apart from their non-Muslim
American counterparts, but it is part of a larger complex of modesty standards that serve much
the same purpose.88
The Structure of Courtship
Perhaps the most functionally important and distinctive element of this is dating. Islamic
law strictly prohibits the kind of courtship that is traditionally practiced by American society,
involving as it does the unchaperoned relations of unmarried, but marriageable individuals of
the opposite sex. Under Islamic law members of the opposite sex who are marriageable are not
allowed to interact without close supervision. Marriageable in this case is a very wide spectrum.
Only immediate family members such as siblings,89 parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles are
maḥram, or prohibited marriage partners (Al-Misri 1994, 527-30). As a result, most people of
the opposite gender fall into the marriageable category, meaning that one must only be in their
87 Head covering requirements vary from religion to religion. In the case of Christians, such requirements
were largely restricted to worship contexts, such as the use of the chapel veil in pre-Vatican II Catholicism.
Some groups, such as old-order Anabaptist groups wear head-coverings in their daily lives, but these tend
to be small and rather innocuous. While Jewish women are required to cover their hair, many halakhic
interpretations allow them to wear a wig. Consequently, the hijab is particularly noticeable.
88 Almost all of the literature regarding Islamic modesty standards focuses on women (the literature is
large, but among the most important contributions see Antoun 1968, Bowen 2006 or Tarlo 2010). While
women have the most obvious and compelling modesty standards, the ᶜawrah (Arabic for “imperfection”
or “unexposable”), or part of the body that must be hidden from others, exists for both men and women.
I once had a squash partner who was a very observant Muslim whose family came from Pakistan. I was
swimming often at the time and he mentioned he would like to do so himself, but then, after asking
whether there were gender-segregated times, he lamented to me that it would likely be impossible, for
with the presence of women, he would need to wear loose pants to cover the area between his knee and
his navel: not only would a regular swimsuit be too tight, but the clinging that wet fabric would cause
would also be too revealing to show women.
89 This can include siblings established by raḍāᶜah, or breastfeeding, as Islam recognizes milk kinship,
which places milk siblings outside of marriageable status (Altorki 1980).
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company in the presence of others and women as well as men must hide certain parts of their
bodies from each other.
Islamic law further isolates the Muslim dating community from the American
mainstream by its requirements for Islamic marriage partners. Women are prohibited from
marrying outside the faith (Qur’an 2:221), a prohibition which was scrupulously observed
among my research population of practicing Muslims. While men are generally allowed to do so,
in practice this rarely happened among the practicing Muslims in my research population. When
mixed religious marriages did occur, it was never between two practicing members of different
religious faiths and as a result a nominal conversion by the non-Muslim party was a common
result. Unsurprisingly, several of these nominal conversions became actual conversions, leading
to a true increase in the community.
The prohibition on marriage outside the faith is usually easy to enforce since observant
Muslims are prohibited from dating and since Americans typically do not marry without a period
of dating, observant Muslims rarely find much opportunity to marry outside the faith. Despite
the insular requirements of marriage, the American courtship culture exercises a strong
influence over the imagination of Muslims raised in the United States. Both single Muslims and
those raised in the United States invariably cited the variance between American courtship
rituals and the requirements of Islamic law as one of the primary difficulties of being Muslim in
America.
Dating is a distinctive custom commented on by observers as being peculiar to American
society.90 It centers on youthful experimentation with different partners (both of a physical and
90 American and European courtship practices have merged over the last several decades and so in order
truly to appreciate the difference, one must look back in time. An early reference can be found in The
American People: A Study in National Character, Gorer 1948, 109-124.
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emotional nature), specific rituals including going out in both public and private while spending
extensive time in the company of a desired romantic partner (Gorer 1948, 109-24). With the rise
of the so-called “Hook-Up Culture,” many forms of American dating have dramatically changed,
but they have changed in a way that emphasizes the physical element of romantic relations
(Bogle 2008, England & Thomas 2009, 141-52). Far from ameliorating the problem of dating
from a Muslim’s perspective, this change in American courtship norms exacerbates it. As a
result, America’s Muslims have developed a distinct pattern of courtship that both satisfies
Islamic law and serves to separate them from the American mainstream.91
The most common form of courtship in my interviews were semi-arranged partnerships.
The arrangement either took place between the parents of the two individuals or, in the event
that the individual’s parents were not Muslims or not practicing and therefore unable to play
match-maker, between a spiritual advisor and the potential spouse’s parents.92 In many cases
when a spiritual adviser was involved, the match was made with the spiritual adviser’s own child
or a relative, a fact which only served to cement the relationship between adviser and advisee
even further. These advisers were sometimes the Imam, but often not. In both cases, it was not
uncommon for individuals to marry spouses from overseas. In these cases, the parties did meet
briefly before the marriage ceremony, though usually no deep familiarity was gained. If the
parties were satisfied from their meeting, the marriage was arranged, immigration paperwork
filed and the non-American spouse was brought to the United States. This process can happen
91 Though it should be noted, perhaps ironically, that as observed by O’Brien, Muslim teenagers may in
fact be re-engineering the dating process in such a way that returns this population to courtship behaviors
that more closely (though not identically) resemble past American dating behaviors than current
courtship practices do (O’Brien 2017, 78-111).
92 Unfortunately, my research was not personalized or deep enough at any mosque to involve detailed
demographic data and as a result my information on this aspect of Islamic dating life is very
impressionistic, relying largely on anecdote and a somewhat sparse secondary literature.
154
on an extremely expedited basis, particularly if the parties are related, requiring often only as
much time as the visa bureaucracy needed to move forward.
A second, more common form of marriage is what I will call the semi-arranged marriage.
The process of the semi-arranged marriage seemed to follow a regular pattern, though this was
likely a product of coincidence rather than design. While in many of the countries of origin (or as
is the case when American Muslims enter an arranged marriage with a person from their
family’s country of origin), marriages may have been fully arranged with partners either not
meeting or not speaking to one another before the actual ceremony (or simple contract signing,
the only requirement by Islamic law to make a marriage valid), in most of the American cases
there are occasions where the prospective spouses meet one another. These are often
chaperoned and required to be limited in number so as to avoid the appearance of dating.
Usually two or three meetings are considered to be sufficient, though more might be allowed.
They take place within a reasonable time before the marriage ceremony because too much time
would also give an impression of dating.
In almost every case of a semi-arranged marriage that I encountered during my research
process, the American Muslim married a cousin or close family connection, emphasizing the
importance family networks play in marriages, a fact which is common in many societies, but
not at all in the United States currently. Cousin marriages (often parallel cousin) are a
particularly common marital practice in these cases, as is typical of Islamicate societies (Murphy
& Kasden 1959, 17-8; Korotayev 2000, 395-400). This practice sets the Islamic community
drastically apart from mainstream America, for cousin marriages are the constant butt of
American jokes which hold that cousin-marriage is an indication of rusticity, a lack of
cosmopolitanism and even education. Despite this negative reputation, the primary motivating
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factor for cousin marriages is, in fact, a closeness of community (Murphey & Kasden 1959, 18-
22).
Despite the challenges, there are alternatives to semi-arranged marriages. One of the
most interesting, but a phenomenon I did not encounter during my interviews, is dating
banquets. These are mass events coordinated by mosques and Islamic groups that bring
individuals together in a large gathering to meet prospective partners. If two individuals are
interested in each other, their guardians or a representative then serves as a go between and a
marriage is arranged. This process has the advantage of avoiding the one-on-one intimacy that
runs counter to the Sharia but allows individuals to meet face-to-face and have some control
over their choice of partner. Perhaps the largest and best known is held by the Islamic Society of
North America at its annual convention.93
Far more popular alternatives are tools that allow couples to meet together on their
own terms but avoid the problematic issues of dating from the perspective of Islamic law. Of
these the one that makes Islamic dating closest to mainstream American dating is the use of the
internet to find available partners. Muslim dating sites allow individuals to meet, like any dating
site, but their conversation takes place largely online, as a result there is no concern for the
breach of modesty concerns. Couples are simultaneously empowered to learn more about one
another and have what is far closer to the typical American dating experience, one that, in many
ways, differs little from the average long-distance relationship.94 There were a few examples of
this practice in my survey, but it was far less common than the semi-arranged marriage, which
was the most common form of courtship.
93 For more information, see http://www.isna.net/matrimonial/ (accessed May 14, 2019).
94 Literature is becoming quickly available on Islamic internet courtship. See particularly the articles by
Rochadiat et al 2018 or Lo and Aziz 2009.
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From the perspective of Islamic law, the most interesting form of dating is also the most
controversial: the nikāḥ mutᶜah, or temporary marriage. No one in my survey of mosques and
Islamic Centers either knew of any one who conducted their courtship in this manner nor did
any of them say it was an acceptable form of dating, but there are some couples who use a
loop-hole in Islamic law to perform what is essentially regular American dating within an Islamic
framework using the concept of a “temporary marriage.”
The idea of the temporary marriage is highly divisive in Islamic theory. It has
traditionally had much greater validity in Shi’ism than in Sunnism. The premise of the temporary
marriage derives from the idea a marriage as a contract that characterizes the relationship in
Islamic legal thought. As a result of marriage’s contractual nature, one can theoretically add any
conditions one wants, including a time limit. The imposition of a time limit is what makes the
marriage temporary. In the few minority positions that accept this form of marriage in Sunnism
and in Shi’ism, a temporary marriage has very different functions and requirements than a
regular marriage, however, making it a distinct phenomenon (Haeri 2014).
While there is not sufficient room for a full discussion of the idea of the temporary
marriage here, what is significant for our discussion is that on the surface allowing temporary
marriage would seem to allow a couple out of the dating trap. By engaging in a temporary
marriage, not only is unchaperoned contact between individuals possible, but sexual contact is
also technically allowed, although many of the couples who use a temporary marriage in this
way draft the contract so that sexual contact is prohibited, a qualification which is precedented
in the Shi’i form of the traditional arrangements (Haeri 2014, 92). For all other purposes,
however, the couple is considered married, so that two individuals who would not otherwise be
allowed to share each other’s company may do so for the purposes of courtship. If at the
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termination of the temporary marriage the couple has decided they are not intended for each
other, then they may end the relationship with no further effort to extend their temporary
marriage into a permanent one.
In most of the Islamic world temporary marriages suffer from serious stigma. The Sunni
majority has deemed them against the Sharia in general, with a minority supporting the idea of
a misyār marriage.95 Even among the Shi’a where the mutᶜah form is more accepted, the status
of women who are known to have engaged in such a marriage can be very low. In some cases,
they are viewed as a kind of prostitute (Haeri 2014 196). Similar concerns that temporary
marriage allows fornication forms the bedrock of the general objection among the Sunnis who
often consider either such marriages to be a thinly veiled excuse for a man to engage in sexual
activity with a woman to whom he is not truly married (Osmani 2010, 307-310).96
This infamous connotation among Sunnis is certainly the reason why temporary
marriages are not more widely practiced in the Islamic community in the United States. While it
seems like an ideal work-around to the issue of courtship, every Muslim and Imam I spoke to
categorically said that a temporary marriage was immoral. They often chuckled at the idea. They
acknowledged that on the surface it was attractive, but, when discussing its potential always
emphasized the possibility of intercourse which it presented. This was a significant obstacle, for
while the Shi’a might create a temporary marriage without sexual rights, these scholars
considered a marriage without sexual rights to be no marriage at all. Indeed, sexual access and
95 This form of marriage translates as a “traveler’s marriage” and is similar to a temporary marriage but
involves a somewhat more expansive contract that often contains all the elements of a permanent
marriage with the exception of certain provisions such as living together (Osmani 2010).
96 Indeed, the very word mutᶜah means “pleasure” in Arabic.
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the pleasure and reproductive potential it brought was a primary reason God created the
institution of marriage for humanity, according to their beliefs.
As a result, a marriage without sexual access was no marriage at all and a temporary
marriage was either, therefore, a fraud or an excuse for an illicit dalliance. In fact, the few
people I interviewed who raised the potential of temporary marriages did so in the context of
friends who used them as a thin excuse to engage in activity that from an orthodox Islamic
perspective is highly promiscuous and casual, likely to void the very protections these forms of
marriage are supposed to protect.
The difference over this issue highlights a particularly difficult point of Islamic law for
Muslims in the US, one that emphasizes the structural function of the law. Islamic law both
provides the means for this coherence and separation of American Muslims as a body apart and
a way to bridge this same gap. If Islamic law provides the grounds to prohibit a basic interaction
like dating, Islamic law also holds the key to overcoming that hurdle through the use of various
ḥiyal (literally meaning wiles, the singular is ḥīlah), but while ḥiyal are regularly used to some
degree by almost every Muslims (Islamic finance, for example, is basically an intricate series of
ḥiyal that mimic the effects of interest without openly being interest (Mansoori 2011), a
worshipper must draw the line at some point when the trickery ceases to be justificatory and
turns to a way to avoid the essence of the law and its aims (the Maqāṣid al-Sharᶜīa) (Mansoori
2011, 384-92). Due to the many conflicts between mainstream American practice and Islamic
law, walking this line is an essential duty of the Islamic community in the US and guiding them
along this narrow path is a primary function of its Imams. Islamic law, in other words, both holds
the cause for the separation of Muslims from American society as well as the potential to
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integrate that community fully and remove such tensions. The problem is where and how to
draw the line and much discussion over Islamic legal questions in the US centers on this point.
The debate over dating is an excellent example of this difficult practice, for while it
presents the possibility of a fully Islamic courtship, it is a possibility that threatens to overturn
the very principles which modesty is intended to protect. How to accomplish successful
integration while maintaining Islamic ideals is something that requires the application of not just
creativity, but a dedication to maintaining what can be interpreted as the true spirit of the law.
What is interesting in the case of dating, is that the average American Muslim seems to
err on the side of rejecting the standard American course of courtship. While some
accommodations have been made, such as internet dating, these water down the American
ritual and obviate its significant points (the first date, first kiss, meeting the potential spouse’s
parents, etc.) to non-existence. Instead, the far more traditional and, from a typically American
standpoint, very foreign tradition of the semi-arranged marriage remains far more popular than
its radical counterpart that would allow Muslim couples to engage in all the typical American
courtship rituals, i.e. the temporary marriage.
While this alignment might seem to emphasize the unwillingness of Muslims to adapt to
American customs, one can take this argument too far. Muslims are not, for example, the only
religious group with particular and often untraditional (from an American perspective) courtship
practices. In fact, many religious groups within the United States engage in courtship rituals that
run counter to the mainstream. Fundamentalist Christians, for example, have courtship customs
that they explicitly separate from the American tradition of dating with the label “courting,”
calling to mind a supposed set of earlier traditions that were not, from the Evangelical’s
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perspective, as libidinous as those practice by the average contemporary American (or even the
average American of 75 years ago) (Shively 2012; Irby 2014, 267-70).
These customs involve sex segregation rules that are nearly as strict as Muslims’ own,
such as prohibitions not just on unchaperoned dates, but also on kissing and even hand-holding,
rules that are intended to ensure the avoidance of the temptation toward pre-marital intimacies
between the potential spouses (Irby 2014, 267-70). Among even more religious Christians, such
as the Amish, unique courtship traditions have existed for centuries involving the use of courting
chairs and bundling, which occurs when one partner has stayed at another’s house too late in
the night to go home and so the couple are places in the same bed, sometimes with a board
between them or otherwise bundled in a set of blankets so tightly that escape is impossible
(Stevick 2007, 192-5). Despite these unique cultural markers, Christians who subscribe to these
practices have little difficulty integrating themselves into the American mainstream. Islamic
courtship rituals should be viewed within the same context. They are patterns of behavior that
are separate from the mainstream, encourage assortative pairing, yet fit within a larger practice
of courting in the United States.
The Structure of Ramadan
Aside from courtship, another significant way the Sharia separates Muslims from the
rest of the American population while simultaneously cohering them into a single community is
through the requirement to observe the holy month of Ramadan, a period of daylight fasting
and nightime feasting with vigil prayers. Ramadan’s effect in cohering the community is
significant for a variety of reasons with timing being an important one: it doesn’t coincide with
Christmas, the most significant holiday of Christian and Christian-heritaged Americans. While
Jews have also long been separate from the Christmas holiday, their celebration of Chanukah
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temporally coincides with Christmas, making the separation less significant. Muslims, on the
other hand, must observe Ramadan within a movable lunar calendar cycle that does not synch
with the Gregorian solar calendar. As a result, their most celebrated month very rarely coincides
with the December celebrations of Christmas and Chanukah, forcing Muslims to make their
holiday observance more fully within their own communities at times when their non-Islamic
neighbors may actually be ignorant that a holiday is even occurring, a fact that can create
confusion and dislocation.97
I will not belabor the reader with a review of all the ways important holidays and
festivals unite communities together, the literature is too vast,98 but I will discuss why Islamic
law is so important for creating, defining and even enabling the structures that make Ramadan
and its incumbent celebrations possible, for while individual Ramadan celebrations are
extremely specific to individual parts of the Islamic world, there are certain fundamental aspects
to the celebrations that are determined and shaped by the Sharia that Muslims, both in the US
and abroad, must participate in and which allows them to unite as an American community
despite the various differences and demographic divides described in the first chapter. In other
words, by creating a shared common space for distinct religious practice, Ramadan provides
America’s Muslims an important venue for developing communitas, one that is reinforced
through the typical group-oriented practices of fasting, breaking the fast and the special
Ramadan prayers (the tarāwīḥ).
97 The fact that the most important festival in Islam, one that is a focus of so much celebration in the
Islamicate world is so wholly ignored in non-Islamicate countries is interesting and raises many issues that
I was unfortunately unable to explore deeply. More unfortunate is the seeming lack of any other
scholarship on this phenomenon. How the timing and significance of Ramadan affects Muslims’
integration into American society is a subject that deserves serious study.
98 The curious reader may review some recent surveys of this literature found in Frost 2015,
“Anthropology and Festival: Festival Ecologies” and Addo 2009 “Anthropology, Festival and Spectacle.”
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Festivals are important for making and unmaking communities (Leal 2016, 592-6).
Ramadan is no less. Ramadan builds the basic elements of the communal ritual, leading up to a
feeling of communitas in the classical Turnerian vein: special rules for eating and drinking (its
prohibition during daylight hours and permission at night) establish a liminal space that is
separate from ordinary life. Likewise, the requirements to break-fast in a group, to attend
special nightly prayers in a congregational setting, to give alms and attend to the needy, all
establish a robust sense of community among the Muslims involved. The exchange of food and
communal meals form an especially important element in building a sense of Islamic
community, both in the United States and abroad (Hellman 2008, 212-8; Woodward 2011, 114-
36).
The Ramadan feasts are particularly important community moments, both for
enhancing intra-communal bonds by having meals after the evening prayer in the Islamic Center
or mosque as well as in opening the community up to invite outsiders in. I participated in one
Boston-area ifṭār (the term for breaking the Ramadan fast) held by a large Islamic center in a
nearby elementary school. Local notables including the mayor and police chief (neither of whom
were Muslim) were in attendance. Since it was an election year, so were each of the candidates
running for local offices. All of these individuals gave speeches at what I was told was an annual
event.
Ramadan fasts and feasts are so significant, that even many Muslims who do not
practice on a regular basis will attempt to fast, much like Christians who attend church only on
Easter, Christmas and for their wedding and (by request) funeral. Muslims often discuss
Ramadan in connection to their favorites treats or traditions, much in the way European
Christians have favorite Christmas or (less commonly now) Easter traditions and foods. As I
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mentioned earlier, Ramadan is so important a communal event, that many individuals who
convert to Islam and later leave the faith point to a lack of inclusion in Ramadan festivities
(whether due to purposeful exclusion or a simple lack of sufficient social network to be
included) as a primary reason why they leave the practice of the religion. Muslims are often
aware of this and as a result now go to lengths to ensure converts are included in their personal
gatherings. Listening to stories of Americans isolated during Ramadan,99 one is reminded of the
stereotypical American Christian depressed, alone, watching holiday TV specials.
While these ritual enactments are not the focus of this dissertation, they are important
for giving context to how the law is able to shape both the affect of communitas as well as the
actions that create it, for Ramadan requires a series of ritual actions in order to realize its effects
and those ritual action, like all other ritual actions, are built by Islamic law.
The first, most significant role Islamic law plays in establishing Ramadan is the
framework it provides for the holiday. Islamic law not only declares that Ramadan should be
observed and marked by charitable acts and fasting, it also describes both how to determine
when the time for Ramadan has come, when it has gone as well as what acts count for charity
and what abstentions comprise fasting. In fact, some of the liveliest debates in the American
Islamic community center on issues involving Ramadan.
Moon Sighting
Perhaps the most divisive and, from a perspective of the study of Sharia the most
interesting, legal element of the festival is the debate over the sighting of the moon. Sighting
the moon is crucially important in the Islamic rituals connected with Ramadan because the
99 See, for example, “For Some Converts, Ramadan Is the Loneliest Time of the Year” (Sacirbey, 2013).
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moon sighting determines when the month begins and ends. Since the Islamic religious calendar
is a lunar one, each month begins with the new moon. Consequently, knowing when the moon
is new and establishing that it is, in fact new, is extremely important. Astronomical observation
is required for telling when the time for the fast has begun and when it has ended. With the aid
of modern science, it would seem a trivial matter to determine whether the moon is new or not
or when prayer time should begin. This is not the case, however, for science is only part of the
issue. Determining whether the moon is new or not is a hybrid astronomical and legal question,
though the legal issues of it are far more complicated than the astronomical. As a result, most
Imams resolve the conflict astronomically rather than legally. In order to understand what this
means, we must explore the legal contexts of the question.
Sighting the new moon goes well beyond the mechanical and scientific process of its
observation, for the moon appears at different times at different places. Moreover, local
weather and atmospheric effects can alter one’s observation of the moon, perhaps causing one
to miss its observation entirely or to view it as being new before or after it actually is. As a
result, sometimes one section of the earth will observe the moon as new while another region
waits, sometimes several days, to observe its own completed cycle.100 Given the emphasis on
the unity of the Ummah in Islam and the desire for the community to act in unison at the
100 Elements of this description are somewhat exaggerated. No longer is it likely or even really possible to
have the observation of Ramadan differ so markedly in different regions of the world, though before
modern means of communication, such discrepancies were possible. However, the sighting of the moon
and having a unified means of doing so was presented by several groups of informants, the most legally
astute group that included especially the Fiqh Council of North America, as a primary way to unite the
American Islamic community. In fact, one of my informants from that organization said this was one of
the most serious issues dividing the American Islamic community. Consequently, the above description
exaggerates the potential for this issue both to divide and to unite the community, but it does so to reflect
the perception of certain informants who felt the issue to be very compelling. As we will shortly see, many
individuals working as Imams in smaller organizations did not see this issue as particularly problematic
and were often ignorant of the attempts of scholars to fix it.
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appropriate moments, this is a distressing concept, for how united can a community be if it
cannot even celebrate its most significant festival simultaneously?
This problem has led to a major debate within the Islamic community at large (Shah
2009). One side of the debate argues that because of the sake of unity, only the moon sighting
of the clerics in one part of the world should be accepted as a guide to the whole of the Islamic
world. While some groups debate where this central location should be, the overwhelming
majority agrees that if this theory is pursued that location should be in Mecca since this is where
the Prophet himself lived and where he sighted the moon. It is also the qiblah, or the site where
all Muslims face in prayer. As a result of this fact, it is the literal geographic center of the Islamic
spiritual community in the world. Because of this centrality, whenever local conditions are in
any way shape or form restrictive of action, the standard of Mecca and Medina, which is close
enough geographically to be considered the same location for these purposes, is taken as the
proper guide (Al-Mostafa 2005, 38-30). An example of this is in the Arctic where extreme
latitude would make life difficult or impossible, since the sun never sets for the whole month of
Ramadan then a pious Muslim would not be allowed to eat or drink water for that whole month,
resulting in death. To solve this problem, the time of Mecca is used as a replacement for the
local sunrise/set cycle. A similar solution has more famously (though perhaps even less
frequently) been used by Muslim astronauts in space (Lewis 2013).
The second theory of sighting the moon argues that the needs of the whole community
are less significant than that of the local congregation. As a result, these parties rely on the
observance of the moon in the local area to determine whether the month of Ramadan has
begun or not. There are two major ways the moon can be observed locally. The first is the
traditional method of determining the start of Ramadan: the Imam leaves the mosque, looks up
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at the moon and, utilizing the skills of his education, determines whether the moon is new or
not. The second involves using the techniques of modern astronomy to calculate when the
moon should appear new given its progress in the lunar cycle. This involves no observation,
rather it simply relies on the products of professional astronomers to determine the cycle for
the local community.
I should note at the outset that none of these categories are fully mutually exclusive.
The real debate outside of purely theoretical spaces (which has formed the basis of the
discussion so far) is when a congregation should use which. As we discussed above, in certain
places, such as the Arctic, one could never use the local cycles for the observation of the festival
month. Either the time for fasting would never come or it would be permanent. In other words,
Ramadan would literally be a time of feast or famine. In these cases, the cycles of Mecca and
Medina must be used.
On the other hand, there are times when an estimated cycle of the moon is necessary. If
there is expected to be a chain of heavily overcast nights, it is quite likely that an Imam or his
helpers by themselves will be wholly unable to observe the new moon. As a result, reliance on
the astronomical chart or using the sighting in Mecca might be appropriate. Still, there are
complications: many of these options are highly technical in nature. The idea of relying on the
sighting of the New Moon in Mecca, for example, is something that can only emerge with
modern communications technology allowing individual communities to gain immediate access
to the Imam’s decisions. Likewise, the astronomical calculations require connection with an
establishment of astronomers. Which is more valid is a thorny question, for both involve the
question of bidᶜah, or the reliance on innovation. The primary question is, therefore, whether
one or both of these is bidᶜah ḥasanah, or permissive innovation, or bidᶜah sayᵓiah, or illicit
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innovation and here the debate rages on with little if any resolution. Fortunately, which side is
right is not an issue that need concern us any further because the individuals who formed the
basis of this study found no need to pick sides.
These debates really cover exceptional issues in the everyday world of a practicing
Muslim. The vast majority of the time, a congregation will have access to the whole gamut of
ways to determine the moon’s newness. In this context an Imam (and his congregation) must
ask, which way is best? This is a much thornier question, one that has plagued many of the
institutions of Islamic law in the United States. Interestingly enough, Imams themselves seem to
have few difficulties with the problem. None of the Imams I discussed the issue with identified it
as a top concern. Often, they did not even see it as a problem at all. They said they just go out,
sight the moon, return and check with others (including the authorities in Mecca) and then
make a declaration. The perspective of the Imams at the level of the Islamic Center or mosque,
in other words, differed greatly from the concerns of legal scholars attempting to unify the
Islamic community through a single process. Not only did the Imams see little need for a single
process, they were able to unify the community at large through recourse to all of the above, for
none of the communities I observed were out of sync either with each other or with the rest of
the world. In other words, moon sighting is a scenario where the divide exists much more in
theory than in practice and where the attempts at resolution, unification and even the creation
of conflict were high stakes and intense at one level, but low and unimportant on another.
The core of the debate in the minds of the scholars is between, on the one hand, the
local community as opposed to the global Ummah and, on the other, between the accuracy
deliverable by technology and the ability of the human individual to ascertain the truth unaided.
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In the case of sighting the moon, Islamic law, not astronomy or even unaided human reason, is
the right tool for the job.
The approach one takes to selecting the proper method for determining the timing of
Ramadan is, in theory, linked to how one views Islamic law. Individuals who tend toward
Salafism prefer using the sighting of the scholars in Mecca and Medina.101 This makes sense
given their emphasis on the unity of the Islamic Ummah and their categorical understanding of
what is lawful being an extremely limited one. In their minds, there is always one clear answer
to what is correct and the scholar’s best option is to discover and then choose that single,
correct answer. Relying on the scholars of Mecca is satisfying because not only does it provide a
single touchstone for the entire international Muslim community, but it refers back to the origin
point of the religion itself. Individuals who follow this line of reasoning prefer to refer their legal
questions as far back and as close to the point of Islam’s origin as possible whether that be
temporal (referring back to the time of the Prophet and his Companions) or geographical, going
back to the locations where the Prophet engaged in his ministry.
While the centralized theory has its adherents, in practice it is not particularly common
as an absolute position. This difference is likely due to the long-standing practice of local areas
determining sightings for themselves. While partisans of the centralized approach argue local
sighting was used only because of the difficulties of communication in the pre-modern world,
this is generally viewed as a weak argument and most areas continue to sight the moon on their
own.102 It is, in fact, in line with the practice of using local time rather than Mecca and Medina
101 See a fatwa by the Salafist-aligned scholars at the American Muslim Jurists Association as an example
of this reasoning: https://www.amjaonline.org/fatwaa/WebSite/details.php?fid=76234 (AMJA Fatwa
Committee 2008).
102 For two alternative views see the work of FCNA (https://www.moonsighting.com) and the Central Hilal
Committee of North America (https://hilalcommittee.org/about-us).
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time to establish the five daily prayers and is a matter of convenience if not necessity with
convenience being a consideration in Islamic legal thought. As a result, most of the Imams I
spoke to either sighted themselves and confirmed with the Saudi time or used an American
Islamic association to determine whether the moon had been sighted.
Another aspect of this debate is whether to use the eye to observe the moon or to use
astronomical calculation. While we cannot delve deeply into all the legal technicalities here, this
disputation on a theoretical level is largely one about the nature of tradition and the validity of
so-called “innovative” techniques to determine religious, ritual facts. This tension is a common
thread running through debates over Islamic law, one which was implicit in the discussion about
dating immediately above. In essence the problem is, given that the Prophet and his
Companions, as well as generations of Muslims afterwards, used the physical sighting of the
new moon as their guide, can Muslims today break with that tradition and use astronomical
tables which, while theoretically more accurate, are not in congruence with the established
tradition?
Those who hold that only the naked eye can sight the New Moon rely on the tradition of
physical sighting and the argument that it is not the knowledge of the state of the moon that
matters (which can be derived from calculation), but the actual process of sighting the moon
itself that determines the beginning of the holy month.103 They do not argue that sighting is
objectively the best method of determining the phase the moon, but that since it was
performed by the Prophet, it has a particularly important place in the operation of the rite of
Ramadan. Consequently, while other methods may be more accurate scientifically, religion, in
this argument, is not science. The method of the Prophet is not the method of scientists. Since
103 See the AMJA link above.
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the sighting of the moon for Ramadan is a religious concern, the work of religious individuals
should be considered above and beyond the potentials of science. In other words, these
individuals argue that the process of sighting the new moon is as important, if not more, than
the result of the sighting itself (AMJA 2008).
Individuals who argue that the use of the astronomical tables are equally legitimate for
observing the moon rely on the idea that the process is merely a means to an end. For these
individuals, determining the form of the new moon is most important and how one obtains that
knowledge is merely instrumental. As a result, these parties place a stronger emphasis on result
than method. They do not necessarily dispute the validity of using the naked eye, nor could they
since it was the practice of the Prophet, but they argue that it is only one of several acceptable
options to obtaining knowledge of when the month of Ramadan begins (Shah 2009, 143-51).
In the United States, very few congregations use the sighting of Mecca and Medina
alone. Perhaps this fact is unsurprising given the small number of Salafists in the country. Imams
and congregations might use the Holy Cities’ sightings as a guide to ensure they are not sighting
a new moon before scholars in the Holy Cities, but this is largely to ensure that they are not
wildly off and so that the feasts associated with the Pilgrimage, which must be observed
according to a fixed schedule, are not in conflict with their Holy Month.
There is, consequently, an interesting rupture between local imams who serve the
specific needs of a congregation and Islamic scholars associated with large, national or
international movements. This disjuncture can be linked to the distinct needs of each level of
organization. For the imams of local communities, moon sighting is primarily about the routine
ritual requirements of religious life: their congregation needs to know when to begin and end its
celebration of the Holy Month and the abstruse theological debates, while potentially
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important, are a distraction from the basic, ministerial needs and duties they held vis-à-vis their
local population.
Scholars and scholarly institutions, on the other hand, are more removed from the basic
requirements of ministry and consider doctrinal homogeneity and obedience to be far more
important considerations. That is because while they may have similar pragmatic concerns in
other parts of their lives, as scholars and leaders of the broader Islamic community, their
concern is both with orthodoxy of practice on a theoretical level as well as broader, trans-
congregational unity. This unity comes as a function of the role of the scholar, for while Islam
does not traditionally have clergy similar to liturgical Christian churches, scholars serve as the
binding force that holds the Islamic community in coherence: through their interpretations of
the law and guidance, they maintain the ability to introduce orthodoxy and common practice.104
Their success in this endeavor results in a more or less united Ummah, or community.
Consequently, while their hard-line stances of questions of how to sight the moon may serve the
needs of individual communities less (which is why Imams tend to ignore them), they are
important in a more general way. This explains why scholars invest so much effort into these
arguments while local leaders seem largely apathetic concerning them.
Fasting
The month of Ramadan itself offers many points of law that help separate and cohere
the Islamic community in the United States, forming the communitas described above. The first
and major requirement of Ramadan that separates the American Islamic community from the
American mainstream is the fast. This binds Muslims together through a sense of shared
sacrifice, but also removes them from some of the normal activities of American society such as
104 For a description of how this works in process see Messick’s The Calligraphic State (1992).
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lunches, snacks and other forms of casual interaction based around food. Muslims usually
attempt to navigate this with grace. In fact, navigating this conflict with grace was a focal point
of discussion during the Ramadan sermons that I attended at three different Islamic centers:
one was not supposed to make one’s fasting obvious or emphasize it so it separated a Muslim
from her fellows. Instead, one was supposed to be as humble and as unobtrusive as possible.
My personal experience with Muslims during this period has shown that unobtrusiveness in
fasting is in fact a common practice.
More significantly for the Muslim population in the US, Ramadan is a focal point of
social interaction with other Muslims, especially other Muslims in the Islamic Center. Islamic
Centers have many social events around Ramadan in an effort to encourage social interaction
among the congregation. These include regular, sometimes nightly breakfasts. These meals are
governed by their own observances of Islamic law depending on the interpretation of the Sharia,
which in some schools of thought strongly suggest the fast to be broken with dates and water as
was the reputed habit of the Prophet (Al-Tirmidhi 696). These communal meals often bleed into
other events at the Centers that lead deep into the night, including a special set of Qur’an
recitations and prayers that occur in a regular cycle called the tarāwīḥ prayers. These happen
alongside a set reading schedule of the Qur’an so that the entire book is chanted over the
course of the thirty nights of the month. Charitable donations are encouraged during the
month. Indeed, according to several traditions the rewards a Muslim will receive in Heaven for
charitable gifts is greatly increased if those gifts are given during the month (Al-Bukhari 1795;
Muslim 1955). These gifts usually go solely to charitable causes and there is a debate about
whether the Center itself counts as such a cause, a discussion we will have when we cover the
Islamic Center later in our analysis.
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As we have seen, Islamic law has a particularly powerful structural impact on the
American Muslim community. Its requirements for religious observation, especially its
requirements regarding family and gender interactions as well as worship, form tight and
cohesive bonds among the community that also serves variously to separate that community
from American society at large as well as to integrate it within a larger American context in
specifically Islamic ways. While we have focused the above discussion largely on the laws
themselves, an important item of note that has emerged throughout is that Islamic law qua law
is not the only way the American Muslim community is tied together, but discussions and
debates regarding the law also have an important role in shaping and cohering American
Muslims.
The Structure of Debate
Legal debates have historically been a driving force in creating coherent Islamic
communities. While the most obvious and large-scale divides within the Ummah as a whole
have been over theological issues such as the nature of prophecy, the order of succession to
Muhammad, etc., arguments which have created the well-known divisions of Sunni, Shi’a,
Ahmadi and others, debates over legal issues have often been highly significant in creating
communities within these groups. Sunnism in particular has long seen powerful political and
social factions form around Islamic schools of law. The Hanbali school, for example, was
originally created as a social and legal reform effort against what was popularly conceived as the
excesses of the Abbasid Caliphate, a movement championed by lower classes who were largely
Arab against the dominant Hanafi and Persian ruling classes (Hodgson I 389-92). While the
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divisions created by debates over Islamic law in the United States are not nearly as cut-throat
and violent as were the debates in the Early and Middle Periods of Islam, they are highly salient
in realizing the structural function of Islamic law in dividing and cohering religious communities.
As we have seen in our examination of the debates over the moon sighting and dating,
there are many different ways Muslims can solve the problems presented by Sharia. In that
case, the Fiqh Council of North American and the American Muslim Jurists’ Association, both
bodies of recognized scholars with international reach, arrived at opposite conclusions regarding
the validity of using astronomical calculations to sight the moon: the first saying it is the best
means and should be used, the second saying it is an absolutely impermissible innovation and
its use is prohibited.
The fact that the “real” Sharia is unknowable to humanity in its entirety and the
consequential fact that many, even opposing views, can be understood as legitimate,105
sharpens the possibility for a divide within the community over legal issues with different parties
rallying around the scholars of their choice. Consequently, we must explore first the cause of
these intellectual debates and second why individuals take the sides they do and what impact
that has on the overall organization of the American Muslim community.
The origin of Islamic legal debates in the United States is a factor of two major
influences. First is the issue of immigrants moving to the United States from countries with
established, but heterogeneous legal traditions needing not only to adapt their understanding
of the Sharia to new circumstances, but also needing to homogenize their legal understanding
105 Often justified by the famous Hadith saying that a jurist who is right on a legal question receives two
rewards in Heaven while a jurist in err receives one (Al-Buhari 6919; Muslim 1716).
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with the other groups with whom they find themselves interacting.106 This problem presents
both a challenge and an opportunity. On the one hand, such diversity threatens the coherence
of the community by splitting a minority into even smaller factions and ruining the harmony of
the Ummah. On the other, the fact that this is a new world for Islam holds out the opportunity
that different communities can re-evaluate the issues and come to new, strengthening
consensus on previously divisive questions.
Most of the Imams and congregants I spoke to understood this under the opportunity
rubric. They consider the challenges faced in the new, non-Islamic environment of the United
States as an opportunity to rid the community of some of the accretions of cultural Islamic
practices that may have distracted from the pure orthodoxy of Islam’s original community. In
order to understand this more fully, we should briefly review the complex interaction between
Islamic law and local traditions.
When various communities enter Islam, they carry with them a variety of traditions and
practices that have varying amount of compatibility with the Sharia. These traditions are called
ᶜurf, which means custom107 In issues of outright conflict, the solution to the difference is
simple: one abandons the forbidden practice and adopts an Islamically acceptable alternative
(though debating what that is can be complicated, as we saw from the issue of dating above). In
cases where the practice is fully compatible with Islamic law, the case for most things, then the
answer is even easier: just continue on with the original practice (in the case of the United
106 Of course, many Muslims know very little about the law and orthodox practice, but as we discussed
above, legal orthodoxy is becoming one of the major ways of establishing religious orthodoxy and even
Islamic identity in the US, at least since the 1960’s. As a result, even among populations that are less
informed about Islamic law, knowledge and comportment according to its rules becomes de rigeur.
107 For the most comprehensive study of this subject, see Shabana Custom in Islamic Law and Legal
Theory. For classic articles on the subject, Libson’s “On the Development of Custom as a Source of Law”
(1997) and Othman’s “’Urf as a Source of Islamic Law” (1981). We will discuss custom in greater detail
below.
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What Elements of Islamic Law Do American Muslims Use?
If the last chapter focused on how American Muslims use Islamic law structurally, the
present will focus on how they use it substantively. Substantive law means legal commands. This
is the element of the law that most people see. In American law, a substantive law would be the
speed limit, the prohibition of theft or what the tax code says we must pay to the government.
In Islamic law, the category is somewhat of an ill-fit, for reasons discussed in the introduction,
but it tends to cover everything from the commands of religion to its prohibitions. Its range is
far wider than in American civic law and contains not just criminal elements, but family and even
worship rules as well. This is because while American law deals only with the civic needs of its
populace, Islamic law deals with their religious requirements as well.
On the surface these two legal codes, American civic law and Islamic law, seem to
conflict, but as discussed above, the Muslim population of the United States generally uses them
in a way in which they are compatible and in fact emphasize one another rather than detracting
from the other’s operation or creating conflict. They do this by allowing the state to take control
of issues they believe it is best situated to control and in so doing use compliance with American
law to maximize the effectiveness of Islamic law in those domains where it operates.
The most obvious accommodation that Islamic law in the United States makes for civic
law is in the area of criminal law. Islamic law has a robust and highly developed criminal law. Its
most famous (or perhaps infamous) elements are the ḥadūd penalties. These are very few in
number and consist of the only crimes explicitly assigned punishments in the text of the Qur’an.
They include adultery, theft, unfounded accusations and apostasy. Their punishments are
varied, but all corporal, usually involving lashings or stoning (Qur’an 5:33, 38; 9:66; 24:2, 4, 6;
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16:106). In practice, their implementation is usually neither as strict or draconian as critics
presume and countries who implement the ḥadūd do so in different ways involving a wide range
of severity and leniency.108
The ḥadūd are usually front and center in the various controversies over the
implementation of Islamic law in the United States. When anti-Islamic movements agitate
against the specter of “Islamo-fascism” or “Sharia-creep” the ultimate vision they seek to fear-
monger against is a state where corporal punishments for apostasy or adultery are inflicted by
an alien judiciary of religious totalitarianism.109 Needless to say, these visions are highly
exaggerated, though they have been influential enough to spark the passage of laws in various
states (SPLC 2018). We will consider the details of the anti-Sharia movement in greater detail in
a later chapter. What is important to discuss here is how America’s Muslims deal with the
challenges that this conflict of law present.
Since America’s Muslims view Islamic and American law as complimentary, they look to
the two to perform different functions according to each’s ability. There are certain elements of
the law, such as its criminal component, that a state, given its superior resources, is able to
accomplish much more effectively than private individuals. This is a fact which the Muslim
community recognizes and therefore allows the state to perform on its behalf.
108 For an overview of Islamic criminal law and its implementation in various national contexts see
Kamali’s Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: A Fresh Approach (2019).
109 I have taken as emblematic of this position the Center for Security Policy, which is an extreme anti-
Islamic organization. Identifying a good representative of anti-Sharia positions in the US is difficult
because so many our so far removed from the American mainstream of thought that their claims to
representativeness are suspicious. CSP is likely not representative of any form of thought about Islam
among the majority of Americans but exists within the mainstream of discourse in that it is not a white
supremacist or openly fascistic organization devoted to the support of “Western Civilization,” but rather is
structured like a mainstream think tank and presents its information in that format. A warning is
necessary that the information CSP presents is often inaccurate and false and so should be considered
only insofar as it illustrates the position of the organization and not for demonstrating anything about
Islam itself. It’s website is: https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org, accessed May 18, 2019.
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While this might seem like an abrogation of one’s duties to observe God’s law before
the law of this world, the Salafist’s critique, one must understand how Islamic law structures
duties to understand why this surrender of obligation is considered acceptable. Duties are
organized under two categories in Islamic law. They are the farḍ al- ᶜayn, Specific Duties, and the
farḍ al-kifāyah, Sufficient Duties. The farḍ al- ᶜayn consists of duties that are obligatory upon
each individual as a Muslim while the farḍ al-kifāyah are obligatory upon the community as a
whole. While each person must perform the first, so long as any one member or small group
performs the second, the obligation is discharged (Kamali 2011, 451).
When we think of the Specific Duties, we can imagine those every-day, personal
elements of religion such as prayer, the obligation to fast and other things that are wholly within
any individual of mental competence and maturity ability to perform. The Sufficient Duties are
those which only a small segment of the community is capable of performing either because
they require some special talent or do not need wider involvement. These include the jihad
when necessary110 or the criminal law. The fact that the criminal law must be a duty is clear
since its absence is anarchy, but because the criminal law is jurisprudentially complex, requiring
as it does knowledge of the rules for evidence and an ability to judge impartially among other
things, only a specialized group of people may execute it. Consequently, so long as a small group
of the community does this, the duty is discharged from the rest.
American Muslims view the American government as perfectly positioned within society
to accomplish the goals of enforcing the criminal law: it has both the resources and the
110 This sense of jihad refers to the actual waging of holy war when the Islamic community is under threat.
Jihad has two different meanings, one referring to the struggle against sin and making the self obedient to
God while the other refers to the waging of war in defense of the faith (Mohammad 1985). This dual-
meaning derives from the fact that the root of jihad means simply to “struggle.” We encountered this
same root in the word ijtihad above.
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legitimacy to make laws and enforce them. The biggest problem from a Muslim’s perspective is
that the criminal law it enforces is not an Islamic one. Despite this fact, all of my informants
unanimously agreed that the American government’s execution of the criminal law satisfied the
Sufficient Duty for the community. Why might this be? Part of the answer lies in the idea of the
Jurisprudence of the Minority. While none of my informants volunteered this phrase as a
description on their own and only half-heartedly endorsed it when I mentioned it as a topic,
their explanation of why the American government’s execution of its criminal law satisfies the
Sharia requirement is identical to the justification provided under the theory of the
Jurisprudence of the Minority.
The Jurisprudence of the Minority in this case holds that a minority group in a larger
population cannot insist that its own laws be followed to absolute perfection, including Islamic
law. As a result, Muslims are incapable of insisting that their law be the dominant legal paradigm
when they do not make up the majority of the population or live in a land that it is not
traditionally dominated by Islam. If Muslims are to live in these places, therefore, they are
forced to obey non-Islamic law. This acquiescence is acceptable so long as the dominant legal
paradigm does not require them to perform or engage in any non-Islamic deeds (March 2009,
171).
While rampant criminal injustice or compulsory unIslamic action might be conditions
that force Muslims resident in the hostile country either to implement Islamic law or emigrate,
in the American context, the criminal justice system is sufficiently structured and sufficiently
flexible that this is unnecessary. In fact, the American system is, in the words of many of my
informants, more efficient than the countries they left and consequently, as they said, may be in
many ways more “Islamic” than those so-called Islamic systems.
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It might seem strange that an avowedly secular system of justice might be more Islamic
than an explicitly Islamic system, but if we return to the concept of the Maqāṣid al-Sharīᶜah we
will readily see a possible explanation. The maqāṣid are a set of rules that make up the “Aims of
the Sharia.” These aims are neither substantive nor procedural law but form the elements that
the Sharia intends to protect. They were described in more detail above, but for now it will be
sufficient to remember that they aim to protect the most important elements of life necessary
to live in a way pleasing to God. It is important that the criminal law fulfill the Aims for two
reasons: because doing so prevents crimes against righteous Muslims and because an iniquitous
criminal process would strip innocent Muslims of their rights though ineffectuality in
prosecution and mistaken convictions, placing them in a position of persecution and requiring
hijrah, or emigration (March 2009, 171).
The American legal code is just and generally efficient, my informants argued.
Consequently, though my informants failed to make this later point explicit, it protects the five
aims of the Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah (life, lineage, reason, religion and wealth). Moreover, because
the United States is not a predominantly Muslim country, according to my informants, it need
not enforce the exact penalties commanded by the Qur’an, but instead can operate according to
the stipulations of its own native traditions so long as the effect is the same. This acquiescence
is especially permissible since American law does not command Muslims to perform any acts
that their religion specifically proscribes. American law, therefore, fulfills the Sufficient Duty
incumbent upon the Islamic community to build criminal justice as defined under the
Jurisprudence of the Minority, meaning that Islamic criminal law need not be implemented in
the United States.
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As discussed above, issues like the ḥadūd are the exception in Islamic law. For the most
part, American Muslims find ways to harmonize the requirements of the Sharia with American
civic law. American law, likewise, is structured in such a way (as we will explore in the final
chapter) that it often enables Muslims to use the Sharia in complement with civic law.
Consequently, far more of my research involved harmonizing the two legal systems than it did in
exploring their conflict. Below are some of the major areas where Islamic law is operative
among the Muslims in my research population and, as it appears from research in the literature,
in America more broadly.
Family Law
Among the most significant elements of Islamic law used by American Muslims is family
law. In many ways, family law, or what we think of when we use that term, is the cornerstone of
Islamic law in the United States. It can be understood to include all aspects of the family,
including its formation (courtship, the marriage ceremony, the distribution of assents and work
within the family, etc.) and its dissolution (most important here is divorce, though there are
other ways for a marriage to end under Islamic law).
The Marriage Contract
We have discussed above in the section regarding the social structuring effect of Islamic
law how family law works in the area of courtship. What we missed is how Islamic law forms the
concept of marriage itself. Islamic law places much of the responsibility for forming marriages
onto individuals themselves. This is so because under Islamic law, marriage is a contractual
relationship cemented in a document. This, the primary form of marriage, is known as a nikāḥ.
Because a nikāḥ is contractual, it can be formed in the same way as any other contract (Haeri
2014, 23-33) and need not have a special ceremony or even the presence of the parties since
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the contract may be performed by proxy (Nasir 1990, 53). Of course, given the importance of
marriage in any society, most marriages are accompanied by ceremonies, though their details
vary by region and ethnicity. In my research population this ranged from some African-
Americans who are the most conservative Muslims and who consider a large ceremony to be an
unIslamic innovation, they therefore prefer a very small ceremony. In contrast, Muslims from
the Indian sub-continent prefer large and elaborate ceremonies.
The marriage contract itself, called in Arabic an ᶜaqd al-nikāḥ, has certain basic
components. At a minimum it must contain the names of the parties, the names of their
witnesses and the amount of mahr, a payment that is made by the groom to the bride. The
marriage contract may include any additional terms the parties wish and these terms, so long as
they are not in direct contravention to Islamic law, become binding like any other contract.
Imams interviewed mentioned a wide range of things that were included in marriage contracts,
including stipulations that the couple would remain in the town where they were married, that
parents would live with the couple or basic issues of property division and other contingencies.
The effectiveness of the provisions is a different question from drafting the contract.
While they are permissible, they are unusual. One Imam said he drafted all the contracts
personally for couple he married and used the term “boilerplate” to describe most of them. He
also expressed some disdain for including too many provisions. He claimed that the provisions
to live in a certain area or to house relatives in the marital home were honored more often in
the breach. When I asked what happened in the event these provisions were broken, he said
that so long as both members of the couple consented and continued to behave as if they were
married, then the contractual terms were treated as null and void and had no impact on the
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marriage. 111 If the provision were violated and immediately complained of, then the wife could
use it to initiate a divorce proceeding, though the Imam would counsel the couple beforehand
and actually pronounce the divorce himself unless the right to divorce were granted the wife in
the contract itself.112
The contractual relationship of an Islamic marriage gives it a legal existence that is
absent from a typical Christianate marriage113 but mirrors Jewish practice. In fact, as I will
discuss below when discussing the intersection of American and Islamic law, Islamic marital
arrangements are legally treated very similarly to their Jewish counterparts. Given the
Christianate nature of American law, marriage as a contract raises some issues in the civic legal
system that often causes the Islamic marriage and the American civic marriage to be separate
legal entities, though Imams are normally careful to make them coincident in terms of the
formation and dissolution of the marriage itself by requiring the state to issue a marriage
111 The concept that a stipulation in a contract, repeatedly ignored but not treated as a breach, has a
technical recognition in Anglo-American law under equity as estoppel by reliance, i.e. the parties have by
their conduct have acted as if the provision were moot and relied on its mootness to continue their
relationship, as a result any party seeking later to enforce the term is “estopped” from doing so. I have
been unable to determine an equivalent term in Islamic law either from my informants or my own
research, I believe this is a result of the fact that Anglo-American law relies more heavily on textual rules
(either court precedent or statute) than does Islamic law, which tends to emphasize jurisprudence and
the analytical powers of the jurist (as discussed in the introduction). As a result, while Islamic law has
elements that function like the equitable principles of Anglo-American law, and as we see derive the same
results as concepts like estoppel, they are not perceived as being part of the law in the same way, rather a
function of the judge’s application of legal principles. In a way, we can hold that the Islamic judge gets to
these principles through an analysis of the ratio legis while the Anglo-American judge does through an
analysis of ratio decidendi. For a brief overview of equity and equitable principles and their relationship to
Islamic law, see Rosen “Equity and Discretion in a Modern Islamic Legal System” (1980) and Makdisi,
“Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law” (1985).
112 The permissibility of delegating divorce in the contract, the so-called al-ṭalāq al-tafwīḍ, is debatable
and depends on the school of Islamic law under which the contract is drafted (Munir 2006).
113 The contractual element is not absent from Christianate marriages, but it is a highly contested element
thereof. For a more-in-depth discussion of these issues, see Witte’s From Sacrament to Contract:
Marriage, Religion and Law in the Western Tradition (2012).
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certificate and decree of divorce before the Imam will draft the contract or recognize a divorce
himself.
Because American civic law treats marriage as a status rather than a contract, the legal
claims of the spouses upon one another are different in the civic legal system. While American
civic legal systems have developed devices in the last several decades such as the pre-marital
contract that enter contractual elements into the marital relationship, these are largely
concerned with the disposition of assets in the case of divorce and do not touch the marriage as
a whole. The result of these limitations is that the contractual elements of the American civic
marriage are constrained and therefore less robust than under Islamic law. As a result, despite
these moves towards recognizing marriage as a contract, they do little to bridge the gulf
between marriage as contract and marriage as status.
Prenuptial Agreements and the Problem of Mahr
American prenuptial agreements are the strongest example of how American marriage
is beginning to look like a contract. Because of the similar elements that each has, particularly
that each can be recognized as a contract,114 a legal argument holding an Islamic marriage
contract as a prenuptial agreement would seem likely to succeed in an American courtroom.
Surprisingly, Islamic marriage contracts are almost never recognized as prenuptial agreements
since prenuptial agreements have very specific and limited forms governed by statute and the
114 In order to form a contract under American law, there must be two or more parties who enter into an
agreement where there has been bargaining, offer and acceptance as well as consideration (Second
Restatement of Contracts, § 1-4). In the case of an Islamic marriage contract, all three are present, though
the traditional argument that the woman exchanges sexual access for maintenance (Haeri 2014, 33-36)
would likely render the contract void under public policy grounds. Nonetheless, an argument that the
mahr is exchanged for some other aspect of the marriage, companionship, care, etc. could likely save the
argument from the perspective of American civic law. There is precedent in the courts of certain
jurisdictions for reading a contract on these grounds into the relationship of unmarried, cohabitating
partners (Seff 2012).
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Islamic marriage contract seems not to meet these criteria (Siddiqui 2007, 646-8, Oman 2011,
321-4). That is not to say an Islamic marriage contract couldn’t ever be considered as a
prenuptial agreement, but no informant I interviewed or case I reviewed contained an instance
where the marriage contract was made up in a way so as to double as a prenuptial agreement
explicitly.
The problem enforcing Islamic marriage contracts in American courts of law arises from
the mahr which such contracts mandate (Siddiqui 2007, 654-5). Mahr is a payment made upon a
marriage contract from the husband to the bride that serves as consideration to make the
contract valid. A mahr payment can be virtually anything of value and can be made upon the
marriage or delayed to a period after the signing of the contract. If the payment is delayed, it
must be made upon a simple divorce (the ṭalāq) or the death of the husband, to be paid from
his estate. (Haeri 2014, 37.)
The problem with the mahr to an American court is not its religious nature, but a
perceived moral issue: to American courts, mahr presents a potential incentive to divorce as
mahr looks to these courts like a payment made in return for marital dissolution, a prima facie
cause to nullify a prenuptial agreement. To understand this, we must understand some of the
concerns surrounding the generic American prenuptial agreement and why it was so late to
develop.
Prenuptial agreements were developed in the last half of the twentieth century and
remained of dubious standing until recognized by statute in the various states that allow them.
One of the reasons they took so long to develop is the states’ moral interest in marriage.
Contrary to what many think, American courts do not and never have viewed themselves as
neutral arbiters in the case of morality. One of the primary moral concerns of courts is family
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law and, in particular, marriage. Family courts, therefore, spend a lot of their time attempting to
ensure the stability of marriage and try to discourage anything that might move toward its
dissolution. One of the primary elements in this has been interpreted as reducing incentives for
divorce (Marston 1997, 897-9).
Because of a desire to avoid incentivizing divorce, prenuptial agreements usually follow
very tightly orchestrated rules. One of these is that the agreements can only distribute assets in
a neutral way, meaning that no party can be seen to gain something through the process of
divorce. Prenuptial agreements, therefore, cannot include penalties that will be paid to a spouse
or anything resembling such a payment. Since mahr is often made to a woman upon the divorce
in addition to the alimony awarded by an American court, is classified by most courts as an extra
payment made upon divorce. Because if this interpretation, American courts consider that a
Muslim woman stands to gain something concrete from the divorce process if mahr remains
due. These courts will therefore declare the Islamic marriage contract null and void based on
concerns about morality (Siddiqui 2007, 654-5).
From an Islamic perspective this is an unusual statement. The mahr is absolutely not
intended to serve as a reward for divorce. Divorce is in fact discouraged in Islam as the most
reprehensible of the permissible acts (Abu Dawud 2178). What makes mahr seem as an
incentive to an American court likely lies in the difference between the American and Islamic
divorce processes.
American courts when writing opinions do not present the argument outlined above in
quite so many words. One of the problems American courts have with interpreting Islamic
marriage contracts is a lack in understanding the nuances of Islamic law, but the outlines of the
above argument are present and amply demonstrate the difficulties that merging the American
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civic and Islamic understanding of marriage presents. This does not mean that mahr is totally
useless. As we discuss in the final chapter, individuals are able to write mahr payments into their
divorce settlement papers, which are then enforceable in a court of law. Ultimately, therefore,
private ordering is able to use the court system to realize an Islamic solution the courts
themselves are unable to produce.
Regulating the Life of the Marriage
Given the difficulties courts have recognizing the contractual nature of an Islamic
marriage, the marriage contract as a legal instrument often has force only within the Islamic
community itself. When such disputes over elements in the contract arise, Imams function as
both judge and marriage counselor.
While to a non-Islamic audience it might sound strange to arbitrate disputes that arise
over the course of the marriage through reference either to a contract or to the law itself, this is
possible due to the nature of Islamic law. The Sharia is a body of law that is concerned both with
public and private deportment. As a result, it contains solutions not just for forming and
dissolving a marriage (a public concern), but also managing and controlling the relations of the
spouses with one another while husband and wife (a private concern). It does this in part
through the clauses in the marriage contract described above, which allow each party to
stipulate what they expect from the marriage relation at the outset. Since these clauses are
relatively uncommon and cannot foresee all the possible disputes that will arise over the course
of a marriage, Islamic law also regulates the marriage through a series of standard expectations
of the marital relationship. These expectations establish the rights and duties of each party vis-
à-vis the other.
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Almost no element of the marriage life is too intimate not to have any guide established
in the Sharia. This includes the sexual life of the spouses. While an Islamic marriage contract can
be understood as establishing a man’s rights to sexual access, it also establishes expectations
that the woman will have certain rights to sexual activity and a marriage can end as a result of a
husband’s refusal or inability to satisfy his wife’s intimate needs (Ibn Qudamah 7:30; Al-Jassass
1:374). Islamic law also establishes the requirements for educating a child at various stages of its
life and creates expected burdens for family development as well as recommending the
comportment of spouses vis-à-vis one another. Among the population of Muslims I studied,
these requirements of the law were common knowledge.
The above paragraph should not be read too broadly. Islamic law is not a tyrannical,
draconian code that dictates every moment of marital life. Instead, it exists to serve the married
couple in establishing their expected behaviors and providing recourse in the event of marital
problems and to guide the marriage along a path pleasing to both spouses as well as to God.
Islamic law when it operates within a marriage only takes effect, at least in the United States,
when the couple themselves invite the Imam to intervene in the case of a dispute. In this
situation, an Imam operates as a kind of marital counselor, though this role is not without its
controversy on account of the Imam’s lack of training in the American-style of couple’s therapy.
In every Islamic Center or mosque and with every Imam I interviewed, the process of
resolving issues arising between spouses was very similar. If the couple had problems, they
consulted the Imam for a solution, which could include divorce. The Imam would then call both
members of the couple into his office and discuss the problem with them together. Then he
would hear them separately and counsel each individually. Finally, he called them together
again to give his final words of advice and, ideally, schedule a follow-up meeting that would
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occur some weeks in the future to hear how the situation was progressing. In the case of
couples seeking a divorce, the Imam would only grant such a divorce after this second meeting,
and sometimes even later.
Unfortunately, due to concerns for the spouses’ privacy, I was never able personally to
observe one of these sessions, which in some organizations, such as Sharia boards, actually
takes place in a room that has the appearance of a court room with individuals seated before a
panel of Islamic legal experts as judges. This is the same format and venue these bodies use to
arbitrate business and other more public disputes.115
Curious because of the formal similarity to courtrooms and mediation sessions, I asked
my informant Imams whether they acted like judges in such disputes. Each one said they did. I
asked further whether they felt that each family problem had one right answer, which could be
found in the religious texts. Here there was more disagreement, with some saying that was true,
but most saying there was more than one solution to the problems. All agreed, however, that
marital issues could all be solved primarily by identifying the root cause of the issue, searching
through the sources of Islamic law to find the answer and then providing it to the parties and
helping them, through advice and potentially continued counseling, to apply it in their own lives.
It was an essentially legal process and one that resembles the conduct of other Islamic family
courts described elsewhere in the anthropological literature (Hirsch 1998; Agrama 2012).
This highly juridical process of marriage counseling is not without its controversies.
These issues wend their way into the fabric of a debate within the American Islamic community
about how traditional religious services should be and what relation Islamic law should have
115 None of these boards existed in Boston and so this information is gathered both from interviews with
legal scholars working at such associations and their websites. As examples see:
https://www.sbny.org/page_marriage-counseling; https://www.islamictribunal.org, both accessed May
21, 2019.
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with the non-legal aspects of American society that coincide and compete with it. This conflict is
especially pressing in the case of mediating marriage disputes because in the American context
legal processes are emphatically prohibited from intermingling with the private sphere of
marital relations. Legal control of these areas is viewed as tyrannical at best, totalitarian at
worst. Thus, many of the most discussed and far-reaching Supreme Court decisions of the late
20th and early 21st centuries revolve around questions of how to limit state governance over
family law issues including contraception, abortion and homosexuality.
The tension that Americans perceive between the law and the private realm are bound
to an understanding of law, discussed in the introduction, that is inherently Christian in origin:
that the law is an insufficient moral guide, that it may be wholly removed from the realm of
morality, and that it exists primarily as a tool the state uses to maintain order among its citizens.
Law, therefore, is a civic, political force, divorced from moral truths and metaphysical concerns.
As a result, it is also divorced from the reality of the individual person, the details of their lives
and beliefs so long as these individuals comport themselves in a manner publicly that does not
run afoul of its dictates. Ensuring that these dictates do not interfere in the private lives of the
citizens is viewed as a primary role of judicial branches of contemporary democracies.
Islamic law, as we have discussed in the introduction, has a different kind of legal
epistemology. Islamic law is grounded in the idea that law is not to be restricted to the state and
the state’s governance of people’s public lives. Instead, Islam sees the law as a way to govern an
individual’s spiritual life and their relationship with God and one’s relationship with God should
in turn define one’s relationship with other people and the world. The law, in this case, is not
just a public issue, but a private one. In fact, the private elements of the law may, arguably, be
more important than its public contents. The fact that Islamic law contains almost no provisions
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of what we consider public law, but much of what we consider private law confirms this fact.116
Because God, in the Islamic understanding, is everywhere and everything partakes of Him and
because Islamic law is one of the most certain ways to gain knowledge of how God wishes
people to act, then law becomes applicable not just to govern the lives of people as citizens and
cooperators, but as human beings in the totality of their lives. Because of this, Islamic law
governs people not just as social creatures, but also as feeling, thinking, and ethical individuals.
When seen in this way, Islamic law takes on potentially therapeutic functions. In
practice this potential derives from the idea that the law is set in-line with an individual’s fiṭrah,
or essence, an essence which partakes directly of the divine reality and is the truest element of
our humanity (Encyclopedia of Islam, 3rd Ed.). Because it is the truest part of ourselves and is
itself divine, whatever is most divine most suits us best as it reflects the truest part of ourselves.
Our consciousness is an imposition upon our fiṭrah, however, and so our emotions and
subjective needs can lead us away from God (Izzati 2002, 96).
In this model of the self, law and therapy experience a strange (from an American
perspective) summersault: Islamic law becomes the most powerful way for an individual to
achieve peace not just within themselves, but also with others. This creates a potential problem
for people who have recourse to other, non-Islamic, ways of solving their personal problems.
These individuals, including those who subscribe to American-style counseling, are not using
Islamic law to guide their actions and thus are not in line with their fiṭrah. Instead they are using
their subjective emotions and the counseling of secular experts to resolve their problems.
Because they are interrogating their subjective selves which have the potential to err, instead of
116 In Anglo-American law, public law is commonly understood to refer to administrative, constitutional
and criminal law. Private law is the law of tort, contracts and private life where the government is not
involved as a party to the dispute.
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the inerrant divine word, to solve their problems, they risk losing touch with their fiṭrah and
thus putting themselves out of the reach of God, causing them to despair of finding the true
path. As a result, some groups of Muslims tend to eschew American-style marital counseling for
its potential to create a disharmonious deviance with the divine and, ultimately, the true self.
Along these lines, there are two primary providers of Islamic religious services to
American Muslims. The first and most common are Imams who receive a traditional legal
education, usually abroad, and are qualified as legal experts. The second and far less common,
though on the rise, are Islamic chaplains who usually lack formal Islamic legal training but have
an education in chaplaincy from American institutions of higher education such as the Hartford
Seminary,117 institutions that train not only Muslim chaplains, but Christian and sometimes
Jewish clergy as well.
As a result of this ecumenical American education, the chaplains I interviewed had a
much different approach when ministering to the religious needs of their congregation than do
Imams. The difference between these approaches is particularly relevant in the case of family
disputes within a marriage where the chaplains focus much less on the law, in which they are
usually not specialists, and instead use counseling techniques drawn from clinical practice and
learned through the course of their seminary training. These techniques focus less on aligning
the couple’s marital behavior with divine guidance and more on focusing on the couple’s own
position vis-à-vis each other and dealing with their problems on an emotional level. They are, in
other words, more like therapists and less like judges and their work typically does not take
place in formal settings where the couples are interviewed individually and then told what to do
117 See https://www.hartsem.edu/macdonald-center/islamic-chaplaincy/ (Accessed August 15, 2019)
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but resemble counselling sessions where couples are present together and encouraged to
create their own solutions, tailored to their own problems.
Many of chaplains and lay Muslims with whom I discussed the issue expressed concern
about the traditional approach to marital counseling taken by the Imams. Their concern boils
down to the dispute over the role of law in Islam in general, namely whether the law should be
taken as a complete normative set of rules within which all problems can be solved and all of
life’s questions answered or whether the law is a guide which hints at deeper elements of
existence but does not explain them outright and directly, requiring introspection instead. If the
law is the former, then it and it alone can answer any problems that arise in the course of life. If
the latter, then sometimes the law will be insufficient and other means, such as introspection,
should be considered. Of course, in reality, the dichotomy is not so strict, but in practice shades
of one extreme or the other are present in the Islamic legal approach to marriage counseling
and the chaplain’s version of it.
The divergence in marital counseling techniques tends to correlate with the date of
immigration. Muslims who are of African-American descent or are multi-generationally
American tend to fall towards the chaplaincy side of the spectrum in their practice, a fact which
is probably influenced by their greater exposure to and comfort with American practices of
therapy and counseling from which the chaplain’s practice develops.118 Individuals who are
immigrants themselves or are but a generation or so removed from immigrants tend to favor
Imams for marital counseling, which is similar to how family issues would be resolved in their
native countries (Hirsch 1998, Agrama 2012). Sometimes this divergence is expressed in strict
118 Though in the case of African-Americans, it may also be explained by less education in Islamic law itself
and less exposure to the depths of its traditional scholarship on these issues.
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religious terms by these latter individuals, who see American techniques of counseling as both
self-indulgent and heterodox, given that they focus on the needs of individuals and not the
dictates of God. Consequently, some of these individuals view the American therapeutic process
of self-centered, secular, and ultimately unIslamic.
In point of fact, most of my interlocutors, whether in a formal interview or casual
discussion, especially those with longer exposure to the United States, tended to fall in the
middle. They viewed the counsel of Imams as important in determining aspects of their lives, to
include marital counseling, but also considered the professional practices of therapists as a
helpful guide. In these situations, individuals were likely to avail themselves of both services.
While Imams did not say they regularly referred people to family counseling, none expressed an
opposition to its practice. Consequently, while it is possible in theory to divide the community
into extremes, as in many other aspects of their lives, in practice most Muslims, whether Imams,
chaplains or laity, tend to follow a mixture of the two approaches.119
In the end, this counseling, whether legal or therapeutic, will result in either the
resolution of marital problems, which based on reports, happens in most of the time (especially
among South Asians), or it will end in divorce. If the latter, then there are two currents that
must be resolved: issues of the civic law and issues of Islamic law which usually, though not
always, overlap.
Imams, Marriage and Divorce
Under American civic law, there is a relatively close union with Islamic law in the realm
of marriage and divorce. While this tight relationship and its comparative context will be
119 For a brief outline of a conference held by the conservative (one informant Imam referred to them as
“Salafist”) group AMJA that urged Imams to include therapeutic techniques in their counseling see
“Practical Counseling Skills for Imam(sic)” at https://www.amjaonline.org/research/islamic-arbitration-
guidelines-and-procedures/ (Accessed August 15, 2019).
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described in greater detail below, it suffices to say here that most Imams and the American
government work together to ensure that the two systems operate as harmoniously as possible.
This cooperation derives from the American states’ delegation of the power to marry to private,
usually religious parties. This delegation is exceptional when compared to European
democracies (Buchler 2011, 28-40).
In the case of marriage, all US states empower Imams to perform the marriage
ceremony and certify the relationship just as they allow ministers, priests, and rabbis to do.
Consequently, almost all the Imams interviewed for this study agreed that the state should set
the parameters for marriage and they acquiesce by only marrying people who come to them
with a valid marriage certificate. This involves the Imams in an Islamic marriage to a greater
degree than they might be in the Islamicate world but serves to bring Islamic marriage practices
and ceremonies more closely inline with the mainstream American practice as well as to bring
Islamic marital expectations in line with the state’s.
In the US, therefore, the Imam plays a central role in the marriage process. No doubt
this is in part influenced by the Christianate tradition of a solemnization ceremony in a church,
which itself gives rise to the legal requirement the state imposes that a religious official sign the
marriage certificate before witnesses. Whatever the origin of the state law, almost all of the
Imams I interviewed were dedicated to complying with it and explicitly said they required a
marriage certificate in order to tie the Islamically legal marriage into state law.120
The principle behind this rule is linked to one of the central features of Islamic law, that
is the prevention of injustice (Kamali 1999, 194). In many Islamicate countries, the family of the
120 The obvious exception to this policy is among African-American Imams and Muslims who practice
polygamy as the receipt of such a document would not be possible in such a context. These were the only
individuals and Imams who believed a marriage could be valid in the US under Islamic law without a
marriage certificate and state recognition.
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married parties are often sufficient to enforce settlements upon divorce or to put pressure on
the either of the parties to perform their marital duties. Wives might have recourse to their
natal families to force the husband into acting correctly, sometimes shaming him by abandoning
him and returning to her family’s quarters. In the US, however, the only option for individuals to
enforce their marital rights is the court, which will not do so without a state-recognized
marriage with a marriage certificate.
The potential injustice that concerns these Imams most has to do with the dissolution of
the marriage. A particular concern is that the woman receive her rights upon divorce, which can
include support during the period of time she must wait if within child-beating age before
remarrying in order to determine whether she is pregnant or not and when she must be paid
her mahr. Without a legal marriage and divorce settlement enforceable by the courts, an
abandoned woman may be left in an impoverished and desperate state. There are also potential
concerns about the status of children born into a legally unrecognized marriage: if there is no
legal recourse to protect a wife’s rights a husband may abandon her and their children with no
repercussions, leaving them unprotected. In this case, it may be better that the wife had never
been married, for otherwise she may have married someone else or made different
arrangements. Consequently, in the US, where Islamic law is itself not effective in sanctioning
violators itself, Islamic scholars have determined that the religion must bind itself to the state
apparatus in order to obtain justice.
The ease with which an American marriage can be accomplished by an Imam is
important for the predominance of state-recognized marriage among American Muslims. The
incorporation of the Imam into the legal marriage process is an example of how American law
encourages the operation of Islamic law and in turn Islamic law acknowledges the dominance of
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the state. That this integration is not inevitable or even universal is quite clear when we look at
the example of the UK, where a relatively high proportion of Islamic marriages are carried out
without state permission (Bowen 2016, 211-12). The lack of formal registration creates a morass
of legal problems for women and children who are effectively abandoned by their husbands
after a talaq (repudiation), which, according to Islamic law, is the unilateral right of the husband.
While Islamic institutions exist to deal with these situations in much greater numbers in the UK
than in the US, they are often impotent in crafting legally enforceable solutions (Keshavjee
2013, 130-7). Their example demonstrates why American Imams are so loath to recognize the
validity of non-registered marriages.
Imams may also object to marriages for other reasons. Islam has certain requirements
for marriage, such that a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim man, though a Muslim
man may marry a non-Muslim woman, the belief being that religion “follows” the father.
Likewise, Islam has a strict law against the adoption of children. This is a result of one of the
aims of the Sharia, the protection of nasb, or lineage. Muslim legal scholars tend to interpret
this as meaning that the European form of adoption, where one is taken into a family and the
child then adopts that family’s surname and is treated as one of its offspring, is prohibited
because it erases the nasb of the child. Instead, Islamic forms of adoption based on the Arab
practice of mawlah, or “clientship” are allowed where the individual maintains his own familial
name, but functions as a member of the patron’s family and, traditionally, would intermarry
with it and establish true genealogical ties (Sonbol 1995, 48-51).
While this is not often a concern for marriages, I am aware of one time where an Imam
refused to witness the contract he drew up for the partners when they insisted the groom’s
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adoption of the bride’s children be included as an item in the contract. The Imam said the
provision was unIslamic and refused to countenance the union but said would have if the
offending provision had been removed. The groom, was, the Imam related to me, an old friend.
The biggest exception to the rule that Muslims will not marry without a state certificate
are for polygamous Muslims where a state certificate is impossible to obtain due to bigamy
laws. As discussed above, these marriages are most common among African-American Muslims,
who are also the Muslim population of the US with the most strained relationship with the
state. Consequently, they do not see that state as a source of justice in the same way many
immigrant Muslims do and consequently see its protections concerning marriage as being
equally valuable.
Finance
The dilemma Islamic Finance presents to American Muslims stems from the twin horns
of an Islamic dilemma: the need for credit in an economy such as that in the United States and
Islam’s strict prohibition of interest or any financial instrument involving interest (Qur’an 3:129-
30; 2:275-80). Islam’s restriction of interest, which it calls ribā, is one of the foundational rules
of Islamic commerce. In some ways such a tight restriction on an integral element of trade is
surprising. Islam, Sharia and the history of the religion all show a very strong positive inclination
toward commerce, especially long-distance trading. Many of the most serious conversations in
Islamic law cover the requirements for contracting and establishing business relations, including
what constitutes sale, lease and the varieties of contract (Vogel & Hayes 1998; El-Gamal 2006).
As with the rest of Islamic law, the primary goal of these rules is to create harmony,
mutual benefit and security for all parties. As a result, interest, or “money growing money,” is
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prohibited as being a vehicle whereby one individual may benefit from harming another. While
Islamic law, both at the time of the Prophet and later, recognized many forms of business
interactions such as futures exchanges that seem to operate like interest, these are carefully
distinguished from interest-bearing instruments and form the basis for Islamic Finance
(Udovitch 1967; Khan 1988).
Islamic Finance itself is a highly controversial discipline with a vast body of
scholarship.121 Its proponents argue that it uses a complex series of financial exchanges to
ensure that a borrower can obtain financing and a lender profits at the same rate as regular
interest, but that the relationship is transformed so that the lender assumes some of the risk of
ownership from the borrower, which causes their interests to align such that the lender will not
profit from the borrower’s loss (Visser 2014, 29-59). Its opponents argue that it is little more
than a complex series of legal tricks that perform the function of interest under the guise of
Islamic legitimacy.
The circumvention of the prohibition on interest and the industry it has created is not
uncontroversial. Given the ethical foundations of the ban, Muslims sometimes tout the non-
interest developments of Islamic finance as a more ethical alternative to Euro-American
finance.122 Despite the moral promises many people see in Islamic finance, many Muslims
believe that instead of avoiding interest, all Islamic finance accomplishes is creating a complex
121 For more information see Iqbal & Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice
(2006); El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (2006); Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic
Finance (2001); Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (2010); Tripp, Islam and the Moral
Economy (2006).
122 As examples, see Moisseron & Toulon, “Is Morality-Based Islamic Economics an Answer to the Global
Financial Crisis?” (2014); Irfan, “Could Islamic Finance Save Capitalism?” (2014).
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series of exchanges that mask, but do not eliminate the threat of usury.123 The controversy
hangs on how close to interest one can get without actually recreating a system of usury so
close to the original as to be indistinguishable to it.
As mentioned above, within Islamic law there exists the concept of ḥīlah, a word which
mean “wile” or, more appropriately here, “trick.” Ḥiyal, the plural, are essential legal tactics
created to exploit a loophole or to skirt a legal prohibition and thereby potentially make what is
otherwise illegal, legal. The potential to confuse the licit and the illicit, driven by the power of
human reason, that these legal maneuvers present is precisely what makes them so
controversial. The primary argument for them is derived from maṣlaḥah, or public interest.
While few scholars can argue that these forms of financial transactions were formally approved
by the Qur’an or the Prophet, they argue they were not explicitly prohibited (at least in the
forms so created) and since they are of such a benefit, they cannot constitute a harm (Kamali
2000).
A common example of Islamic finance, is to make mortgages halal. One option for this is
to have the bank purchase the home and then resell it to the seller in monthly payments at a
profit.124 If the purchaser defaults, the bank is often prohibited from evicting the tenant,
however, for a variety of reasons, including justice and the desire to make the operation look
less like a common loan.125
123 As examples, see Yusof “Are Islamic Banks in Malaysia Really ‘Islamic’?” (2008); Jaffar & Musa,
“Determinants of Attitude towards Islamic Financing among Halal Certified Micro and SMEs: A Preliminary
Investigation” (2014).
124 For an explanation of this process, see the LaRiba website:
https://www.lariba.com/sitephp/model.html (Accessed August 19, 2019).
125 See LaRiba FAQ “What happens if I lose my job?” https://www.lariba.com/sitephp/faq.html#16
(Accessed August 19, 2019).
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Recognizing that it is almost impossible to exist in the United States without interest,
many Muslims look at the prohibition of usury as an ideal to aspire towards, but whose practice
is in reality impossible. They justify this by citing the oft-quoted verse of the Qur’an saying that
Islam and its law is not intended to be a “hardship” to its people (Qur’an 2:185, 22:78). This
idea, which is central to the Jurisprudence of the Minority, whether scholars consciously use
that term or not, holds that if something is unavoidable, or can be avoided only by sacrificing
many of the basic essentials of life, then Islamic law must conform to the reality it encounters.
This means even allowing an otherwise prohibited item so long as that allowance does not
automatically violate one of the objects of Islamic law.126 This is the foundational principle of
maṣlaḥah (Kamali 2012, 351-8).
In American society doing without interest makes life very difficult. Some of the most
basic purchases of an individual’s life are impossible without interest. Cars and houses are the
two most basic examples. Without a car, which is impossible for most people to buy without
paying interest, one cannot drive to work and thus cannot provide for one’s family. While a
buying a house might seem more like a luxury, it is an integral part of the American experience.
Interest is recognized by most Imams and Muslims I interviewed as a fact of American
life. While virtually everyone recognized the need to engage in some form of interest, each
person drew the line in a different place. No one said interest must be avoided completely,
though certainly a very small minority must hold this position. Some said any and all interest
was acceptable. Others, about 60% of my respondents, said only necessary interest was. This
latter group differed in their feelings toward what types of interest were necessary. Most, but
126 This principle is why the use of credit is allowed to American Muslims, but the use of alcohol isn’t: the
balance between the violation of Islamic law and its objects, the hardship of the prohibition and the need
to conform to society with alcohol, which is purely a social element of American society, is not as great as
it is with credit, which can deprive a person of some of the basic necessities of life.
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not all of this group, said credit cards were prohibited because a person could get along without
them even if it made life a little harder. Fewer said a car loan was prohibited because, while one
might not be able to buy a great car, one could buy one that was good enough with cash. Most
still said a car loan was fine because buying a bad car was so much more expensive than a good
one in terms of repairs that it was unreasonable to buy cars only with cash. All agreed, however,
that one shouldn’t use this excuse to buy an extravagant car if one couldn’t pay cash for it. The
smallest group said that mortgages were forbidden. In fact, virtually everyone agreed that
mortgages were acceptable. Ironically, many of the individuals who were able to find Islamic
mortgages even said they believed conventional mortgages were permissible. I interviewed five
individuals with Islamic mortgages who wished they had used a conventional one instead. They
said the fees associated with the Islamic mortgages intended to compensate the bank for its lack
of interest were often in practice higher than an interest payment would be and ultimately
questioned how halal its structure really was. This person relayed his opinion to me in front of
his Imam, who nodded his head in agreement.
When I asked Imams about the issue of interest, they generally expressed ambivalence
but acceptance towards their congregants’ use of interest. They understood the realities of life
in the US, being Americans themselves.127 One Imam put it to me in a very evocative way. He
said that if one examined the scholarly sources, at least in the Hanafi tradition, one could find
scholars ruling every which way on interest from full prohibition in a non-Muslim country to full
permissibility.128 He told me he said this to his congregants when they asked, advising them that
because the sources were so torn, they themselves should go pray and have recourse to their
127 I only interviewed one Imam who was not a permanent resident of the US.
128 None of the scholars I interviewed believed interest would be permissible in a Muslim majority
country.
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own conscience: imagine themselves living in a house, for example, that they bought with
interest. Could they be comfortable and happy? Would their conscience be silent? If so, then
God has answered them. If not, then equally so. Their decision would be made.
Perhaps the biggest exception to the nature of credit among American Muslims, and the
exception that proves the rule is not abrogated, but suspended for the particularities of
American Muslims, is the financing of Islamic Centers. Every community I visited that did not
have a dedicated building was saving funds to build one. All of them had been saving for several
years in order to gather the significant expense to pay for the building out of pocket. They did
this because, while every Muslim I interviewed accepted the necessity of using credit in the US
for personal purposes, none of them accepted the idea that an Islamic Center could be built
using such funds. This building was a religious one and thus was not subject to the same
exemptions that obtained in an individual’s private life.
This process makes it very difficult to build an Islamic Center. It also makes the
construction of these buildings very much unlike the construction of churches, where loans are
perfectly acceptable. Indeed, even in the Catholic church new parishes are built with loans of
money from Dioceses which the parish must repay, usually without interest. Given the
expansive growth in American Islamic Centers (Bagby I 2011, 4), this restriction strangely seems
not to be a particularly strong barrier inhibiting the founding of such institutions. I would
suggest that this is due to the Islamic community’s willingness to use what to a Christian or
Jewish audience might seem like unorthodox or even unappealing spaces for worship. While it is
not unheard of for Christian denominations to rent out large, free-standing buildings for
churches that were purpose-built for other uses,129 very rarely are these spaces in strip malls or
129 I have attended mass in a former motorcycle dealership in Virginia that smelled so heavily of motor oil
the incense was kept constantly burning.
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store-fronts except for small, typically evangelical churches. Several of the Islamic Centers I
visited were situated in these spaces, however. These spaces are not ideal, but like Christian
congregations who rent space, these areas are often used as temporary worship-halls while the
money to build a formal Islamic Center (or to retrofit an existing space) is collected. This
flexibility in the use of space allows a community to coalesce around the space, hire an Imam
and develop sufficient momentum and identity so that the congregation is able to develop the
long-term planning and savings required to build an Islamic Center form their own funds.
There were, for example, three Islamic Centers renting their space and looking to build
new, purpose-made buildings. As groups, each of these organizations were one hundred
percent dedicated to using Islamic finance. They would either save up the total sum they
needed to build without engaging in traditional financing or they would find an Islamic
mortgaging group like LaRiba130 that could accommodate their needs. When it came to the
individual congregants, however, the situation was quite different.
One of the major obstacles to using Islamic Finance in the United States is lack of its
availability and the ubiquity of traditional credit. While many Islamic Centers were able to find
Islamic lenders willing to take on their loans, some individuals complained that it was hard to
find lenders to take on smaller, family-sized mortgage prospects. Moreover, those that did were
not entirely happy with their loans. As I mentioned previously, virtually every Muslim I spoke to
who had taken out such a mortgage was ambivalent about it. Many considered it to be
essentially the same as an interest-bearing mortgage and were, in some cases, paying more in
financing charges, what the lender used as a substitute for interest, than they would have if they
had taken out a conventional mortgage.
130 See their website, https://www.lariba.com/sitephp/index.php (Accessed August 8, 2019).
206
Fewer individuals than expected referenced American laws restricting usury when
discussing the acceptability of using the American financing system, but some did. One Imam
even suggested that interest-bearing loans in the United States were not the same kind of thing
as the usury spoken of by the Prophet because there were limits on what rates could be charged
and because there are protections for people’s houses and other items necessary to life to
guard them against foreclosure. This is an argument that I thought I would hear quite often in
Muslims’ discussion of interest. It is, in fact, the argument that ultimately convinced Christian
theologians and lawmakers to abandon their ban against lending money at interest (Visser 2014,
49-51). Given the practical concerns, the historical precedent and the logical force of the
argument, I was forced to wonder why it was not advanced by more Muslims.
My hypothesis is that the position holding interest as allowable under duress and only
duress (meaning without considering the quality of the usury) is a position that affirms the
essentially illicit nature of usury and holds that its use is acceptable only when unavoidable. The
position that focuses on the intention and the rate of interest is one that admits that the lending
of money for interest is theoretically acceptable. While the former position can be justified in
terms of the overall framework of the law by recourse to equitable principles of jurisprudence
that include the avoidance of undue hardships, the latter position requires a radical re-imagining
of Islamic law that would necessitate the abrogation of the prohibition against usury found in
both Hadith and Qur’an. In other words, because the Prophet and his revelation both explicitly
prohibit lending at interest, the legal interpretation that was able to minimize that violation is
the most acceptable one. That would be the duress and not the intention argument.
If courtship customs and even food consumption can be a hard and fast line for some
observant Muslims, financing seems to be an issue where every Muslim I spoke to on the topic
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agreed that compromises must be made with American society at least to some degree. As
already noted, all agreed that for some purchases, such as a car or a house, an interest-bearing
instrument was inevitable and therefore acceptable under the Sharia, but only because of the
hardship that arises from the minority presence of Muslims in the United States. In this way,
using interest was not unlike polygamy, but in reverse. While polygamy was theoretically
permissible, it was practically prohibited. While interest was theoretically prohibited, it was
practically permissible.
In this case, the hardship of a non-interest-bearing financial life was the main driver.
Several Muslims used this very example to explain the problem to me in terms of mortgage
payments. In the US, it is impossible for the average Muslim to save enough money to buy a
house, so they rent to avoid the interest. They want to live an Islamic life and visit the mosque
often, so they rent near the mosque, but rents go up or they get a family and they can longer
afford it, so they move further out. As their family grows and things change, they need more
space, so they move farther out to save on rent. Now, they are far from the mosque and their
religion suffers as a result. If they had bought a house, however, because mortgages are usually
cheaper than rent and fixed for the long-term, they might have stayed by the mosque and their
religion would have been better.
This vignette, though hypothetical, shows the difficulty in being a Muslim minority and
following the Sharia, but also shows the need and ability of Islamic law to adapt to the
circumstances of the community. It shows how many Muslims use Islamic law to debate about
their place in society and what to compromise; in other words, how they remain Islamic in a
non-Islamic land. While most of my sample do not compromise on dating, because the modesty
requirements are considered too central to the religion (and cultural notions of honor) to give
208
up, especially if nothing of greater religious value is to be gained, compromising on interest is far
more permissible because, so long as the rates are not usurious, there are laws in the United
States that generally prevent individuals from taking advantage of one another in lending
arrangements and its prohibition remains, theoretically and potentially, in effect.
Moreover, these instruments can help the worshippers fulfill their religious duties. As
mentioned above, a business started with a small business loan establishes a Muslim in his
community, allowing him to become a good representative of Muslims everywhere and advance
the daᶜwah, or calling others to appreciate and even convert to the Islamic faith. American
Muslims, in other words, see the greater benefits to the religion of using interest in the climate
of an interest-centric society and so have decided, though not without serious debate and
contemplation, to embrace that tool in this specific social context as a way to advance their faith
and establishment in the US as a whole.
Wills and Inheritance
Inheritance is one of the most important and complicated issues in Islamic law. The
Islamic laws of inheritance are rigid and predetermined. The American laws of inheritance are,
by contrast, loose and impressionistic. Thus, there are radical differences in the ways American
civic law and Islamic law deals with the succession of estates. In American civic law, emphasis is
placed on the will as a manifestation of an individual’s desire and the means of her control over
his or her possessions. In essence, American ideals of property are realized through the will
instrument even in death. Few documents in the law are given as much deference as a will. Even
if a will is unclear, unethical, immoral, or even perverse, it will be interpreted by a court with as
much sympathy for the author as possible and if the document’s authenticity can be confirmed,
any request within it, so long as that request is not facially illegal, will be honored.
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In Islam, the conception of an individual’s inheritance is quite different. Perhaps
because of its emphasis on the protection of the family, one of the five Goals of the Sharia,
inheritance of an individual’s assets is highly controlled. In fact, determining the shares of an
inheritance to be distributed within the family is one of the most complex and difficult tasks of
an Islamic legal scholars and some Islamic legal texts contain tables of complex mathematical
formulae to determine who gets what.131
Under the Islamic scheme of inheritance, the estate of an individual who dies is
calculated in terms of its gross value and divided into shares. These shares are then
fractionalized and distributed to individuals based on the relation they share with the deceased.
While the deceased is allowed certain pre-mortem distributions and the estate does have
certain values cut-out of it for certain classes of survivors or donations to religious causes,132 but
otherwise Islamic law is very strict in controlling who can get how much of the estate (Nasir
1990, 230-45).
Ironically, despite the difference in rigidity between the systems, American Muslims are
able to realize, in theory at least, the strict rules of Islamic inheritance in the United States quite
easily. In fact, blank form wills directing American courts to follow Islamic law regarding the
death of the individual combined with the American insistence that the last wishes of the
deceased be scrupulously observed mean that an Islamic will is honored as closely as the court
can achieve. This can involve calling Islamic legal scholars to the court when wills are disputed in
order to determine exactly what the distribution of assets should be. Interestingly enough,
131 As an example, see Gandz’s discussion of inheritance law in the development of algebra by Al-
Khuwarizmi, “The Algebra of Inheritance: A Rehabilitation of Al-Khuwarizmi” (1938).
132 The waqf, which functions like a trust and can sometimes be manipulated to create a trust to control
the distribution of a significant portion of heritable assets.
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when courts do this, they may actually end up following Islamic law more closely than many
Muslims who handle the issue on their own do.
As we have seen in many other arenas, American cultural norms exert a strong pull over
American Muslims both for social and practical reasons. Inheritance is among them. My
research shows, however, that the traditional model of Islamic inheritance, which views the
estate as something that can be liquidated and then perfectly disposed of among the heirs, is
actually never fully realized. There are a number of reasons why this is the case. The major
obstacle is the position of the wife of the deceased. American law and society are imagined in
such a way that the married couple is assumed to be co-owners of the property in the case of
the death of one of the spouses.133
As described above, this is not the case under Islamic law, which presumes that either
the wife will be maintained by her children out of their own estates upon the husband’s death
or, in the absence of children, she will return to her natal household. This, however, is simply
not how American society operates, so a Muslim wife in most cases into the estate for the
duration of her life. Upon her death, the estates assets are divided accordingly.
Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately), my research did not reveal many deaths in the
communities I studied. In part this was no doubt due to the private nature of loss, but it was
also a result of the high proportion of immigrants and the relative short-duration most of the
families I interviewed had lived in the United States.134 There simply have not been enough
133 This is true in both forms of property ownership states for the purpose of divorce, be it a community or
equitable property jurisdiction.
134 While I gathered narratives regarding the older, 19th century community of Muslims in Boston, I either
never encountered any or they had assimilated into the immigrant community so completely as to be
unidentifiable. Even if I had, I would expect their inheritance patterns to have been like other Americans
due to their lack of knowledge of the technicalities of Islamic law.
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generations of law-observing Muslims in Boston to build a strong image of how inheritance
functions other than second-hand stories from Imams.
The data I was able to collect from Imams showed that while in practice a Muslim’s
estate was likely to be handled very similarly to any other American, the decedent’s family
normally asks the Imam for a proper Islamic accounting. I was interested in how the Imams
handled this, especially with the proliferation of assets whose values are highly speculative, but
not so much that they violate Islamic prohibitions of interest. The concern over interest, for
example, does not usually prohibit one from investing in the stock market since one actually
owns the stock one buys, nor does it prohibit investments in other speculative property like real
estate whose value is highly uncertain and may be worth less if liquidated under the pressure of
immediacy.
Universally, Imams answered that they avoided these concerns as they are not
financially skilled individuals. Instead, they simply asked parishioners to provide them with the
sum total value of the decedent’s estate and did a division from there. Each Imam emphasized
that they got no closer to the actual division than that, citing the privacy of the family. None
explicitly said they were concerned about the inevitable rivalries, jealousies and greed that often
accompanies the question of estate division, but usually hinted that they also wanted to avoid
being used as a tool in that particular fray.
Whether this division ever worked out in practice was uncertain, though it seemed
clearly implied that it did not. After interviewing congregants, Imams and even Muslim lawyers,
all indicated that this was a particularly confused and difficult area of the law where practice
and theory divulged, but there seemed insufficient information to determine by exactly how
much. One lawyer simply called it a “mess.” I would like to know how similar this pattern is to
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inheritance in Muslim-majority countries (which, for wealthy families, likely poses similar
problems with the globalization of finance), but virtually all the scholarly work on the subject in
the contemporary world covers legal codes and not legal practice, as a result it remains an open
question in both circumstances what happens with property when a person dies.135
Likewise, many informants, especially female informants, expressed displeasure over
the division of an estate into shares since a woman receives half of what her male relative does.
This especially rankled one informant who was pious herself, but her brothers were not. She
worried that when her parents died they would take advantage of religious rules that they did
not themselves observe while she, who did not drink, wore the hijab and avoided the
temptations of a non-Islamic society, would suffer. These statements and practical realities,
described by family members who experienced a loss, indicate that the Imams’ division of an
estate is rarely observed. This was confirmed by informants from personal experience when a
spouse survived the other, where inheritance functioned as it does in any non-Islamic American
household. The lawyer whom I interviewed on this subjected lamented this state of affairs,
opining that Imams would do better to contact estate attorneys and work with these individuals
or financial advisers to bequeath an estate more Islamically, but he indicated this was a rarity.
The American malleability of the will helps realize the goals of Islamic law in the death of
a Muslim in more ways than simply allowing him to distribute his assets in a Sharia-compliant
way. Islam also has very strict requirements for the handling of a decedent’s body, much like in
Judaism (Lamm 2000 1-72). Many of these requirements are similar, such as a fast burial with a
135 An exception dealing with medieval inheritance practices is a brief discussion by Powers in Law, Society
and Culture in the Maghreb, 1300-1500 (2002).
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particular preparation and winding the body. Islam has some further requirements that Judaism
lacks, such as the requirement to be buried in direct contact with the earth.
A will is ideal for these requirements since American law cognizes the document not
simply as a way of dealing with property, but with any request a decedent has as to their own
personal state. Consequently, the blank wills provided by various Islamic legal organizations
often contain elaborate descriptions of what the individual desires to have happen to her corpse
in the event of death, all of which become legally binding upon her executor.136 Some of these
documents spend the majority of their space discussing the details of how their bodies should
be handled and buried, though burial can be difficult as the number of Islamic cemeteries in the
United States is not very high. In Massachusetts there are only a handful: the Gardens at
Gesthemane, the Mount Auburn Cemetery and Forest Hills Cemetery. An additional cemetery
dedicated to Muslim burials was planned for construction in Dudley, Massachusetts, but due to
various conflicts the project was cancelled.
The lack of available burial space is an area that forces further compromise between the
ideals and realities of Islamic law and life in the United States. This is particularly true in terms of
health code regulations, which is often a complaint of communities chosen to host Islamic
cemeteries. The burial requirements in Islam are quite simple: the body must be washed,
prayers said over it, buried facing Mecca wrapped in a seamless, white shroud but otherwise
naked. The body must also be buried as quickly after death as possible. The deceased should
also be buried without a coffin.137
136 See as an example: https://www.missionislam.com/knowledge/will.pdf. Accessed May 23, 2019.
137 For an example of these requirements, see Al-Misri’s Reliance of the Traveller, pp 220-40.
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Many of these requirements parallel those of Jews and so do not readily present
problems for burial in American cemeteries. The exception to this is the Islamic prohibition of a
coffin. This prohibition creates a series of problems for Muslims attempting to gain approval for
burial and in Massachusetts was the reason for the failure of at least one cemetery that was
planned for Walpole (Seltz 2015).138 Most often in Massachusetts, the concerns raised regarding
the lack of a coffin centered on threats posed to the water supply.
There are a variety of solutions to the prohibition of using a coffin. Some Islamic
cemeteries compromise by using only a liner filled with earth. In a traditional American burial,
the body is placed within a casket, which in turn is placed within a concrete liner buried in the
earth. In these situations, the body is shrouded and the liner filled with earth. The body is then
placed directly within the liner, but in contact with the earth, thus technically satisfying the
requirement of a container-less burial as far as possible.139 Sometimes, the Walpole example
demonstrates, such a compromise is not possible and Muslims are forced to be buried like the
local, majority population.
One of the requirements of a Muslim burial that are more easily satisfied is washing the
body before burial. One of the most common specialized features of Islamic Centers in the
Boston area are rooms to perform the ghusl or washing. Every dead body must be ritually
washed before burial, a ceremony regulated by law and normally performed by close kin or
friends of the deceased. This is an alternative to embalming. Imams and other officials play
important roles as ritual specialists for washing the corpse because it is infrequently performed
138 The group that attempted to put the cemetery into Dudley was not the same as the group working for
the cemetery in Walpole.
139 See as an example in Connecticut, “Muslims Reconcile Burial Rites, State Rules” in the Hartford
Courant, Feb 18, 2008.
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and thus expertise is not widely spread within the community. Corpses are washed regardless of
the cemetery in which they are buried.
Slaughter
Islamic law carries certain very particular requirements for slaughtering meat. While
these requirements are not complicated, they are very explicit: meat must be slaughtered with a
single, clean slice across the throat in a way that causes the animal a minimum amount of pain
and the slaughterer must dedicate the slaughter to God (Qur’an 5:3-5). While the final
requirement raises the possibility that only a faithful Muslim may kill an animal in a permissible
way, a verse from the Qur’an allows a Muslim to eat any meat permissible to a believer of a
Book, meaning one of the Abrahamic religions (Qur’an 5:5). This functionally means Muslims can
eat most Kosher meat, since the Jewish requirements for slaughter are similar to the Islamic, but
it opens strong ambiguity surrounding the meat killed by Christians since Christianity, which has
no divine law on this matter, places no requirements on the slaughterer of meat and allows,
unlike Islam and Judaism, the believer to eat without dietary restriction.140 How a Muslim can
reconcile this argument, and what meat he can eat in a majority Christian country, therefore,
becomes an immediate problem.
Halal slaughter is a religious ritual and thus has both a mental and a physical
component. The mental element is intention, which is the usual mental component to all Islamic
actions. While all Islamic acts require conscious intent to be considered legally valid, slaughter is
140 This is a problem raised largely in industrial societies where slaughter is not observed. I remember
when in Mauritania, I paid a Bedouin the price of a goat so he could slaughter it while I was in his tent.
When we had selected the animal from the flock (and I carried it around my neck, with the legs dangling
over my chest according to the sunnah, or tradition, of Christ, a joke which my host unsurprisingly did not
seem to get), my host happily handed the knife to me to perform the slaughter. I abjured, saying I was not
familiar with the proper process, and so he slaughtered the animal and skinned it himself while I felt my
competencies in masculine jobs somewhat sink in his estimation.
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an act where intent should be publicly manifested. Traditionally, this takes the shape of saying
“In the name of God” or “bismillah al-raḥmān wa al-raḥīm.”
The second part is a physical act that must be performed in a particular way. This is the
act of slaughter itself. In order for the slaughter of a domestic animal to be valid to make its
meat legal in Islam, one must take a sharply honed knife, lay it across the throat of an animal
and draw it so that the windpipe, jugular veins and carotid arteries are severed, but the spinal
cord is not. As mentioned above, the reason for this particular method is the humanity of the
slaughter. 141
As the description of the ritual of slaughter demonstrates, this act is intensely religious,
which means it is governed by the Sharia. It is also a subject ripe for contention because of the
specificity with which it is described in the law and because of ubiquity of meat-eating.
Consequently, the question of halal food is often one of the most significant and important ones
in the life of an American Muslim.
Islamic slaughter did not always raise such questions in the US. In years past when
Muslims were fewer, and therefore halal food less available, Muslims took the same justification
of avoiding hardship that allows them to use a credit card to allow them to eat non-halal food.
With the increase of the Muslim population in the United States, halal food has become
much more widely available. As a result, some of the permissiveness of the previous attitude
has disappeared, a point made to me explicitly by my informants. Now halal food is available at
many supermarkets, even in places where there is not a large Muslim population, and when
supplemented with Kosher options is more than enough to meet the needs of much of the
Islamic population.
141 As an example, see Al-Misri 1994 364-7.
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Despite the abundance of Halal meat, it is not ubiquitous. This means that the rules
concerning whether slaughter done by a Christian makes meat halal is still important since many
restaurants and other facilities do not offer halal meat on a regular basis. Given the historical
dominance of Christianity in the US, and my Muslim informants assumed this to still be the case,
one might presume the slaughterer of meat is a Christian. If this is the case, it raises the
question of whether the meat slaughtered by anyone in the US is halal. While some informants
presented this as a possibility, it is generally rejected. In practice, while Christians seem to have
the potential to produce halal meat, they do not automatically do so when they slaughter.
However, if they utter the words and follow the ritual, the meat becomes halal. Consequently,
in order to produce halal meat, an individual need only say the words and perform the actions
regardless of their belief but must perform the ritual.
Of course, the situation is a great deal more complicated than the simple utterance of a
word in practice. The ritual of slaughter, called dhabīḥah in Arabic, was based on pre-industrial
forms of slaughter where all animals were slaughtered by hand. The industrial revolution
changed the slaughtering of animals just as much as it changed everything else. Given the
volume of meat produced in today’s abattoirs, it would be impossible to go around slitting the
throats of every animal. Instead, a series of devices are used to enhance the speed of the
process, some of which are clearly unacceptable to an Islamic slaughter, others of which are
more questionable.
Certain methods of slaughter used in slaughterhouses are clearly prohibited, such as the
use of a killing hammer, suffocation, or bolt-gun to slaughter the animal. Other means are more
questionable and are potentially permissible. There are, for example mechanized, devices which
will cut the throats of many animals at once. While this might seem a simple analogy to the
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original slaughter, it does raise questions about whether one needs to recite as many Bismillahs
as there are animals being killed or only one when the switch is turned. Most scholars seem to
agree on only one.
There is the also issue of stunning. Many slaughterhouses in Europe and the United
States slaughter in at least two stages: before they kill the animal, they stun it, usually either
through an electric shock or by using a bolt gun to shoot the animal in the head and knock it
unconscious. This is a controversial procedure from the standpoint of Islamic slaughter. While its
ostensible purpose is humane, many Islamic scholars believe the extra step involves more
suffering for the animal than the ritual slaughter and that the Islamic method, since approved
through prophecy, is the most humane. Consequently, many scholars prohibit the practice of
stunning. Other scholars view the stunning as acceptable so long as it immediately knocks the
animal unconscious and does not interfere with the Islamic slaughter itself. It is, in their opinion,
an extra step. This is by far the minority position.
Because of this ambiguity, there is a debate within the American Islamic community
regarding slaughtering. Like debates over other issues, such as dating and the mahr, Muslims in
my research tended to be divided between liberal and strict lines perspectives regarding halal
meat, though most fell towards the middle, believing that as long as meat was labelled halal and
they didn’t have a reason to think the producer was lying, then that meat would be acceptable
for consumption.
The most liberal line of thinking on the Sharia of the slaughter says that any meat killed
by a Christian is halal because the Qur’an allows people to eat the meat of the “People of the
Book.” They argue since Christians have no requirements, then there are no requirements they
must follow as long as the slaughterer is a Christian. This position, being the most liberal, is
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followed only by a small minority of Muslims now that halal meat is widely available in Boston.
Informants mentioned it was a more common position twenty or more years ago when Halal
meat was almost if not actually impossible to find.
People in opposition to this position, which are the majority of my sample, often raise
the issue of pork as a challenge to its legitimacy. That is, since pork is permissive to Christians
the line of reasoning holding a Christian’s slaughter halal for Muslims would imply that pork, as
long as the pig is killed by a Christian, would be permissible to a Muslim. People in support of
the liberal position refute this, arguing that the pig is explicitly forbidden to Muslims as food and
an explicit ruling of the Qur’an is more binding than a general ruling such as allowing a Muslim
to eat any meat slaughtered by a Christian.142 Consequently, one can simultaneously believe
that meat slaughtered by a Christian is permissible while still holding that pigs are excluded. A
more popular position believes that the rule would imply that the consumption of pork is
permissible is a point strongly against its validity.
The more extreme position delves into the deep technicalities of slaughter. For this
group, the rule that the Peoples of the Book’s meat is permissible to eat merely means that the
slaughterer must be a person of the book, however the slaughter itself must take place
according to the strict rules of Islamic slaughter (dhabīḥat ḥalāl). While this group usually
accepts kosher slaughtering techniques as legitimate, it is highly suspicious of meat slaughtered
by Christians.
The requirement of cutting the animal’s throat is also debated. While no one debates
that the throat must be cut for a valid halal slaughter, the central question is how to cut, a
question which hinges on why the throat must be cut. Cutting the throat causes an animal to die
142 See “al-ʿĀmm wa-l-khāṣṣ,” Encyclopedia of Islam, 3rd Edition.
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in two ways, either through blood loss as the result of slicing the carotid artery or through loss
of air in slicing the windpipe. Most scholars seem to agree that the prior is the intent since it is
the fastest death and the intent of cutting the throat is to minimize suffering. As a result, there
is a difference about slaughterhouse methods, especially regarding automated tools that might
cut the windpipe, but miss the carotid artery.143 While in theory these methods meet the
technical standard of cutting the throat, they may not fulfill the purpose of a painless death. This
discrepancy shows the tension between the formalism of Islamic law and its intent: one must
not merely fulfill the empty ritual act, but one must also fulfill the purpose of the law.
Automated methods also present problems since in theory an individual is required to
do the killing by hand in order for the slaughter to be valid. In this case, there is a question
whether throwing a lever counts as an act of manual slaughter or whether the movement must
be more directly connected to the knife.
There is a final, but not insignificant debate about whether stunning the animal causes
needless suffering. If it does, it renders the meat haram, the opposite of halal. If it does not,
then it is likely still permissible. Consequently, for the stricter consumers of halal meat, another
question to be discussed is not merely whether the meat killed by a Christian slaughterer is
permissible, but also how the animal itself was slaughtered.
Individuals in the middle position, which makes up most congregants, leave the debate
over permissibility to the experts and rely on either labeling or trusted grocers (who are often
small convenience store owners or specialty butchers who tend to be Muslim themselves) to
provide them with acceptable meat. They rely on this labeling method in good conscience
143 Lest the reader be concerned that all of their meat has been killed in such a dramatic and slow way,
part of the reason for stunning the animal before the final process of slaughter is so, in the event that the
windpipe is the only thing cut, the animal will be unconscious as it dies and thus will not suffer in the
process of its death.
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because they cannot reasonably be expected to do all the same level of intellectual work as the
other scholars. Because of the layperson’s lack of expertise, such reliance is permissible.
This reliance on labeling can present a problem, however, for there is a concern that
these businesses (especially the abattoirs that are not run by Muslims) may be insufficiently
aware of what the requirements for halal slaughter are. As a result, there is a possibility that, for
example, a slaughterhouse may label meat as halal simply if the animal were killed using a
mechanical device to cut its throat rather than being killed with a bolt-gun, but without the
other requirements, such as a clean cut or the utterance of the name of God over the animal.
The method alone would only go part of the way to meeting the requirements for halal
slaughter. Because of these concerns, halal labeling is a major concern of many organizations
and we will see how they respond to this need in a later chapter.
While it is not obvious, America’s Muslim community uses the debate about slaughter
tacitly to understand how to relate both to mainstream American society and to itself. Like the
issue of fasting, the concern with meat consumption can, if taken to an extreme, isolate Muslims
from their fellows, causing them to change dietary habits, refuse gifts of food or avoid eating at
certain restaurants.
In my research, however, I found very few Muslims who took this requirement to that
extreme. Unlike dating where very strict lines are held concerning modesty standards, halal
meat consumption is an area where most Muslims will try to do their best to be scrupulous, but
usually allow for a high level of uncertainty. This itself is acceptable according to most schools of
Islamic legal thought which hold that so long as one has made a reasonable effort to perform
one’s religious duty, then the obligation has been discharged. Ultimately hardship is to be
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avoided when possible and meat seems to be a point where many people compromise, likely for
the sake of both convenience and pleasure.
That being said, certain groups are very strict about holding the line. These tend to
include the few American Muslims and their organizations who are associated with Salafism and
the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence. These individuals and groups, such as the American
Muslim Jurists’ Association, take the most technically scrutinizing and restrictive stance toward
halal meat, suggesting vegetarianism over the consumption of something haram.144 Most
Muslims prefer to take the position of avoiding hardship and encouraging integration, though as
more halal meat becomes available and its certification is more certain, mainstream American
Muslims seem to be growing more careful in their observation of halal meat rules.
Custom
At various points in our discussion we have had recourse to the idea of custom. We
introduced the idea that the customary practice of a location might conflict with Islamic law and
present a tension, as with American courtship norms. Alternatively, in some areas Islamic law
presents a lacuna where custom is required to fill out the details of religious practice, mahr has
been presented as an example of this function of custom. From these examples we can see that
custom is clearly an important element of Islamic life in the United States but its importance
rests in ambivalence towards custom as a concept. Among American Muslims, custom is at once
a thing to be exalted and something to be avoided, simultaneously and variously a point of
corruption and vindication. Which valence it assumes greatly depends upon who is speaking and
what subject they are speaking about.
144 See the fatwa database at https://www.amjaonline.org/research/the-halal-and-haram-in-food-and-
medicine-2012/
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Almost every American Muslim I encountered in this project identified the US as a place
new to Islam,145 one that requires special adaptation and consideration in order to fit Islamic
norms and laws into a new framework. This challenge was identified not just by African-
Americans, converts and American-born Muslims, but also by foreign-born immigrants, all of
whom placed a primary value on the reinterpretation of Islamic law to fit into their new social
context.
To understand this on a theoretical level, we should consider a division discussed above:
that between customary (ᶜurf) and other norms under Islamic law. This is a somewhat difficult
dichotomy to draw because, as we have seen, in practice it is sometimes strict and sometimes
not. Roughly the chief difference is between those norms that are established by the habitual
practice of human society (custom) and those that are established by divine decree (Islamic law
proper).
As we have seen, custom plays a key role in defining elements of Islamic law that its
primary sources do not, such as what the mahr payment should be, how courtship should be
conducted, etc. While custom in this sense might be seen as completing the social
implementation of Islamic law (and this is why in debates over how to fit Islamic law into a
particular society the role of custom is so important), it also creates a set of norms that have the
potential to conflict with Islamic law, as we saw in the debate over courtship where American
courtship customs threaten to overwhelm Islamic notions of modesty even (and especially)
when Islamic law bends to adapt itself to those customs. Consequently, while custom in some
cases is seen as a compliment to Islamic law, in others it is viewed as a threat to it.
145 The exceptions were those very few individuals with ties to the pre-World War II Islamic community in
Boston.
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While some Islamic legal scholars, such as those affiliated with the group American
Muslim Jurists of America, 146 see the threat custom poses to aspects of Islamic law enhanced by
the foreign nature of American culture, most immigrant scholars and worshippers I interviewed
on the subject saw things very differently.147 Instead of seeing American society as a threat to
Islamic law, they actually imagined this new terrain as a promise.
America as a Land Without Custom
To understand why the United State should be seen as a brave new world for Islamic
law, I should emphasize that these individuals tended to focus on the aspect of customs in their
own homelands that threatened Islamic law rather than supported it. Many individuals had
critiques about a variety of practices common in their native countries that they considered
unIslamic such as worshipping at saint shrines, laxity in moral virtues, local superstitions or some
other element of practice that was common but fell short of my informants’ view of true Islam.
As a result, rather than seeing the US as presenting a set of problematic customs that
must be adapted to fit into an Islamic structure (as many African-Americans did), many of the
immigrant Muslims in my research saw the absence of Islamic cultural traditions as an
opportunity. They interpreted what they perceived as the new, open space America provided as
a chance to rid their own practices of non-Islamic, local accretions and distill, through their
discussions about what Islamic law means in a new land, a purer and better form of Sharia.
Ironically, this is the same project as the radical Salafists, but through the exact opposite
approach: while radical Salafists interpret the absence of Islamic norms in a dominant European
146 See for example the collection of articles on their website: https://www.amjaonline.org/articles/,
accessed May 16, 2019.
147 While there is always the chance they were telling me what they thought I would like to hear, the
literature referenced, outreach activities in their centers as well as sermon topics, among others,
indicated this to be a sincere expression of belief.
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culture, especially its ideas of secularism, as a threat to the integrity of Islam and the Sharia,
America’s immigrant Muslims see this absence as an opportunity for its renewal. Consequently,
rather than fighting against this new cultural context as many Salafists do, they embrace it.
Where Salafists see the death of Islamic law without a mediating cultural tradition to protect
(ironically as their project is premised upon the corruption of that same cultural tradition),
American Muslims see its life.
One of the key drivers in each of these opposite movements is identical: increasing rates
of trans-nationalism in the global Ummah and returning Islam to a (re)new(ed), perfect state.
Radical Salafists have attempted to locate this transnationalism in new places and new social
formations (e.g. ISIS and the Taliban in Afghanistan). In these cases, their project has been
embodied through often violent purgation of what they viewed as non-Islamic elements of the
past in whatever location they choose for their utopian experiment. These attempts have
involved not just the creation of new polities, but also relocating a cosmopolitan mixture of
foreigners into the newly imagined space to generate a fresh and (in theory, at least) culturally
empty population whose individuals can then be socially and religiously integrated into a new
polity with a new identity, living as “pure” Muslims influenced only by the original community
and free from the cultural practices endemic to the locations from which they came.
In the United States, many of my immigrant informants had a similar view of the process
of creating an Islamic community in the United States despite the fact that they emphatically
distanced themselves both from the radical/reactionary nature of jihadi Salafists and the label
Salafism itself. In fact, survey data shows that virtually no element of the American population
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of Muslims claims that term for themselves (Bagby I 2011, 4). In my experience, even when they
do, they eschew its violent connotations.148
In fact, American Muslims tend to view the very cosmopolitan nature of American
society in the opposite valence as the violent Salafists. Where the Salafists see cosmopolitanism
as a threat to Islam, the Muslims in my sample, and by indications American Muslims more
broadly, see American cosmopolitanism as the factor enabling the creation of their new Islamic
society. They consider the Disestablishmentarianism and diversity of the United States as a way
to avoid the violent trap of the Radical Salafists’ Islamic renewal while simultaneously achieving
its ends.
The idea of America as a brave new world for the Sharia is not without its uses, but as
we shall see below, its implementation is not as perfect as its proponents might wish. While the
American model of Islamic renewal certainly is proving more stable than its violently radical
Salafist counterparts, the inertia of customary practice is strong enough to survive emigration
and not likely to abate fully for many generations if ever. Even when it does, there is evidence to
suggest that it will be replaced by new American customs that will likely be as problematic (if
different) than the ones the immigrants hope to rescue themselves from.
Nevertheless, this desire to see the New World as a blank slate to support religious
revival is part of a long-standing tradition of American religion. It is striking that American
Muslims are continuing the trend. Perhaps the most famous of American religious utopians are
the Puritans who left England with the goal of establishing a “City on the Hill” that would be
governed by and for the religious elect (Fisher 1989, 18-24). Mormons, similarly, moved ever
148 In this regard it should be said again that Salafism does not, ipso facto, mean persons who ascribed to
that label believes in violence. There are non-violent Salafists, which is why I will in this work distinguish
Salafists, who are non-violent, from radical Salafists, who either embrace violence themselves or support
the violence of others. For a broader discussion, see (Wagemakers 2012, 2-10).
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westward in an attempt to find their own Zion, believing that if they were able to build a
community in the desert, removed from the rest of the country, they would construct a religious
utopia (Stegner 1981, 1-16). Even Jews have sought refuge in the New World to perfect their
religion. As extremely orthodox Jewish denominations formed in the nineteenth century, they
fled pogroms and assimilation to come to the United States in the hopes of forming
communities to maintain their religious identity (Gartner 2001, 191-212). In fact, as these Jewish
populations settled in the US, they themselves viewed the new land, with its lack of coherent
Jewish identity, as a way to overcome older divisions and establish a new, communal form of
their religion; a point which will be important in the next few paragraphs and one that parallels
the hopes of many Muslims in their new religious life (Hartman & Hartman 1999, 279-282).
Many of the Muslims I spoke to expressed ideas that reflected the hopes of these
previous groups: the New World is an empty place in terms of Islam. Its emptiness means the
old rules no longer apply. Migration, therefore, becomes a chance for purity, reidentification
and a return to roots. Added is the promise of equal treatment and opportunity, which, even if
sometimes broken, is still more viable than in the often authoritarian or otherwise oppressively
bureaucratic states from which these immigrants come. In a sense, whatever problems these
immigrants may face from their fellows Americans (which is likely more than they expressed to
me in interviews and less than is often assumed), when compared to their fellow Muslims
abroad, the freedom and novelty of the American context allows them to meet one another
anew without the burdens of past localities, governments or previous assumptions.
Of course, this ideal works better in theory than in practice, for as mentioned above,
there are many ways in which these individuals in fact maintain strong ties to their previous
homes. Because of these ties, my informants do not start life in America off as a blank slate.
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While the immigrant generation imports customs and traditions which it hands down to its
children, these traditions are combined, altered and reinterpreted based on the local context in
which these later generations are raised, making change inevitable. Consequently, if the
reformation does not quite occur in the way the immigrants themselves envision, it is certainly
true that some kind of transformation will occur and that transformation will be significant.
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Chapter Five:
Intersection between American and Islamic Law
So far in this dissertation we have focused on how individuals react to Islamic law, how
they use it to shape their lives and what institutions are important in navigating their
relationship with the law. In the context of the United States, individuals and their interactions
only form a part of the legal universe. In a modern, bureaucratic state, law as administered by
the government plays a major part in any relationship, particularly when these relationships
take the guise of law, as Sharia does.
There is consequently a deep relationship between Sharia and American law. While the
two do not always intersect, the American ideal of disestablishmentarianism, actually enhances
the role of Islamic law among American Muslims. As such, no study that attempts a complete
survey of Islamic law in the US could be accomplished without considering the relationship the
processes of both religious and civic law. We have already seen many instances where
American law works to promote Islamic law. In the case of Islamic associations, American laws
regarding contracts, ownership of property, family law and other cases of the personal law of
family, contracts and others were mobilized to create and build Islamic communities. Imams, for
example, used the power the state provides them with to perform marriages that circumscribe
polygamy in the community. When surveying how individuals used the law themselves, we saw
how people have recourse to the law to form their own lives. For example, wills to ensure their
estate and bodies are handled in an Islamically approved way. Each of these is an example of
how Islamic law interacts with and uses American law to create an Islamic society.
Enabling this relationship is not just the disestablishmentarianism that exists in the
United States, but also the kind of legal imagination and political philosophy that exists in the
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country as well. In fact, American legal theory has long been built upon the idea of maximizing
individual discretion and relations as conducted privately. We have seen examples of this
repeatedly in the kinds of private ordering actions described above. The practical result of
empowering individual action and decision-making has been that the American legal system,
ironically, becomes an even bigger player in some of these private arrangements that might be
the case in other places, such as the UK, where the state’s monopoly on marriage officiation
causes many Islamic marriages to be conducted outside of its purview so that marital
relationships are governed by laws outside the UK state’s supervision.
Because of the American legal system’s flexibility, it becomes a major player in shaping
aspects of the private laws used by its citizens. Even if individuals never actually bring a case to
court, the possibility that an issue might become adjudicated (willingly or otherwise) colors the
choices and decisions people make when considering how to live a life informed by Islamic law.
Contracts, wills, marriage agreements, divorce settlements and all manner of documents are
created in a hybrid zone that partakes of both US civic law as well as Islamic religious law,
making the American civic legal system a major player in the system of Sharia as it exists in the
United States. The existence of a private, non-state law system operating in interaction with the
state system in order to achieve the enforcement of the former by the later is technically
referred to as “private ordering.”149
Private ordering shows how individuals, on their own, by utilizing certain legal
instruments or provisions of statutes are able to enlist the law to provide enforcement for
agreements which are made between individuals and otherwise do not involve the state until
149 For more on private ordering, see Schwarcz “Private Ordering” (2002). For a discussion of private
ordering and a specific aspect of American law, see Bix, “Private Ordering and Family Law” (2010).
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one of the parties decides to invoke state intervention. This is essentially what happens when a
couple divorces and cannot create a self-enforcing agreement, when a will is drafted but a
dispute regarding the estate emerges or when the relationship between an Imam and an Islamic
center or two Muslim businesspeople breaks down beyond salvation.
We will cover three major aspects of private ordering as it relates to Sharia in the
American legal system in this chapter. While they are not the only examples we could discuss,
they are issues we have encountered in the chapters above and bring to the surface certain key
elements of the interaction of the two legal codes. We will use the lens of Islamic law to focus
our analysis. These three aspects include inheritance, family law (specifically divorce) and
arbitration, both between persons and between businesses. The reason for the dominance of
private ordering in each of these factors is different but rooted in the typically American idea
that individuals are better disposed to order certain elements of their affairs than the state.
Inheritance law has historically been subject to private arrangements in the Anglo-
American legal tradition. While certain elements of inheritance have at times been controlled by
the state or the king as a result of Feudal pressures, such as the fee tail, or real property subject
to feudal obligations, when ownership of property (especially real property) entailed serious
political consideration, these elements of inheritance law have faded over time to the point of
non-existence. In their place, American law has developed a privately ordered inheritance
system that gives decedents the ability to dispose of their property in whatever way they desire.
Moreover, if the individual fails to create a document governing the disposal of the estate, in
most cases it will devolve to the heirs who allocate its distribution among themselves without
state involvement. Only in the case of both intestacy and the lack of any surviving relatives does
the state become involved in disposing the property of the deceased. In practice, this means
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only when the estate transfers to state control does the state have any interest or control in the
property.
The removal of the state from the center of estate control created a combination of de
facto and de jure private ordering where privately ordered succession dominates in realms
where the law still calls for the state to play a role in the distribution of assets. While the state
recognizes the right of the individual to dispose of the estate according to personal desire by
recognizing the legal validity of a will without question, it requires such an instrument to exist to
enforce the distribution. In the absence of such a document, formed according to laws
recognized by the state, the state will enforce its will through an intestate distribution of assets
according to a scheme set by its own legislation. Thus, in cases of intestate demise the American
state does not recognize universal succession, i.e., the practice of an individual heir coming into
full possession of the estate and thus automatic control to use or distribute it at will. Instead
the state preserves for itself a formal role in the distribution of assets of any person. This control
means that, in theory, whenever an individual dies without a will, the state has an interest in
realizing a particular division of the assets according to its laws.
In practice, however, despite wide-ranging intestate deaths,150 division of assets by the
state virtually never occurs. Instead, a de facto process of a kind of universal succession is
practiced where an intestate’s heirs divide up the decedent’s property among themselves
without ever notifying or seeking the interference of the state and without the state desiring to
be involved. Only when there is a dispute over the inheritance and the issue is raised to the
courts will the state direct the division of the assets according to the regime established by the
150 A Gallup Poll estimated in 2016 that fewer than half of all Americans have a will
(https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx, accessed October 15, 2019).
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Common Law or its statutes. In cases of dispute, where there is a valid will, the state will of
course enforce the will. As the number of disputed inheritance situations is extremely low, this
means that in practice virtually all successions in the United States, Muslim or otherwise, occur
via private ordering. This private ordering allows, as we shall see, Muslims to affect the rules of
Sharia within their families without concern for interference by authorities motivating by non-
Islamic rules and concerns.
Family law is another area where private ordering dominates the legal landscape with
consequences for Islamic law in the United States. This is especially true for divorce settlements
where settlement by the court almost never happens. Instead, couples determine the
distribution of their own assets between themselves and have the agreement certified by a
family court that recognizes the private settlement. The only exception is cases of child custody
where the court may take into account the arrangements of the couple but must decide custody
based solely on the best interests of the child regardless of the agreements reached between
the parents (Bix 2013 148-50).
The desire for the court to allow couples to settle their own divorce stems from a
variety of moral and practical concerns. Divorce settlements are often emotionally fraught, time
consuming affairs where recriminations, jealousies and passions govern outcomes as much as
the law does. The court’s intervention in these debates is seen not only as an intrusion by the
state into the private lives of the parties, but also as highly inefficient since each divorce case
requires careful consideration and mediation while there are only so many judges on any given
family court. As a result, only when the couple and their lawyers are absolutely unable to agree
to an equitable dissolution of the marriage and a distribution of assets does the court become
involved in the negotiations.
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This makes a divorce settlement function like a contract between the parties, which is
enforceable only by application to the court upon violation of the agreement by one of the
parties to it. Likewise, virtually any stipulation the couple desires may be placed in the
settlement, making it a flexible document that can guide the parties through their lives as
separate individuals. Unlike contracts, however, the divorce settlement is restricted in its
application. Namely, one cannot draft a divorce settlement before the divorce, which is how
many courts view often both prenuptial agreements as well as Islamic marriage contracts.
The lack of enforcement of prenuptial agreements and Islamic (as well as Jewish)
marriage contracts is an example where the state strays from its interest in private ordering,
moving towards a policy that it views as incentivizing marriage by preventing contracts that
provide a consideration in case of divorce, but this exception is rapidly closing. Indeed, American
courts in all jurisdictions have come a long way from viewing prenuptial agreements as ipso
facto invalid. Now all jurisdictions accept them so long as they conform to certain expectations.
These considerations set the stage for the considering the enforceability (or lack thereof) of
Islamic marital agreements.
Arbitration has become an increasingly prominent form of private ordering in the United
States. It became a possibility when the Federal Arbitration Act passed in 1925. While the Act
initially was envisioned as covering only corporations and business interests, its provisions have
been read broadly to apply to all persons, legal or natural. This creates what is perhaps the beau
idéal of private ordering, for it allows parties to agree via contract to take their disputes not to a
court of law, but to a private arbitration authority.
While this Act has achieved some infamy in recent years for its use by credit card
companies, cell phone service providers, banks and employers, it is also highly effective in
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allowing members of specific social communities to ensure that their disputes will be handled
within those communities and according to their norms rather than having their dispute
resolution outsourced to a court of law where their specific moral and ethical beliefs may not be
respected.
While this ability to protect potentially idiosyncratic interest would seem most obviously
to benefit minorities like Muslims who might use these contracts to refer disputes to a Sharia
arbitration committee, majority groups like Christians also benefit as they can refer disputes to
an arbitration committee guided by Christian standards. Because the arbitration is recognized by
the free agreement of each party, any violation of the arbitration can be sanctioned by a court
of law and the arbitration decision enforced in American courts.
While it may seem on the surface that the use of the American legal system to enforce
an arbitration decision made by a religious body would be a violation of the First Amendment,
this concern is forestalled by the so-called Neutral Principles Doctrine. This doctrine states that
an American court may enforce and arbitrate issues involving religious considerations so long as
the court is not required to determine issues of religious doctrine. What this means in practice is
that if the court can decide the issue as a matter of law, then the court can hear the dispute no
matter how deeply religious concerns may be involved. Consequently, if a decedent writes in
her will “I wish my property to be allocated in a manner according to Islamic law,” the court may
do so even if that involves determining which School of Islamic law to use (which it can decide
based on neutral principles such as identifying the legal school preferred by the Imam of the
Islamic center the individual attended, the nationality of the person, etc.) and which principle
within the school to use. In order to effect this, it will usually call in an expert witness who then
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advises the court on the appropriate principles of law which the court will apply only in that
instance without forming precedent for future cases.
Likewise, in cases of arbitration, the court views the agreement to arbitrate before a
particular committee as part of the contract between the parties, which might be enforced like
any other element of the contract. The end result is that so long as the arbitration committee’s
decision does not violate public policy (such as violating one of the laws in force within the
jurisdiction or requiring something that shocks the conscience), that decision will receive
enforcement by the court as a neutral principle of the contract reached between the parties.
Arbitration’s place in American law under the Neutral Principles Doctrine is well
established, but it is not the only country to have adopted such laws. England, for example, has
recently followed in the United States’ footsteps with their own Arbitration Act in 1996, though
it reserves a stronger role for the judicial system than does the American act. Other nations like
India also respect arbitration decisions under their own laws, though in India’s case it also
recognizes a role for religious law within its court system (Goodman 2009 494-506).
While private ordering is in many of these domains so typical in the American life that it
is tempting to assume that all societies and legal use private ordering to resolve these issues,
this is not so. The use of private ordering to resolve these issues in the American legal system is
in fact a result of the particular development and evolution of the set of laws in the United
States.
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In the English context,151 inheritance law has also been removed from the control of the
individual. This was particularly true when the bulk of inheritance involved real property. From
the earliest period of English law, there was a close identity between real property and political
affiliations. Because one’s political position was determined by ownership of land, and
oppositely, whom a lord or king controlled was determined by who held land from his account,
accession to land upon the death of an individual was controlled in the form of entailment,
which conditioned who and how land could be both inherited as well as alienated. In fact,
control over testamentary law formed a major crux in the debate between church and state in
England since who inherited what when was often the major factor determining the
maintenance or destruction of political alliances. When wills began to be recognized, which took
some time, they only covered personal property and even so the legal validity of these
instruments was the subject of doubt.
Similarly, in cases of family, the state and church have been intimately involved
throughout the history of Anglo-American law. Divorce until relatively recently was a
cumbersome process overseen by the state in all its parts. Before the advent of the no-fault
divorce in the 1970’s and ‘80’s, any divorcing couple would have to appear before a family court
judge and show that their marital collapse fell into one of the recognizable categories for
divorce, that they suffered from a fault, and the judge would determine on whose shoulders the
fault lay and this determination would impact the distribution of the marital assets. Before that,
when divorce was hardly legal, divorces would have to be given by state legislatures (Bix 2003
124-26). Consequently, the state was intimately involved in matters of divorce and marital
151 For a general description of the legal history contained in the following description, see the second
volume of Pollock & Maitland’s The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I 1898, 252-381.
238
dissolution until very recently, constraining not just the results of a divorce, but the very
possibility of marital separation itself.
In the American arbitration system, we have the clearest case of how unusual the
separation of the state from the process of dispute resolution is when applied in a state-
dominated context. Arbitration is, after all, essentially the privatization of a judicial process that
when it is thrown into question, returns to the formal judicial system to enforce a private court’s
ruling. In a way, it asks the judiciary to play agent to a usurpation of the authority that, as a state
system, it should ordinarily possess. Despite this fact, states are increasingly eager to move
arbitration from public fora of the state to private arenas where decisions are rendered
according to what may be little more than the kadijustiz152 of a mediator appointed by one or
more of the parties involved in the dispute. That the state should farm out an essential part of
its authority seems strange on the face of it but can be explained by notions we will explore
below, notions which put into question the idea that it is the state’s goal to render legible,
institute hegemonic control, or otherwise monopolize the lives of its constituents.
The fact that American law carves out these areas of law, among others, as venues for
private ordering, and thus enables the informal enactment of Sharia law and its incorporation
into the formal American system, is not, as these examples demonstrate, inevitable. In fact,
many of these areas of law have become removed from state influence to enable private rather
than public ordering. This is an important point because it is precisely this removal of the state
from these areas that promotes and allows Islamic law to build a bridge between the religious
152 I use Weber’s term here for Kadi justice in the untranslated German because while it is an important
notion as a critique of certain forms of non-rational legal processes, it is not reflective, as Weber assumed
it was, of the actual process of Islamic law which is both highly rationalized as well as highly structured.
Consequently, I use the term in German rather than English to distinguish the Weberian ideal from the
Islamic real.
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exercise and beliefs of Muslims and the legal system of the American state. By the state’s official
recognition of this private ordering, it incorporates Sharia law as an adjunct, if not an actual
part, of its legal system and thereby affects how Muslims perceive and use certain aspects of
Sharia since they must articulate Islamic law in legal instruments that are cognizable and useable
by the American court system. While the previous chapters explored how individuals use Sharia
to interact with each other, here we examine how individuals use Sharia to interact with
American courts and thereby the state.
Probate
The Islamic rules for inheritance are very strict and while outwardly simplistic, their
details can be fiendishly complicated. In their requirements, they leave no room for formal
individual discretion and render invalid almost any individual attempts to direct one’s estate
premortem. Although there are some workarounds, a decedent’s estate must be divided into
shares and distributed among the individual’s heirs no matter its financial scope or complexity.
There is neither universal nor partial succession. Not even the wife may accede to anything
other than her portion. Similarly, everyone up to a certain genealogical distance receives a part
of the estate, though the shares are subdivided based on gender and remoteness from the
deceased. Thus, sons receive a full share, while daughters receive half a share. Shares are
inherited outwardly in diminished amounts according to a complicated set of calculations.153
Because this form of inheritance is purely numerical, it requires the estate’s property to
be broken down into its monetary value and distributed accordingly, which in theory requires a
complete liquidation of the estate. Obviously, a liquidation of this sort is extremely undesirable
in many cases, both in the past and in the present. Consequently, scholars have devised legal
153 See as an example Al-Misri’s Reliance of the Traveler 1994, 460-505.
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tricks to circumvent the ideal inheritance scheme where certain items of property may be
preserved and directed to a particular heir or set of heirs. Such schemes include waqfs, or a
form of property-holding that resembles a trust in the Common Law traditions.154 Despite these
machinations, the ideal is a numerical distribution of the estate.
Because of this structure, wills that distribute assets based on a person’s individual
preferences are generally strictly forbidden in Islam. Wills as a desire to accomplish a deed or to
fulfill desires of the deceased are allowed, but they have no legal value and serve simply as a
conveyance of the deceased’s wishes.
Likewise, procedures for handling the corpse and performing the funeral are
predetermined by Islamic law. The body must be washed and controlled in a way that is
prescribed by prophetic tradition and buried according to specific standards that describe even
how to place the corpse into the grave. Death, in the Islamic model, is described down to the
most minute detail.
Probate issues are managed very differently in American law. While these issues are in
theory controlled by the state and so differ in technical detail among the states and territories
of the United States, in practice there is little difference between the jurisdictions. Wills have
long been viewed as a particularly important document within American law. They are
considered the last wishes of the deceased. Anglo-American law has long held the last actions of
a dying person to be of particular import. This belief is seen not just in the vehemence with
which the law respects a will, but in other aspects of the law. The last words of a dying person,
for example, have special power when used as a confession or accusation of another in
154 For an example of this operating in contemporary Israel and Palestine, see Layish’s “The Family Waqf
and the Shar‘i Law of Succession in Modern Times” (1997).
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committing a crime and are admissible to court where hearsay evidence otherwise would not
be. The will is therefore respected completely; currently there are no restrictions that can be
placed on an individual’s disposition of their estate or body in a will. Any person may be
disinherited. Any property given to whomever and any wishes will be respected so long as the
will itself is proven to be a valid instrument of the decedent’s desires.
Likewise, the decedent has full control over the corpse under American law. Should the
deceased desire cremation, cremation will happen. Embalmment, open casket viewing, or even
being pressed into a diamond are all legally acceptable forms of handling the dead body. There
is no default way for the body to be handled under American law other than restrictions for
public health concerns. In intestate cases, disposal depends on the policies of the government to
handle the corpse.
From the above, we see that Islamic law and American law are almost perfectly opposed
to one another to the legal control each system exerts when disposing of a decedent’s person
and assets. While the American model is one of private ordering, where the decedent becomes
the sovereign of his own estate, under Islam God is the arbiter of distribution, ensuring that
what He considers a fair and equitable distribution of wealth is transferred from generation to
generation. Likewise, since we are all from God and to him we return, the body remains under
the authority of the Sharia even in death, and so God’s commands dictate the handling of the
body after life ended just as He commanded its activities while it was alive. Thus, under Sharia
the estate and the deceased’s body are not theirs to control.
The permissiveness of American law opens the way for the control of Islamic law,
however. By giving the decedent total control over his estate and body, a Muslim can enact the
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controlling requirements of Islamic probate through the open-ended instrument of the
American will.
Because of this fact, despite their minor role in the Islamicate world, wills are an integral
part of the practice of Islamic law in the United States. Almost every major Islamic institution
present in the country offers blank wills that allows the testator to enter her information into
them and guarantee that she will receive a proper Islamic burial and that her assets will be
distributed in a manner fully compatible with Islamic law.155
These wills typically have two parts. One deals with burial arrangements and the
handling of the body. The second controls the estate. Unfortunately, while the first is relatively
straightforward, the second can be complicated. This is especially so since it is unlikely that the
decedent will have the same assets when she makes her will as she does when she dies. Because
of the Islamic requirement to liquidate the estate, this makes writing the will superficially easy,
but makes it extremely difficult for the executor who must enact the will.
This difficulty is compounded by certain social realities within the American familial
landscape. Namely, it is both habit and law among Americans to practice universal succession by
the surviving spouse after the death of the other. This is such a common practice, that spouses
rarely bother even filing the wills of their marital partners with probate courts. It is simply
assumed both by the courts and the heirs that the spouse will come into the full enjoyment of
the marital estate. In part, this assures the maintenance of a spouse who may not have equal
levels of wealth as the decedent, such as when a husband who has been the primary
breadwinner predeceases his wife. Moreover, most of the highly valuable property in American
155 These forms are readily available and so to avoid the possibility of out of date references, the curious
reader is encouraged to enter “Islamic will” into a Google search.
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marriages are titled or deeded property like cars and real estate. These items are likely held
jointly by the spouses, so that the one will accede to full ownership in the default of the other’s
ability to claim the property.
This practice complicates traditional patterns of Islamic inheritance so that while wills
are often drafted providing for the ideal inheritance scheme of shares, in practice Islamic
inheritance works largely in the way it does for non-Muslim Americans where the surviving
spouse enters into the full estate of the other in a manner resembling universal succession. It is
only, therefore, with the death of both spouses that traditional Islamic concerns for the division
of the estate come into effect if at all.
Muslims in my research group when asked justified violating the Islamic legal ideal on
two grounds. The first is the technical nature of the ownership of joint property. Under
conditions that obtained at the time of the Prophet and for most of Islamic history, the Muslim
husband, like his contemporary Christian husband, had sole control if not ownership over all
property in the household. As a result, at his decedence, his estate, including the real property,
was dissolved completely, while at her decedence, the estate was left largely unchanged with
the exception of some personal property whose distribution could be devised by will or not.
Similarly, at the time of the Prophet and throughout most of Islamic history, large
extended families served as coherent agents of action so that while it was not uncommon for
widows to be left bereft of maintenance, it was not commonplace either. Many widows, likely
most, had either natal families or families of offspring who would maintain them. In fact, the
maintenance of this extended family by male heirs was the major theoretical reason why they
inherited double when compared to their sisters.
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In the United States, this form of property distribution and kinship responsibility is
largely non-existent. Widows are as responsible for their own maintenance as widowers. As a
result, it is not simply inefficient, but unjust to disinherit a widow upon the death of her
husband and universal succession serves as the primary way in which a woman who may not
have the same financial wealth as her husband can maintain herself as she would have while her
husband lived.
Because of the facts of the American system, Muslims in the US find it virtually
impossible to follow Islamic inheritance norms. Fortunately, Imams and Islamic legal scholars
have recognized this problem and usually sanction such succession under the guise of equity in
Islamic law, using the concept of maṣlaḥah or istiḥsān, principles which take advantage of the
fact that in the United States, unlike in Islamicate states, the joint-titling of marital provides a
cognizable argument that what is taking place is something other than pure inheritance.
Interestingly, American probate courts might be a better alternative than private
ordering for obtaining an Islamic division of assets for when a will is contested, these bodies are
required to “interpret” or “construct” the will left behind. While these terms have technical
differences in their meaning, they essentially mean that the court must do its best to obey the
last wishes of the testator and if that testator’s will indicates a desire for an Islamic division of
assets, then the courts must determine what, exactly, that is. Two Imams as well as two other
legal and academic experts on Islamic law whom I interviewed as part of this project mentioned
having been called, sometimes multiple times, to serve as expert witnesses in probate court to
help settle Islamic estate issues. The courts, after hearing this testimony, would then take on the
division of the estate itself, ensuring that the respective parties receive the Islamic share which
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they are owed. Ultimately, however, it seemed that few Muslims opted to have a court enforce
a will, which aligns them with the majority of Americans.
Family Law
The most prominent area for the intersection of Islamic law in American courts is family
law. As previously mentioned, In Islam, marriage has a fundamentally contractual aspect, which
it shares with Jewish law, but which is absent from American law. This contract is a formal legal
device between two legal parties which is observed and written down, governed by the terms
inherent in the marriage document (Haeri 2014, 23-33). The basic requirements of the contract
are given in the Qur’an and Hadith: there must be two witnesses; an agreement from the
groom, the bride’s guardian and the bride herself; as well as a sum paid in contemplation of
dissolution of the marriage (from an anthropological perspective a kind of advanced alimony
called mahr) which can be deferred, but whose amount should be considered and written down
in the contract itself. If any of the conditions are absent, the marriage is legally invalid and
subject to a faskh or annulment.
Because marriage is a contract under Islamic law, there are no special ceremonies or
individuals required to effect it. Two parties may marry each other by themselves so long as the
necessary requirements are observed (including the presence of two witnesses) without
ceremony and without an officiant. This is in strong contrast to the American understanding of
marriage, where marriage is sometimes treated as a contract, but this is highly controversial.156
Because marriage is viewed historically as a status relationship rather than a contractual one,
marriage under American law is defined by a ceremony that must be performed by an officiant
in order to be valid. In the United States, it is relatively easy to be recognized to perform a
156 See the discussion in Witte’s From Sacrament to Contract (2012).
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marriage. In fact, in some states, such as Massachusetts, recognition is basically a pro forma
issue that can be granted to anyone.157
As a result of the ease with which recognition is granted to officiants and despite the
differences in the understanding of what a marriage is and how it is formed, the Islamic and
American legal processes are highly compatible; the only requirement is that American law
mandates an additional step over the ordinary Islamic process, namely that an Imam or other
recognized officiant be present in order to effect the change in legal status between the parties.
While the synchronicity between Islamic law and American law in forming a marriage is
relatively seamless, its dissolution is quite different and most of the legal conflicts between the
two systems arise here.
The most striking legal aspect of an Islamic marriage is the contract that forms it. Since
the provisions of an Islamic marriage contract are virtually unlimited and it contains the mahr
provision which is activates in case of divorce or other marital dissolution, it seems natural to
treat the document as a kind of prenuptial agreement, which would fit the contract neatly into
the elements of American marriage law that explicitly recognize contractual relationships.
There are two problems with this perspective, however. The first is that many of the
provisions that can be written to control aspects of the spouses’ behavior during the marriage,
such as limitations on moving, requirements to support parents, etc., present problems for
reading the Islamic marriage contract as a prenuptial agreement. A breach of these technically
indicates the end of a marriage, but since a marriage is only considered a contract under
American law (if at all) as a legal fiction, no court would recognize the violation of one of the
157 See the Massachusetts “One-Day Marriage Designation”: https://www.mass.gov/one-day-marriage-
designation (accessed October 23, 2019).
247
Islamic contract’s provisions as an ipso facto act of divorce, though that might be a possible
interpretation under Islamic law.158 The presence of these terms confuses the purpose of a pre-
nuptial agreement and argues against enforcement. The second, is the difficulty of having any
prenuptial agreement recognized in American courts.
American courts refused to recognize the validity of any prenuptial agreements until
recently.159 As noted previously, the primary reason for refusing their recognition was the
concern that such agreements would incentivize couples to divorce since they contemplated the
end of a marriage before it had even begun. Since the protection and preservation of marriage is
still viewed as a goal of public policy by most American courts, prenuptial agreements, despite
their statutory support in many states, are still notoriously difficult to enforce. As a result, any
term in the prenuptial agreement that contemplates payments for divorce render such an
agreement null and void. Unfortunately for the Islamic marriage, the mahr payment, which
functions as a payment made to the bride in the event of the end of the marriage, including by
divorce, and was originally intended to provide her support, is viewed as a payment for divorce,
making enforcement of the Islamic marriage contract impossible in most states (Blenkhorn
2002; Oman 2011, 310-319).
Complicating the issue in many, though not all, jurisdictions is the religious nature of the
document. While we have seen that American courts are capable of enforcing a contract based
on the Neutral Principles doctrine, this doctrine does not extend to allowing the courts to
interfere in what it views as quintessentially religious questions. This certainly includes
158 However, as one Imam recognized, if the married partners continue the marital relations in the face of
such violations, then the terms may simply be nullified and thereby removed from the contract, which
would also be an interpretation amenable under American contract law.
159 For a general overview on the history and law of prenuptial agreements see Bix 2013, 135-50.
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questions of dogma, but also pertains to issues that may peripherally benefit the religion. As a
result, some courts may be reluctant to treat Islamic marriage contracts as valid simply because
they are viewed primarily as religious rather than secular documents (Oman 2011, 324-327).
What is more complicated in terms of the religious element of marriage is the Islamic
structure for divorce. Traditionally under English law, the church had turned over the right to
recognize and solemnize marriages to the state. In fact, in the medieval period and earlier, many
marriages only tangentially involved the Catholic Church. Over time as Feudalism made the act
of marriage politically important, the Church became more interested in the question, but
because it had originally ceded so much power to the state, the question of establishing
marriage from a religious standpoint remained very much a civil affair (Pollock & Maitland 1898,
362-93). The continued existence of two ways to form a marriage, a marriage under common
law (or the rule of the king) and a civil marriage (or one recognized by the church) is a survival of
this historical fact. Divorce, being unknown to the Catholic church, was always an affair of the
king and the non-religious elements of the state (Pollock & Maitland 1898, 412-15).
Islamic law was never created in contemplation of this arrangement of the state160 and
to this day some Islamicate states leave both the creation of marriage and its dissolution to
systems of religious law that are in theory removed from state control.161 As a result, the act of
divorce in non-Muslim countries creates certain difficulties. Primary among these is that a
religious divorce given through the most conventional method, the ṭalāq, which is a simple
divorce and can be given by a simple verbal command, is not the same as a civic divorce. While
160 Though the state certainly inserted itself, including into family law, as an example see Tucker In the
House of the Law (1998).
161 For examples of these legal systems in action see Hirsch’s Pronouncing and Preserving and Agrama’s
Questioning Secularism (2012).
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the civic divorce is sufficient to end the civic marriage, which is often important in terms of
property rights and other benefits connected to the state, it is unimportant in terms of the
individual’s community and their ability to remarry, a fact which can have devastating social
consequences.
The disjunction between civic and religious divorce is made possible by the fact that
under Islamic law a talaq is the unilateral right of the husband. While there are two other forms
of divorce/annulment that are available to a woman, such as the faskh, annulment of a
defective marriage, and the khulaᶜ, a divorce initiated by a woman requiring her to repay the
mahr, these require extra steps that the ṭalāq does not. As a result, while a woman may initiate
civic divorce proceedings and obtain a divorce from the American state, she will remain married
religiously until the husband declares the marriage over or she obtains one of the two options
available to her, which require either the intervention of an Imam in the case of the faskh or
payment in the case of the khulaᶜ.
In the case where the husband initiates a civic divorce but fails to grant a ṭalāq, the
result is referred to as a “limping marriage” or a “chained woman.”162 This situation presents a
serious problem since the husband is free to marry again while the woman is not. The reason for
this inequitable situation is polygamy: since in Islam a man is allowed to take up to four wives,
while a woman can have only a single husband, the woman may not marry multiple husbands
herself, while the husband can. Consequently, if a woman cannot find an Imam to declare
divorce for her under religious grounds (such as abandonment) or repay her mahr, then she
remains potentially unable to marry another husband. As a result, husbands may out of spite or
162 The term “chained woman” derives from the Hebrew word agunah, which describes an identical
phenomenon that occurs as a result of discrepancy between Jewish and American civic law. For more
information on the Jewish phenomenon of the agunah, see Breitowitz’s “The Plight of the Agunah: A
Study in Halacha, Contract and the First Amendment” (1992).
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for reasons of coercion (particularly when child custody is in question), hold out granting a
religious divorce as a means for extorting his former spouse, leading to an inequitable situation.
Courts in Michigan where the number of Muslims is very high have long experience
dealing with this situation. In fact, certain family courts had created a situation designed
specifically to address it: these courts would order the husband to pay two different levels of
alimony, one extremely high and the other extremely low. The high alimony would be applied to
the husband until the religious divorce would be granted, then alimony would revert to the
lower, more reasonable level. Unfortunately, a Michigan appeals court ruled that this procedure
violated the First Amendment of the US Constitution and constituted an undue interference of
the state into religious matters and so courts have found their hands once again tied when
facing limping marriages (AlKhatib 2013, 102-04).
Despite the trouble Michigan Family Courts encountered attempting to enforce religious
divorces through civic institutions, divorce settlements made between individual Muslims
regularly include religious aspects. This is because the vast majority of divorces that occur in the
United States between peoples of all faiths involve substantial amounts of private ordering, that
is to say that most couples settle the dissolution of the marriage without the intervention of the
judicial apparatus, which only certifies the agreement once it has been concluded. Once these
documents have been sealed by the court, they become matters of public record and viewable
by the general public, which formed the basis of my research into divorces between Muslims in
Suffolk County, Massachusetts.
These agreements take the form of a contract where the parties dispose of property,
make arrangements for the future, determine payments of money among other things. While
only one out of the 24 divorce settlements I examined included any explicit Islamic
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requirements, in all the divorce agreements save two that included the marriage contract163 the
settlements explicitly contained sums of money to be paid separate from alimony or other
property division that were equal in amount to the mahr declared in the original marriage
contract, indicating that the parties specifically negotiated their settlement to contain this
amount.
The primary exception to this rule of private ordering comes with the custody of
children. Every state in the union has ordained that the custody of children shall be guided by
the child’s best interests. Islamic law does not use the best interests of the child as a guide for
custody. Instead it uses the child’s age, determining that before certain ages a child should be in
the custody of its mother and after those ages it should go into the custody of its father. In no
cases did I find any evidence of Muslims preferring the Islamic rules of child custody to those
determinations made by American courts.
Polygamy
One area where private ordering and the law would seem to run into each other is
polygamy. While rare and generally condemned, as discussed above, polygamy is practiced by a
small but significant segment of the American Muslim population (especially by African-
American Muslims). Despite this practice, polygamy is illegal in every state of the United States.
This would seem to be an area where private legal orders challenge the rules of the dominant
legal order and by doing so runs afoul of its conventions. Historically this is true, but even here,
we see that the state’s interest in public ordering is so strong that it compromises the public
163 In most of the foreign marriages I encountered in the records the official marriage certificate from the
country of origin was the contract itself.
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interest of polygamy prohibition to allow individuals to work out their own marital
arrangements.
The issue of polygamy is one that touches not only Muslims, but other American groups
including most famously the Mormons. In fact, most of the legal ground that affects the ability
for Muslim families to engage in polygamy in the United States is established and controlled by
the law created to deal with Mormon polygamy, which arose as an issue in the late 19th
century.164
Mormonism emerged as a religion that challenged many pre-conceptions about
American life, including monogamy. One of the practices that characterized the early Mormon
community as set apart from the rest of American life was the practice of polygamy. In order to
have greater freedom to practice their religion and the lifeways it required, Mormons moved
out west to form a community in what is now known as Utah. Eventually, when Utah grew large
enough and American settlement began to encroach on its frontiers, the Mormon territory
desired to enter into the union. Unfortunately, this resurrected certain dormant conflicts
between Mormon habits and American norms, bringing the mainstream American objection to
polygamy back to the fore. The territory was given an ultimatum: in order to be accepted into
the Union, it would have to abandon the practice of polygamy. This it did, and a federal bill
called the Morrill Act passed in 1862 ended the practice of civilly recognized plural marriage, as
the practice was called, and the church coincided with abandoning the religious sanction it gave
to the tradition.
164 For an overview of these cases, see Gordon’s The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional
Conflict in Nineteenth Century America (2002).
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Given the religious sanction the practice had, its prohibition offended the principles of
many Mormons who clung to the practice as one hallowed by their prophet, Joseph Smith. As a
result, they sought to challenge the new law. The most logical attack on the anti-polygamy law
was to declare that it violated the Mormons’ First Amendment right to free exercise of their
religion. Ultimately, a party led by Reynolds sought to challenge the federal prohibition before
the Supreme Court. The Court, however, disagreed with the Mormons’ claims and held that, due
to the long-standing tradition of monogamy in Europe and monogamy’s foundational place in
American society (along with deprecation of the societies’ which practiced it), the prohibition
against polygamy was not truly a breach of the Mormons’ freedom to exercise their religion, but
was in fact the affirmation of basic American values.165
Reynolds settled the issue then and now, placing the legitimacy of anti-polygamy laws
beyond a First Amendment challenge. For most of the 20th century, this also meant that states
could vigorously prosecute violations of polygamy laws, but given that the issue rarely
surfaced,166 actual prosecution of polygamy remained rare outside of states with a substantial
Mormon population (Witte 2015, 407). The question of polygamy would shift, however, in the
latter part of the 20th and early 21st century. As social mores loosened or changed and new
immigrant populations arrived at American shores, polygamy began to increase in its practice.
As a result, governments had a chance to prosecute the actual practice of polygamy rather than
simply prohibiting it in theory or prosecuting cases of bigamy. Surprisingly, prosecutions for
polygamy have not increased. Far from it, with the exception of Utah, almost all states bans
165 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
166 Most cases were actually bigamous marriages, meaning not multiple spouses co-habitating, but a
single individual fraudulently entering into a new marriage while still married and undivorced from a
previous spouse.
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against polygamy remain passive: they prohibit the practice from being recognized under the
law, but fail to punish anyone who engages in the practice de facto.
The single exception, Utah, is exemplary of this new uncertain stasis in American anti-
polygamy legislation. Despite (or perhaps because) of its dominant Mormon culture, Utah has
assiduously prosecuted individuals who are suspected of engaging in polygamy, which is
considers not just de jure, meaning entering into multiple state-sanctioned marriages, but also
de facto, which is living together with multiple spouses in a single household. While no other
state would perform investigatory work to confirm instances of polygamy and then prosecute
those found guilty of the crime, Utah long did until 2016 and Brown v. Buhman.167
In 2016 the Brown family, famous for appearing on the TLC reality show “Sister Wives”
sued the state of Utah which had been investigating the family with the intent to charge them
for living in a polygamous marriage. The Browns claimed that such a prosecution claiming that
the state of Utah by engaging in its investigation was violating their civil rights (a so-called §
1983 Action). While for a variety of technical reasons too detailed to explain here, the court did
not make a final ruling on whether the Browns had a right to engage in polygamy, it did declare
tacitly that no the state of Utah could not prosecute an individual for the simple act of
cohabitating with another individual, that such a prosecution alone would violate those
individuals’ civil rights.
Despite its technical failure in the court, this settlement formalized in Utah the legal
reality that obtained in every other state: while the law makes polygamy illegal, the state, for
fear of violating other civil rights such as privacy, will not enforce such legislation so long as the
polygamous marriage remains an issue of private ordering. In other words, the laws against
167 Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016).
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polygamy on the state rolls simply recognized a technical legal impossibility of forming such a
marriage, not an attempt to legislate or to create a particular social reality. American marriage
law, in this sense, does not impose a social reality, but isolates particular social realities into
their peculiar social “fields,” to use the term popularized by Sally Faulk-Moore: monogamous
marriage can exist in the field of civic law, polygamous marriage can only exist in the field of
private law.
This is, of course, not a perfect solution from the perspective of the Browns or a Muslim
who feel compelled to recognize the legitimacy of polygamous marriages. After all, it does
create an inherent discrepancy between spouses and a potential source of injustice, for while
divorces are privately ordered, they are subject to state enforcement as contracts. Even if
polygamous couples who divorce were to draft a contract arbitrating their divorce, it is likely
that courts would refuse to enforce it based on the grounds that it violates public policy, i.e.
creates a de facto recognition of polygamy.
This discrepancy in recognition creates a possibility for private ordering where the state
becomes willfully blind to an act that it seeks to condemn, balancing on the one hand its own
preferences, expressed by the law against polygamy, against basic values and rights it seeks to
recognize and encourage on the other, which includes the right to privacy. Consequently,
polygamy for America’s Muslims remains a possibility, but a dubious one. They are forced, if
they wish to engage in it, to make a compromise with the ‘druthers of the system in order to
obtain something it grudgingly allows.
This tension helps explain why immigrant Muslims who have more to gain from the
American legal system eschew polygamy while African-American Muslims who feel they have
less to gain engage in the practice. For the immigrants, the nexus of Islamic law and private
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ordering is important: they wish to operate in a space where if their private arrangements
collapse, they can have recourse to the legal system for their enforcement, thus they use Islamic
legal instruments and rights in a way that maximizes their co-operation with the state. They, in
essence, turn the state into an apparatus that supports Islamic law by devising their property to
heirs using a will and engaging in marriages that the state will recognize and protect, both curing
their duration and dissolution. Conversely, African-Americans do not seek to be engaged by the
state and the law either because they ideologically oppose the state or because the state seems
to have little to offer them. As a result, there is no real tension for them in the ambivalent
relations the American state has towards polygamy. In this instance, they exist in a world
dominated by private ordering, and so all that matters in their marital patterns is the
permissiveness of the state, not its general refusal to recognize their second, third or fourth
wives.
Arbitration
Arbitration is a common way that states turn over traditional functions of law and order
to private parties who are empowered to use the courts to enforce agreements made between
themselves. Between merchants, the origins of arbitration between parties predates the rise of
powerful nation-states with the development of the lex mercatoria, which has formed the basis
of much of contemporary arbitration theory. With the rise of the modern world and the
complexity of international capital flows, arbitration between merchants became an increasingly
important and central phenomenon (Born 2009, 7-63).
The United States has been an enthusiastic proponent of arbitration, establishing its
current legal regime with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1926. The FAA was originally
understood to apply to corporations only. It enabled these organizations to take business
257
disputes to a mediator and have the decision enforced by courts if it became breached. The
theory behind the FAA was that it would increase judicial efficiency by having private parties
arrange disputes on their own, relieving court dockets, as well as improving the resolution of the
dispute since the parties themselves would resolve the issue largely on their own.
In the last few decades, Supreme Court rulings168 have expanded the FAA well beyond
the bounds of commercial litigation to encompass a wide range of disputes between
corporations and customers as well as individuals who have no economic relation to one
another, only interpersonal connections. This broad reading of the FAA (and other related state
statutes) has allowed such individuals to opt out of the state-run court system and redirect their
disputes to arenas both of their own choosing and of their own devising, arenas which use any
rules imaginable, so long as those rules themselves do not force a result in violation of American
law.
This reinterpretation of the FAA has allowed a wide array of private ordering. While it
has recently been more commonly known for the potential advantage it gives large corporations
who are sued by individual customers, from the perspective of America’s religious individuals
(not just Muslims), the FAA provides a kind of utopian promise: the expectation that moral
communities will be able to police their own interactions according to their peculiar moral
values.
The permissibility the FAA allows has led to the proliferation of a variety of arbitration
services. There are many Christian arbitration groups169 as well as arbitration groups led by non-
168 E.g. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S.Ct. 1407 (2019); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018);
Italian American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
169 For an example of Christian arbitration see Peacemaker Ministries, https://peacemaker.training
(Accessed 10/29/2019.
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religious individuals who simply promise a different kind of litigation than one would receive in a
court.170 Islamic groups have likewise leapt on the opportunities the FAA provides. There are
several Islamic arbitration committees, the most famous one being the Islamic Tribunal in
Texas.171
The tribunal in Texas is not the only such example in the United States. There are similar
arbitration boards run by the Sharia Board of New York (SBNY)172 and more ad hoc arbitration
conducted by the Islamic Society of North America, the latter of which often requires associated
Islamic centers to enter a clause into their by-laws holding that all intra-mosque disputes be
turned over to ISNA for arbitration. These tribunals all function differently according to their
own internal understandings of how Islamic arbitration works, but they have certain general
similarities.
In Islamic arbitration there is always hybrid civic and religious legal elements. While the
actual arbitration is conducted by religious figures at SBNY and the Texas tribunal, lawyers are
involved in the process as well to formalize documents. Arbitrations in general are typically
much less formal than judicial hearings, so while individuals may bring documents and present
evidence, parties sit around a table rather than before the judge and the goal is less fault-finding
and more conflict resolution. While Islamic tribunals may insist upon Islamic rules of evidence,
governed by the Sharia, the lack of police power may inhibit their ability to insist upon certain
points.
When these tribunals achieve a result, the decision is drafted as a legal document,
agreed to by the respective parties and signed under the supervision of a lawyer, which gives
170 These are frequently lawyers and law firms with expertise in arbitration.
171 See https://www.islamictribunal.org (Accessed 10/29/2019)
172 See https://www.sbny.org/page_arbitration-committee (Accessed 10/29/2019).
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the agreement the ability to be enforced in a court of law. If the parties to the agreement
execute it without dispute, this is the end of the matter. If, however, one party breaches the
agreement the breacher’s counterparty may sue in a court of law to enforce his side of the
contract.
Arbitration boards are not only responsible for resolving business disputes as described
above, however. They are also capable of doing disputes of any kind. In fact, according to one
informant from the SBNY, they perform more family arbitration than business arbitration.
Family arbitration is similar to family counseling. In many states, family arbitration
before the Islamic tribunal satisfies the counselling requirement that is mandatory before a
divorce is finalized. These arbitration boards are able to do many things beyond family
counseling. Due to their interface with American courts, they are also able to work out divorce
settlements, child custody arrangements and to fill in the gaps between a civil divorce and a
religious one. In practice, their conduct resembles the quasi-judicial family counseling described
above.
Anti-Sharia Movements
Private ordering using Islamic law raises concerns among many American nativists and
secular activists regarding the integrity of the legal process in the United States. Both parties
view Islamic law as a threat to the American understanding of secularism enshrined in the First
Amendment.173 A secondary argument, raised primarily by the nativists, rests on the argument
that the United States has a cultural foundation that rests in a Christian identity and that Islamic
law, even potentially Islam as a religion itself, is antithetical to that tradition. The American
173 From the nativists’ side see the ironically named Fortress of Faith’s argument “Islam Violates the First
Amendment,” https://fortressoffaith.com/islam-violates-the-first-amendment/ (Accessed 10/31/2019).
From the secular activist’s side see Harris’s arguments in Islam and the Future of Tolerance (2015).
260
political and legal order must, therefore, be protected from any Islamic influence.174 The history
and composition of the anti-Sharia movement is too long and involved to be the subject of
discussion here. What is more important for our purposes is to focus on its claims, how it
understands Islamic law to operate in the American legal environment as well as the actions it
has taken to advance its view of an American legal society.
The proponents of the anti-Sharia movement have a very specific view of Islam that
spans both the nativist and the secularist camps. They hold that Islam and Islamic law are
essentially identical, that Islam is a religion that understands itself to be entirely law-bound and
contained as well as jealously monopolistic. They assert that Islamic law functions essentially as
a kind of sovereign force, that because Islam is law and law is monopolistic as opposed to
pluralistic, advocates of any form of Islamic law in the US must necessarily desire that Islamic
law take over and defeat American law, turning the United States away from its roots as a
Christian or secular country and towards the embodiment of an Islamic state.
This understanding of Islamic law is not isolated solely within the Anti-Sharia
Movement. It is also held by fundamentalist Islamic thinkers like the Salafists who do view any
man-made legal code as usurping the divine right of God and His pure law. Like the Anti-Sharia
Movement, these individuals do not believe that legal pluralism is possible and adhere to a view
of legal monopolism where each state can be governed by only a single legal code.
The idea of legal monopolization is empirically false, as this dissertation and other
writings on the subject amply demonstrate. While legal monopolism seems intuitive to citizens
who live in a nation-state where the rule of law is the normative order, there are very few if any
legal orders where only one set of law operates. Even in the strongest nation-states, legal
174 See as an example McDowell’s The Threat of Islam to Liberty and Christianity (2015).
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pluralism, co-existence, and co-operation of multiple legal regimes, is the norm rather than the
exception.
Any European country with Catholic churches bears witness to this fact. In such
countries Canon Law and Civic Law co-exist. Likewise, the United States’ system of federalism
perfectly encapsulates the realities of legal pluralism within the nation state. Given the context,
circumstance, individuals and geographical location, any number of different legal orders may
govern a legal question in America. If the situation arises in Louisiana or Puerto Rico, one of
those legal orders may not even be the Common Law. In the US, instead of legal monopolism
that holds the federal law to be unique and all powerful, the legal codes of various sovereigns,
usually the state governments, must co-operate in enforcing the dominant legal order.
The Anti-Sharia Movement fails to recognize this fact and instead relies on an Austinian
notion of legal sovereignty where a plural order necessarily creates repugnant powers that must
compete for dominance, where those powers that do not win are ultimately vanquished. Under
this classical understanding of legal monopolism, the existence of multiple legal orders creates
struggles for power and instability. The concern of these secularists and nativists is that if that
power is not the civic legal system, then another system such as Islamic law will win.
That this theory is incorrect is amply demonstrated by the brief discussion of legal
pluralism above but is specifically refuted for Sharia by the example of the operation of Jewish
law within the United States. Jewish law, halakhah, is structurally identical to Islamic law. Jews,
however, have existed in the United States since well before the Founding of the Republic. In
fact, a well-known speech of George Washington while President took place in a Boston
synagogue. Just as Jews have long existed in the US, their law has as well. While its practice
within formal institutions of Jewish law, called a Beth Din, dates back only to the early part of
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the twentieth century, Jews have long held high positions in American society. There has been
no question (other than from fringe radical groups such as the Ku Klux Klan) of the
incompatibility of their law with the laws of the United States. This acceptance of Jewish law
exists despite the fact that the number of Jews living in the US remains substantially higher than
the number of Muslims doing so.
The Anti-Sharia Movement nonetheless continues to promote Islamic law as an
existential dilemma that threatens to erode the cultural and civic traditions of the United States.
This movement has so far experienced only limited success. While it has managed to pass its
model legislation proposed by the organization American Laws for American Courts in three
states, as we shall see below, it is likely to have little effect. As the name of this organization
implies, most of these bills do not mention Islamic law or Sharia specifically, but instead target
“foreign laws” as a way to address the issue without running afoul of the First Amendment,
which would likely make religiously targeted legislation unconstitutional as an abridgment of the
freedom to practice a given religion. Because of the common root of this legislation, this section
will deal with Anti-Sharia legislation as it appears in the Model Legislation.175
The Model Legislation is a short document, containing a preamble and six sections. The
Legislation attempts to circumscribe the use of any “foreign law, legal code or system” in judicial
proceedings as well as arbitrations. In point of fact, however, it fails to effect any significant
legal change to the law, for far from baring the application of any “foreign law, legal code or
system” in general, it prohibits them only insofar as courts base their,
175 For the text of this model legislation and the states in which it has been passed see the organization’s
website, http://americanlawsforamericancourts.com (Accessed 10/31/2019). A copy of it has also been
posted in the Appendix.
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rulings or decisions in the matter at issue in whole or in part on any law, legal
code or system that would not grant the parties affected by the ruling or
decision the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges granted under
the U.S. and [State] Constitutions, including but not limited to due process,
freedom of religion, speech, or press, and any right of privacy or marriage as
specifically defined by the constitution of this state.176
While this language seems to threaten the ability of a court or arbitral committee to
apply foreign law codes, in point of fact it does nothing that the Common Law and precedent
did not already command the courts to do, for a court cannot enforce a contract or have its
decisions result in anything that would “violate public policy.”
A violation of “public policy” is far more restrictive than the language that appears in
this legislation, for while the legislation only restricts courts and arbitral committees from using
any law that would result in an abridgment of constitutional rights, “public policy” prohibits the
issuance of a judicial decision that would result in the abridgment of any legal rights, regardless
of whether those rights appear in the Constitution or simply a municipal code. In other words,
courts have long been more tightly bound by their own precedential law than they are by the
Model Legislation.
The Legislation even poses a threat to itself. Section Six of the Legislation offers a
provision that holds no element of the Legislation can be read to abridge an individual’s right to
Freedom of Religion under the Constitution. This clause is unusual, for it is a matter of course
that no legislation enacted by any legislative body of the United States may counteract a
provision of the Constitution. One can only speculate why the authors included it. One
176 Article 2, http://americanlawsforamericancourts.com (Accessed 10/31/2019).
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presumes it was either to attempt to ensure the legislation was not overthrown on
constitutional grounds or to ensure that it would preserve the right of Christian arbitration
tribunals to function.
The latter possibility lays bare the fundamental world-view that the authors of this
legislation have regarding the differences between Christianity and Islam. Much of this animus
remains tacit, but it relies on a long history of the theory of law in Christian theology. Of the
three Abrahamic religions, only Christianity is defined by an extreme antinomianism. For the
other two, Islam and Judaism, their individual religious legal codes play a major role in forming
the relationship between the individual worshipper and God. As previously argued, In
Christianity, this is explicitly not true. Early in the religion, as early as Saint Paul, Christianity
rejected the law as a way of forming the relationship between the worshipper and the divine.
The law, according to Paul, is a dead letter, a thing that is at best a trap for the sincerely pious
person who will follow the law with the hope of redemption in her breast only to be betrayed at
the last moment when, at the threshold of Heaven, she realizes that God had sent Jesus, not the
law, to perfect and redeem the human person. The law, in this theological model, is an
imperfect first step intended to prepare the world for Jesus rather than to redeem it. The law, as
Paul puts it, is fine for murderers and rapists, but not for the true believer.177
This position on the law is radical from a Jewish perspective, which was Paul’s original
perspective, and this radicalism was intentional. Its intention was to shock his audience into a
rejection of the traditional Jewish norms of religious practice and bring both Jew and gentile
into a new Christian practice. In political terms, it meant that the theocratic state that had
existed in Israel presumably since Mosaic times was overthrown. No longer would the law of
177 As an example see 1 Timothy 1:9-11
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God also furnish the law of the polity, but instead the law of God was overturned by the person
of Christ, leaving room only for secular law.
Islam, on the other hand, maintained the position of the law as the main arbiter of the
relationship between the individual and God. While there are other modes of worship such as
Sufism, these modes of worship are esoteric and not available to the majority of the faithful.
Moreover, their praxis itself often depends upon the framework of the law to realize its full
manifestation. As a result, Islam, unlike Christianity, is far more explicit and far-reaching about
its legal elements. The prominence of the law in Islam leads many individuals in the anti-Sharia
movement of either a secular or religious persuasion to see Islam (and potentially Judaism) as
more of a threat to the rule of secular law than Christianity. This belief emerges as a result of
the assumption that since Islam recognizes the law as central to its praxis, it must hold that
Islamic law must dominate to the exclusion of other legal codes.
In addition to its status as the traditional religion of the United States, which
presumably insulates Christianity from threatening the Constitutional order in the minds of the
nativists,178 the fact that Christianity has rejected a law-mediated relationship with God gives
cover to the excuse that it is not a threat to a secular order, but Islam is. In fact, this structural
relationship is often the tacit driving force behind the argument that while a European Christian
tradition has developed secularism, Islam and Islamicate societies know nothing but an
intertwining of the state and religion, a dubious if not out-right fallacious claim.
Ultimately, the flaws in the Model Legislation are even more deep-seated than explored
above, for while it seeks to limit the action of arbitration actions, those actions themselves gain
their authority from the Federal Arbitration Act as described above, which is an act of the
178 The secularist among the anti-Sharia movement see any religion in public life as a threat
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federal government. So far, no anti-Sharia bill has been proposed before the federal legislature,
as a result, all of the bills have been passed at the state level including Alabama, Arkansas,
Arizona, Louisiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee and
Washington. Since the Supreme Court has generously interpreted the FAA, it is unlikely that
these bills passed by legislatures of inferior status to the federal body would be able to have any
serious impact curtailing that legislation’s effect in giving to Islamic arbitration bodies a wide-
scope of latitude in implementing Islamic law in private disputes so long as the resolution does
not violate public policy.
Likewise, in the case of enforcing Islamic wills, the state is not viewed as using a foreign
law, but enforcing an instrument created by an individual which happens to use foreign law as
the basis for its action. As a result, for the same reason that arbitration by Islamic committees
can be enforced based on the binding force of the contract rather than the force of the
committee itself, so too can wills be enforced based not on their origin in Islamic law, but in the
will of the decedent to have his final wishes implemented. In other words, in executing the will,





Islamic Law Builds the Lives of American Muslims
In the introduction we explored how Islamic law provides a way for Muslims both to
know God and to implement his will on the earth by guiding their conduct to build a just and
righteous society. Islamic law in this sense is not just a tool of oppression, political domination,
or even order formation, as it is assumed to be in most Christianate traditions. It is also not a
cold, unfeeling, and moralistic code that deprives an individual of the warmth of human and
divine relations. Instead, as in Judaism, the law builds relations. It constitutes a just society by
harmonizing individual desires and actions with the community as a whole and that community
with God.
When considering Islamic law in this vein, we must think of it not purely as a code,
though it contains a law code, nor should we think of it solely as a theological tradition that
argues about the nature of the good and the bad and how to form justice. Instead, Islamic law is
a contested site of negotiability. It is a place where individuals debate, organize, sanction,
reward, divide and unify themselves as an active cultural community, in not just the religious
sense of that word, but in its more general implications.
This ethnography has shown how a subset of communities within the larger American
Islamic context go about realizing the law in their lives and building their society, both with their
fellow Muslims and with their non-Islamic neighbors. Islamic law dictates certain boundaries for
the community. Its preference for endogamy means that the Islamic community remains
somewhat separate, a gap existing that, in theory, requires at a minimum conversion to bridge.
Likewise, dietary restrictions form networks for shops, restaurants and other service providers
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that create a structure within which the community both separates and defines itself, for it is
not merely a particular cultural cuisine that is implicated by dietary laws, but all foodways,
whether from an Islamicate country originally or not. Thus, even when the foodways Muslims
share with their non-Islamic fellows are not culturally separate, but homogenous, they remain
distinctly Islamic because of the requirements of slaughter and consumption. Even certain
aspects of judicial processes separate the community from their fellows. By drafting arbitration
agreements and using Sharia tribunals or referring their personal issues to an Imam for
counseling, American Muslims create dispute-resolution networks that, while nestled within the
broader American legal context, function apart from the broader legal structures of society.
They use Islamic rules and norms to create tailor-made and truly Sharia-bound judgments that
guide their particular community.
In engaging in these actions of separation, Islamic law allows the community not just to
fulfill its religious duties and to please God, but it also unifies the American Islamic community
as a whole, despite differences between Africa-American Muslims and Muslim immigrants, and
between generations of immigrants as well, as we have previously pointed out. Because of the
particular difficulties and problems that they all face America’s Muslims must unite to resolve
issues in common. Sometimes these are issues that place them directly at odds with traditional
American ways of doing things. Taking a mortgage to buy a house is an excellent example of
this, a problem that the Islamic community faces in the same way everywhere in the US and
must resolve in order to establish a successful and thriving community.
Other issues are more endemic to the Islamic community itself. These are issues that
present difficulties to American Muslims not because they are opposed to American traditions,
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but because they are simply non-existent in American society. They are needs that are usually
particular and often unique to Islam, needs that were met in their countries of origin but require
unique and new solutions in this new context. Sighting the moon for Ramadan was just such an
issue where, in their countries of origin, immigrants were able to rely on formal boards or
national deputies to declare the beginning of the festival. Now, in the new context of the US,
these individuals must form their own organizations in an attempt to unite the community to
answer these pressing questions.
As we have seen, answering these questions often creates division while it
simultaneously unites. While Muslims come together to debate a resolution to these issues,
they often decide on different solutions, which create separate sub-groupings based not only on
religious beliefs but also social and cultural affiliations. Nonetheless, these groups generally
recognize the problem and the existence of other groups who differ on the answer to the
problem from their own and are thus able to constitute themselves into organizations or groups
of organizations that represent the Islamic community at large while simultaneously
encompassing specific blocs of interest. FCNA and the Rahmat-e Alam societies are examples of
groups discussed above who are culturally and interest affiliated, while ISNA and the MSA is an
example of groups that serve to bridge these divisions and reach across to unite the community.
The fact that Islamic law plays such a key role in forming these unions and divisions
highlights the central role that Islamic law plays in Islam as a religion. As one of the bulwarks of
the religious sciences and as the main science that people who are not religious scholars interact
with, the law forms a practical way to realize religion and build a coherent community. It bridges
the deep moral and theoretical concerns of religion with a sharp and demanding cultural praxis
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that forms the contours that separate and form a unique and distinct community. Of course,
division is not the only role that Islamic law plays in American life. It also serves as a way to
merge America’s Muslims with the American non-Islamic population.
Islamic law also creates ways of harmonizing the religion with American cultural
practices even as it sets up conflicts. While many aspects of Islamic practice, guided by the law,
create potential conflicts between Sharia and American civic law, such as the practice of
polygamy, the rich hermeneutical tradition as well as the law’s operation in variegated contexts
has provided a wide range of jurisprudential tools that enable scholars to adapt the law to new
and unprecedented contexts. The flexibility that jurisprudence when properly used provides the
law an opportunity to maintain those elements that help distinguish and define the Islamic
community in the US while simultaneously allowing it to assimilate and cohere with American
society at large.
Polygamy is an excellent example where there is an obvious conflict between a religious
stipulation and American society. As discussed earlier, while some American Muslims (mostly
African-American) take this as a challenge to their faith and adopt polygamous marriage
regardless of the law, the majority use the nature of polygamy as a voluntary marital form to
argue about how to make Muslim marriages conform with American marital norms, adapting
and adjusting what is a quintessentially Islamic legal act, the marriage and its contract, to an
American framework.
Islamic law does not merely present ways of overcoming distinctions, but also helps the
religion positively adapt to American contexts. While the understanding and practice of
congregational worship differs between Christianity and Judaism on the one hand and Islam on
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the other, the fact that Muslims must worship on Fridays and form charitable foundations
presents a framework for fitting Islamic life into American civil society. The congregational
aspect of Islam, channeled both through the communal identity of the Ummah as well as the
need to come together on Fridays for communal prayer, forms political communities that mirror
other similar groups in their surroundings. The need to govern these bodies forced Muslims to
adopt American social structures, such as boards and executive officials, that mirror not just the
churches and synagogues of their fellow religious Americans, but also replicate the structure of
other non-profit and even some for-profit enterprises, providing a way for immigrants to
interface with American life and even civic governments.
Finally, Islamic law establishes a need for justice and the establishment of community
norms. Islamic law, as we discussed in the introduction, is not merely a set of commandments
from God to his people telling them how to worship him. It also covers social interactions with
the aim of establishing a just community. As a result, Islamic law contains provisions for
resolving inter-communal disputes. Some of these may pose a threat to the legal monadism that
exists in the Anglo-European political tradition. Unlike Islamicate political formations, including
most famously the Ottoman Millet system, sub-communities within Anglo-European states do
not get to determine their own legal rules or resolve their own disputes. Instead, this is often
viewed as a threat, as in the constant French fear over communautarisme.
Islamic law provides ways both of harmonizing and of overcoming these distinctions
when the system within which it operates has flexibility. Islamic law, for example, recognizes
certain basic aims or goals that are ultimately associated with justice such as due process and
fitting punishments to crimes. Thus, if these aims or goal are satisfied by non-Islamic legal forms
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and do not directly conflict with these Islamic norms, then the specific demands of Islamic law
may be set aside.
Islamic law also provides a framework for resolving communal tensions for non-criminal
issues. Muslims are thus capable of using civil society and its institutions to create organizations
that enable them to use Islamic law to provide Islamic solutions to their individual problems
through private ordering. This happens in the US via arbitration committees, which are given
authority as the result of wills, contractual clauses, or family mediation requirements. Islamic
law in these cases interacts with the larger legal system of American society to create Islamic
solutions to private problems that can then be supervised and enforced by American courts so
long as they do not violate public policy. The result is a relatively seamless integration between
the civic and non-religious legal system on one hand and the religious beliefs and needs of
individuals on the other.
Disestablishmentarianism Creates an Environment that Allows This Construction
As we discussed in the introduction, the American form of secularism is particularly
suited to allow Islamic law to operate within the community of American Muslims. While we did
not see many of the most striking forms of Sharia institutions in Boston, the official neutrality of
the state and its refusal to recognize or incorporate any religious institution creates an
environment where Muslims are capable of building the institutions that make private ordering
robust.
American law, based on the Neutral Principles doctrine, is capable of taking agreements
based in religious ideals and even made by religious institutions and enforcing them so long as
the court is not the one making religious determinations and the parties have agreed to be so
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bound in advance. This flexibility is most obvious in arbitration clauses attached to contracts
where parties are empowered to chose any forum they desire to resolve their disputes using
any rules (or even potentially none) and, so long as the result is not a violation of the law or
“public policy,” it is enforceable. The courts views itself as enforcing not the process or the rules
used to resolve the dispute, but the instrument of the contract itself, thus enabling American
courts to enforce privately ordered religious disputes while simultaneously avoiding an
“excessive entanglement with religion” that would violate the principles of the First Amendment
of the US Constitution.
Moreover, the traditional prominence of religious institutions in American civil society
means that religious Islamic organizations find an officially welcoming environment even if some
parts of the country do not seem to be so hospitable. The familiarity that political candidates
have with campaigning on church grounds, including Islamic Centers, was an instance where in
my research the informal aspects of political life were most visible. The willingness of schools
both to lend their campus in off-hours to religious functions (such as a Ramadan breakfast) and
to host field trips to Islamic Centers for students (many Islamic centers offered such services on
their websites) was indicative of a stance of accommodation between American educational
institutions and Islamic religious bodies.
The state also has a very different custodial relationship with public space in the US
where disestablishmentarianism dominates than in countries like France or Turkey where
models based in laïcité are the law of the land. Because the state generally takes either a fully
disengaged stance or is dedicated to curating terrain where no exclusion (sometimes to
religion’s detriment, such as when the anti-religious Satanic church or the Pastafarians become
275
involved) is allowed, Islam is permitted to take its place among religions (particularly Judaism
and Christianity) that have longer institutional and cultural lives in the U.S.A.,. This is most
obvious in religious traditions of long-standing participation with the state, especially legislative
prayer. While traditionally legislatures have begun their sessions with a Christian prayer, under
the requirements of neutrality but openness to exercise, Muslims and other religious groups
have been accommodated, ensuring at least in theory that such practices share prominence
alongside the religions with larger followings in the American public. Chaplains in both the
prison and the military are a further example where religion is present in state-sanctioned
activities in a fully ecumenical way.
Disestablishmentarianism likewise offsets some of the populist movements that seek to
eliminate the practice of Islamic religious law. We saw this most prominently in the model
legislation for American Laws for American Courts. While this legislation is more or less explicitly
designed to prohibit courts from basing rulings on Sharia (despite its ostensibly neutral religious
orientation), because of the strong protections for contract and religious exercise guaranteed by
both federal statutes and the Constitution, the text of the bill and the exemptions it requires
render the statute virtually useless as a law since its primary aim is to prevent American courts
from basing their decisions on foreign laws, a thing no American court does when enforcing
decisions that involve Islamic law since the Sharia component always comes through an
instrument recognized under American civic law. The ability of an instrument to carry over a
different legal system into an American court is seen generally by American jurists not as a
weakness of our system, but in fact as a strength and a protector of liberties. While the latitude
given to arbitration recently has come under attack in commercial contexts, there is virtually no
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movement to oppose its use to resolve inter-personal issues. In fact, it is often supported as a
socially healthy and more viable method than the adversarial process of the courts, especially
when it is posed under the guise of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” which is precisely the
argument used to support Sharia councils both in the US and abroad.
Civil Society
The new immigrants have proven readily adept at organizing themselves into civil
society and its institutions, just like the Muslim immigrants who came before them and, indeed,
virtually every immigrant group who has come to the United States. Some of these civil society
organizations have a distinctly US/Canadian audience and have been mentioned previously in
this conclusion. These include the Fiqh Council of North America, the Islamic Society of North
America or the Muslim Students Association. Others, despite having a name that focuses their
attention on the United States, like the American Muslim Jurists’ Association, have an
international focus that carries their scholarship well-beyond the borders of the US.
One of the most prominent of these organizations is the International Institute of
Islamic Thought. This organization is an example of how, even if the US is not virgin territory fit
for the perfection of the Sharia, it stills serves as a fertile cradle for its innovation and
development. The IIIT is an organization headquartered in Washington DC and pioneered by
immigrants to the US. It now has branches in many different countries, including in the
Islamicate world, and an active publishing arm that produces items on Islam in a variety of
languages.
The American Islamic intellectual landscape is not limited to international organizations
like AJMA and IIIT. Institutions like Zaytuna college are reformulating what an Islamic education
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and intellectual tradition means and looks like. While these groups are largely limited to
American populations, many of the proponents and leader, like Hamza Yusuf, have an
international audience. Their intellectual contributions, especially when mediated through
international bodies like IIIT, are generating influence far beyond the narrow scope of
matriculated students. Another source of influence for American modes of Islamic law and
thought not fully discussed above are American universities. Despite Edward Said’s attacks on
the academy as a fount of at best disrespectful and at worst racist tropes about the Islamic
world, American universities are increasingly staffed by scholars who study Islam who are
themselves Muslim. Perhaps the best and most influential example of this is the now deceased
scholar Shahab Ahmed whose book What Is Islam? was explicitly concerned with the nature of
Islamic law.
As these examples illustrate, while the idea of the US as a Brave New World for Islamic
law may be more ideal than real, the impact that the American experience has had on Sharia as
lived both within the borders of the country and abroad is immense. Far from being either a
cowed minority or a raging threat to the established order, Muslims, and Islamic law, has been
influenced by the circumstances of its experience in the new world in profound ways, ways that
have allowed Muslims to use the law both to shape new ways of being as well as to protect old
ways of life. If the United States has not provided Islam with a totally new field devoid of custom
and tradition to build a renewed law, it has at least provided rich soil for transplanted traditions
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B: Model Legislation from American
Laws for American Courts
AN ACT to protect rights and privileges granted
under the United States or [State]
Constitution.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE [GENERAL
ASSEMBLY/LEGIS- LATURE] OF THE STATE OF
[_____]:
The [general assembly/legislature] finds
that it shall be the public policy of this state to
protect its citizens from the application of
foreign laws when the application of a foreign
law will result in the violation of a right
guaranteed by the constitution of this state or
of the United States, including but not
limited to due process, freedom of religion,
speech, or press, and any right of privacy or
marriage as specifically defined by the
constitution of this state.
The [general assembly/state legislature]
fully recognizes the right to contract freely
under the laws of this state, and also
recognizes that this right may be reasonably
and rationally circumscribed pursuant to
the state’s interest to protect and
promote rights and privileges granted under
the United States or [State]
Constitution, in- cluding but not limited to
due process, freedom of religion, speech,
or press, and any right of privacy or marriage
as specifically defined by the constitution
of this state.
[1] As used in this act, “foreign law, legal code,
or system” means any law, legal code, or
system of a jurisdiction outside of any
state or territory of the United States,
including, but not limited to, international
organizations and tribunals, and applied by























































































bodies, or other formal or informal tribunals
For the purposes of this act, foreign law shall
not mean, nor shall it include, any laws of
the Native American tribes in this state.
[2] Any court, arbitration, tribunal, or
administrative agency ruling or decision
shall violate the public policy of this State
and be void and unenforceable if the court,
arbitration, tribunal, or administrative
agency bases its rulings or decisions in in the
matter at issue in whole or in part on any law,
legal code or system that would not grant
the parties affected by the ruling or
decision the same fundamental liberties, rights,
and privileges granted under the U.S. and
[State] Constitutions, including but
not limited to due process, freedom of religion,
speech, or press, and any right of privacy or
marriage as specifically defined by the
constitution of this state.
[3] A contract or contractual provision (if
capable of segregation) which provides
for the choice of a law, legal code or system to
govern some or all of the disputes between the
parties adjudicated by a court of law
or by an arbitration panel arising
from the contract mutually agreed upon shall
violate the public policy of this State and be
void and unenforceable if the law,
legal code or system chosen includes or
incorporates any substantive or procedural
law, as applied to the dispute at issue, that
would not grant the parties the same
fundamental liberties, rights, and
privileges granted under the U.S. and [State]
Constitutions, in- cluding but not limited to
due process, freedom of religion, speech,
or press, and any right of privacy or marriage
as specifically defined by the constitution
of this state.
[4] A. A contract or contractual provision (if








































































































for a jurisdiction for purposes of granting the
courts or arbitration panels in
personam jurisdic- tion over the parties to
adjudicate any disputes between parties
arising from the contract mutually agreed
upon shall violate the public policy of this State
and be void and unenforceable if the
jurisdiction chosen includes any law,
legal code or system, as applied to the
dispute at issue, that would not grant the
parties the same fundamental liberties, rights,
and privileges granted under the U.S. and
[State] Constitutions, including but
not limited to due process, freedom of religion,
speech, or press, and any right of privacy or
marriage as specifically defined by the
constitution of this state. B. If a resident of
this state, subject to personal jurisdiction in
this state, seeks to maintain litigation,
arbitration, agency or similarly binding
proceedings in this state and if the courts of this state find that granting a claim of forum non
conveniens or a related claim violates or would likely violate the fundamental liberties, rights,
and privileges granted under the U.S. and [State] Constitutions of the non-claimant in the
foreign forum with respect to the matter in dispute, then it is the public policy of this state that
the claim shall be denied.
[5] Without prejudice to any legal right, this act shall not apply to a corporation, partnership,
limited liability company, business association, or other legal entity that contracts to subject
itself to foreign law in a jurisdiction other than this state or the United States.
[6] This subsection shall not apply to a church, religious corporation, association, or society, with
respect to the individuals of a particular religion regarding matters that are purely ecclesiastical,
to include, but not be limited to, matters of calling a pastor, excluding members from a church,
electing church officers, matters concerning church bylaws, constitution, and doctrinal
regulations and the conduct of other routine church business, where 1) the jurisdiction of the
church would be final; and 2) the jurisdiction of the courts of this State would be contrary to the
First Amendment of the United States and the Constitution of this State. This exemption in no
way grants permission for any otherwise unlawful act under the guise of First Amendment
protection.
[7] This statute shall not be interpreted by any court to conflict with any federal treaty or other
international agreement to which the United States is a party to the extent that such treaty or













































ᶜAqd al-nikāḥ: Meaning “marriage contract” in Arabic
ᶜAql: Meaning “reason” in Arabic, refers to the use of reason to derive Islamic principles, which 
replaces qiyas in Shi’i jurisprudence. Also one of the aims of the Sharia.
ᶜAwrah: Meaning “imperfection” in Arabic, refers to the part of a body one should not expose 
Bidᶜah: Meaning “origination” in Arabic, refers to new legal rulings introduced into the Sharia 
Bidᶜah ḥasanah: Meaning “good originations” in Arabic, refers to acceptable new legal rulings 
Bidᶜah sayᵓiah: Meaning “sinful originations” in Arabic, refers to unacceptable new legal rulings 
Daᶜwah: Meaning “call” in Arabic, refers to proselytization efforts
Dar al-Salām: Meaning “realm of peace” in Arabic, refers to the Islamicate world
Dhabīḥah: Meaning “slaughter” in Arabic
Dīn: Meaning “religion” in Arabic, one of the aims of the Sharia
Ghusl: Meaning “washing” in Arabic, refers to washing the corpse of a dead body
ᶜEid al-Aḍḥā: Meaning “feast of the sacrifice” in Arabic, refers to the holiest day of the Islamic 
calendar outside of Ramadan
Farḍ al-ᶜAyn: Meaning “individual duty” in Arabic, refers to actions that individuals are required 
to complete
Faskh: Meaning “cancel” in Arabic, it refers to the operation a woman takes to annul a marriage 
Farḍ al-Kifāyah: Meaning “sufficient duty” in Arabic, refers to actions society must fulfill 
Fatwa: Meaning “legal opinion” in Arabic
Filosofia: Jewish philosophy
Fiqh: Meaning “reason” in Arabic, refers to the process of deriving the law in Islamic 
jurisprudence
Fiqh Al-Aqaliyyāt: Meaning “jurisprudence of the minority” in Arabic, refers to the special set of 
the Sharia applicable to Muslims living in majority non-Islamic countries
Fiṭrah: Meaning “nature” in Arabic, refers to the theological anthropology of the human person 
in Islam
Furūᶜ: Meaning “branches” in Arabic, refers to the practical rules that make up Islamic law
Ḥadūd: Meaning “limits” in Arabic, refers to the physical punishments enumerated in the Qur’an
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Halakhah: Jewish law
Hijrah: Meaning “flight” in Arabic, refers to emigration from a place to escape religious
persecution
Ḥilāl: Means “permissible” in Arabic, refers to actions that are licit under Islamic law
Ḥīlah: Means “trick” in Arabic, refers to legal strategies to make certain activities licit
ᶜIbādāt: Meaning “worship” in Arabic, refers to those aspects of Islamic law that cover the rules 
for worshipping God
Ifṭār: Meaning “break a fast” in Arabic, refers to the first meal of the day during Ramadan, which
happens after sundown
Ijmāᶜ: Meaning “consensus” in Arabic, refers to the consensus that makes a legal ruling binding
Ijtihād: Meaning “strive” in Arabic, refers to the level of knowledge and effort a jurist has in 
deriving Islamic legal rulings
Ijtihād fī al-Madhhab: Meaning “ijtihad in a school” in Arabic, refers to a jurist who must work 
within alegal school
Ijtihād al-Muṭlaq al-Muntassib: Meaning “absolute derived ijtihad” in Arabic, refers to a jurist 
who must based their efforts on the scholarly work of others
Ijtihād al-Muṭlaq al-Mustaqīl: Meaning “absolute independent ijtihad” in Arabic, refers to a 
jurist who is fully capable of deriving Islamic law on their own
ᶜIllah: Meaning “cause” in Arabic, refers to the grounds of an analogy
Istiḥsān: Meaning “preference” in Arabic, refers to the equitable act of preferring a weaker 
ruling to a better one in order to promote justice in the Sharia
Jihād: Meaning “struggle” in Arabic, refers to any effort made to fulfill a religious action
Khamr: Meaning “grape wine” in Arabic
Khulaᶜ: Meaning “to remove” in Arabic, refers to the annulment of a marriage
Khuṭbah: Meaning “speech” in Arabic, refers to the sermon given at main prayers on Fridays 
Maḥāḍar: Meaning “meeting” in Arabic, refers to religious schools in Mauritania
Mahr: Meaning “price” in Arabic, refers to the payment that husband must eventually make to 
his bride
Māl: Meaning “property” in Arabic, one of the aims of the Sharia
Maḥram: Meaning “forbidden” in Arabic, refers to an act proscribed by Sharia
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Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah: Meaning “aims of the Sharia” in Arabic, refers to the principles the Sharia 
protects
Maṣlaḥah (Mursalah): Meaning “public interest” in Arabic, refers to the equitable act of making 
a ruling concerning an issue that is not covered in the Qur’an or Sunnah
Maẓālim: Equity courts in medieval Islamic states
Mawlah: Meaning “client” in Arabic, refers to a tribal group’s adoption of an outsider into its 
fold
Mecelle: The Ottoman legal code
Misyār: Meaning “travelling” in Arabic, refers to a form of marriage conducted on a trip
Muᶜāmalāt: Meaning “interaction” in Arabic, refers to those aspects of Islamic law that cover the 
rules for interpersonal interactions
Nabīdh: Meaning “date win” in Arabic
Nafs: Meaning “self” in Arabic, one of the aims of the Sharia
Nasb: Meaning “lineage” in Arabic, one of the aims of the Sharia
Nikāḥ: Meaning “marriage” in Arabic
Nikāḥ mutᶜah: Meaning “marriage of pleasure” in Arabic, refers to a temporary marriage
Qiblah: Meaning “facing” in Arabic, refers to the point which Muslims face when they prayer, the 
Ka’ba in Mecca
Qiyās: Meaning “analogy” in Arabic, refers to the kind of analogical reasoning used in Islamic law 
Raḍāᶜah: Meaning “breast feeding” in Arabic
Ribā: Arabic for “loan interest”
Shirk: Meaning “association” in Arabic, refers to the association of God’s attributes to anything 
else
Tarāwīḥ: Meaning “watch by turns” in Arabic, refers to a set of prayers said at night during 
Ramadan
Tawḥīd: Meaning “unicity” in Arabic, refers to the oneness of anything, particularly of God 
Thawb: A long robe worn by men in the Middle East
ᶜUlūm al-Dīn: Meaning “religious sciences” in Arabic, refers to those disciplines in Islam by which 
one can know God
ᶜUrf: Means “custom” in Arabic, refers to customs that set legal norms under the Sharia
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Uṣūl al-Fiqh: Meaning “principles of jurisprudence” in Arabic, refers to the tools a jurist uses to 
derive Islamic legal rulings
Waḥdat al-wujūd: Meaning “unity of existence” in Arabic, a mystical term referring to the unity 
of creation in God
Waqf: Meaning “stoppage” in Arabic, refers to a charitable trust
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